Redeeming
Mathematics
Vern S. Poythress
A God-Centered
Approach
“Redeeming Mathematics is a valuable addition the growing literature on the relation-
ship between mathematics and Christian belief. Poythress’s treatment of three distinct
dimensions of mathematics—as transcendent abstract truths, as part of the physical
world, and as comprehensible to human beings—is a unique and helpful addition to
the conversation on this relationship. e book is accessible to nonspecialists, but
even those who are well-versed in these matters will nd much to interest and chal-
lenge them.”
James Bradley, Professor Emeritus of Mathematics, Calvin College; author,
Mathematics rough the Eyes of Faith; Editor, Journal of the Association of
Christians in the Mathematical Sciences
Redeeming Mathematics
Other Crossway Books by Vern S. Poythress
Chance and the Sovereignty of God: A God-Centered Approach to Probability
and Random Events
In the Beginning Was the Word: Language—A God-Centered Approach
Inerrancy and the Gospels: A God-Centered Approach to the Challenges of
Harmonization
Inerrancy and Worldview: Answering Modern Challenges to the Bible
Logic: A God-Centered Approach to the Foundation of Western ought
Redeeming Philosophy: A God-Centered Approach to the Big Questions
Redeeming Science: A God-Centered Approach
Redeeming Sociology: A God-Centered Approach
WHEATON, ILLINOIS
Redeeming
Mathematics
A God-Centered Approach
Vern S. Poythress
Redeeming Mathematics: A God-Centered Approach
Copyright ©2015 by Vern S. Poythress
Published by Crossway
1300 Crescent Street
Wheaton, Illinois 60187
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopy,
recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher, except as provided for
by USA copyright law.
Cover design: Matt Naylor
First printing 2015
Printed in the United States of America
Scripture quotations are from the ESV® Bible (e Holy Bible, English Standard Version®),
copyright ©2001 by Crossway. 2011 Text Edition. Used by permission. All rights reserved.
All emphases in Scripture quotations have been added by the author.
Trade paperback ISBN: 978-1-4335-4110-0
ePub ISBN: 978-1-4335-4113-1
PDF ISBN: 978-1-4335-4111-7
Mobipocket ISBN: 978-1-4335-4112-4
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Poythress, Vern S.
Redeeming mathematics : a God-centered approach /
Vern S. Poythress.
pages cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4335-4110-0 (trade paperback)
1.Bible—Evidences, authority, etc. 2.Mathematics—
Religious aspects—Christianity. 3.Mathematics in the
Bible. I.Title.
BS540.P69 2015
230—dc23 2014015579
Crossway is a publishing ministry of Good News Publishers.
VP 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Diagrams and Illustrations 9
Introduction: Why God? 11
Part I
Basic Questions
1 God and Mathematics 15
2 e One and the Many 29
3 Naturalism 35
4 e Nature of Numbers 42
Part II
Our Knowledge of Mathematics
5 Human Capabilities 57
6 Necessity and Contingency 63
Part III
Simple Mathematical Structures
7 Addition 73
8 e Idea of What Is Next 81
9 Deriving Arithmetic from Succession 87
10 Multiplication 92
11 Symmetries 96
12 Sets 100
Part IV
Other Kinds of Numbers
13 Division and Fractions 109
14 Subtraction and Negative Numbers 116
15 Irrational Numbers 121
16 Imaginary Numbers 126
17 Innity 129
Part V
Geometry and Higher Mathematics
18 Space and Geometry 135
19 Higher Mathematics 142
Conclusion 145
Supplements
Resources 149
Appendix A Secular eories about the Foundations of 151
Mathematics
Appendix B Christian Modications of Philosophies of 161
Mathematics
Appendix C Deriving Arithmetic 168
Appendix D Mathematical Induction 173
Appendix E Elementary Set eory 178
Bibliography 187
General Index 191
Scripture Index 199
Diagrams and Illustrations
Diagrams
4.1 Frame’s ree Perspectives on Ethics 44
4.2 2 + 2 = 4, Illustrated bySets 48
4.3 Multiple Relationships 53
5.1 Frame’s Square on Transcendence and Immanence 59
5.2 Frame’s Square with Explanations 60
5.3 Frame’s Square for Numbers 61
5.4 Frame’s Square for Knowing Numbers 62
8.1 GenealogicalTree 82
8.2 Clock Arithmetic 83
10.1 Area 94
11.1 Addition Harmony 99
15.1 Pythagorean eorem 122
18.1 X and YAxes 139
18.2 Addition within a Coordinate System 140
D.1 Dots in a Square 177
D.2 Squares and Dierences 177
Illustrations
11.1 SymmetricFace 96
11.2 Symmetric Starsh 97
11.3 Symmetric Cylinder 97
11.4 Symmetric Honeycomb 97
13.1 e Hotdog Problem 112
Introduction
Why God?
Does God have anything to do with mathematics? Many people have
never considered the question. It seems to them that the truths of math-
ematics are just “out there.”
1
In their view, mathematics presents us with
a world remote from religious questions. Some people think that God
exists; others are convinced that he does not; still others would say that
they do not know. But all of them might say, “It does not matter when we
look at mathematics.”
I think it does matter. In this book I intend to show why. I am work-
ing from the conviction that we should honor and glorify God in all of
life: “So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory
of God” (1Cor. 10:31). e expression “whatever you do” includes our
thinking, and our thinking includes our thinking about mathematics. In
addition, I am a follower of Christ, and I acknowledge that Christ is Lord
of all.
2
If he is Lord of all, he is also Lord of mathematics. But what does
that mean? We will try to work out the implications.
I am writing primarily to people who follow Christ, who have come to
know him as the living Savior and who have put their faith in him. ey
nd out from the Bible that Christ himself teaches that the Old Testament
1
Other people think that arithmetic truths are “in here,” that is, that they are items of mental furniture. We
certainly do have mental concepts concerning mathematics. But, as we shall see later, mathematics ought not
to be reduced to this pole of subjective experience.
2
I have been encouraged here by Abraham Kuyper, who challenged people to think about the universal lord-
ship of Christ in Lectures on Calvinism: Six Lectures Delivered at Princeton University under Auspices of the
L. P. Stone Foundation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1931). See Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy: A
God-Centered Approach to the Big Questions (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2014), appendix A.
12 Introduction
is the word of God, God’s own speech to us in written form (see especially
Matt. 5:17–18; 19:4–5; John 10:35). e Old Testament predicts the com-
ing of Christ (see, for example, Isa. 9:6–7; 11:1–5; 53:1–12; Mic. 5:2). It
also makes provision for later prophets (Deut. 18:15–22). Aer Christ
completed his work on earth, the New Testament was written with the
same authority as the Old Testament. So I am going to draw on the Bible
for understanding who God is, and in addition for understanding what
mathematics is.
3
If you are not yet a follower of Christ, you are still welcome to read. I
hope it will be informative for you to learn what are the implications of
the Bible for mathematics. But if you are going to appropriate the truth
for yourself, you will rst of all have to come to terms with Christ. You
should ask who he is and what he has to say about you and the way you
live your life. I would recommend that you start by reading the part of
the Bible consisting in the Gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John).
3
For extended discussion of the nature of the Bible, many books are available. See especially John M. Frame,
e Doctrine of the Word of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2010). For a discussion of the
broader set of commitments with which to study the Bible, see Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy; and Vern
S. Poythress, Inerrancy and Worldview: Answering Modern Challenges to the Bible (Wheaton, IL: Crossway,
2012).
Part I
Basic Questions
1
God and Mathematics
Let us begin with numbers. We can consider a particular case: 2 + 2 =
4. at is true. It was true yesterday. And it always will be true. It is true
everywhere in the universe. We do not have to travel out to distant galax-
ies to check it. Why not? We just know. Why do we have this conviction?
Is it not strange? What is it about 2 + 2 = 4 that results in this conviction
about its universal truth?
1
All Times and All Places
2 + 2 = 4 is true at all times and at all places.
2
We have classic terms to
describe this situation: the truth is omnipresent (present at all places) and
eternal (there at all times). e truth 2 + 2 = 4 has these two character-
istics or attributes that are classically attributed to God. So is God in our
picture, already at this point? We willsee.
Technically, God’s eternity is usually conceived of as being “above”
or “beyond” time. But words like “above” and “beyond” are metaphori-
cal and point to mysteries. ere is, in fact, an analogous mystery with
respect to 2 + 2 = 4. If 2 + 2 = 4 is universally true, is it not in some sense
“beyond” the particularities of any one place ortime?
Moreover, the Bible indicates that God is not only “above” time in the
1
Some relativists and multiculturalists might claim that even the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is “relative” to culture. But
in their practical living they show that they are condent about such truths.
2
e subsequent analysis of the truth borrows ideas and wording from Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science:
A God-Centered Approach (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), chapters 1 and 14.
16 Basic Questions
sense of not being subject to the limitations of nite creaturely experience
of time, but is “in” time in the sense of acting in time and interacting with
his creatures.
3
Similarly, 2 + 2 = 4 is “above” time in its universality, but
“in” time through its applicability to each particular situation. Two apples
plus two more apples is four apples.
Divine Attributes of Arithmetical Truth
e attributes of omnipresence and eternity are only the beginning. On
close examination, other divine attributes seem to belong to arithmetical
truths.
Consider. If 2 + 2 = 4 holds for all times, we are presupposing that it
is the same truth through all times. e truth does not change with time.
It is immutable.
Next, 2 + 2 = 4 is at bottom ideational in character. We do not literally
see the truth 2 + 2 = 4, but only particular instances to which it applies:
two apples plus two apples. e truth that 2 + 2 = 4 is essentially immate-
rial and invisible, but is known through manifestations. Likewise, God
is essentially immaterial and invisible, but is known through his acts in
the world.
Next, we have already observed that 2 + 2 = 4 is true. Truthfulness is
also an attribute ofGod.
The Power of Arithmetical Truth
Next, consider the attribute of power. Mathematicians make their formu-
lations to describe properties of numbers. e properties are there before
the mathematicians make their formulations. e human mathematical
formulation follows the facts and is dependent on them. An arithmetical
truth or regularity must hold for a whole series of cases. e mathemati-
cian cannot force the issue by inventing a new property, say that 2 + 2
= 5, and then forcing the universe to conform to his formulation. (Of
course, the written symbols such as 4 and 5 that denote the numbers
could have been chosen dierently. And a mathematician can dene a
3
John M. Frame, e Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2002), 543–575.
God and Mathematics 17
new abstract object to have properties that he chooses. But we do not
“choose” the properties of natural numbers.) Natural numbers conform
to arithmetical properties and laws that are already there, laws that are
discovered rather than invented. e laws must already be there. 2 + 2 =
4 must actually hold. It must “have teeth.” If it is truly universal, it is not
violated. Two apples and two apples always make four apples. No event
escapes the “hold” or dominion of arithmetical laws. e power of these
laws is absolute, in fact, innite. In classical language, the law is omnipo-
tent (“all powerful”).
2 + 2 = 4 is both transcendent and immanent. It transcends the crea-
tures of the world by exercising power over them, conforming them to its
dictates. It is immanent in that it touches and holds in its dominion even
the smallest bits of this world.
4
2 + 2 = 4 transcends the galactic clusters
and is immanently present in the behavior of the electrons surrounding
a beryllium nucleus. Transcendence and immanence are characteristics
ofGod.
The Personal Character of Law
Many agnostics and atheists by this time will be looking for a way of
escape. It seems that the key concept of arithmetical truth is beginning
to look suspiciously like the biblical idea of God. e most obvious es-
cape, and the one that has rescued many from spiritual discomfort, is to
deny that arithmetical truth is personal. It is just there as an impersonal
something.
roughout the ages people have tried such routes. ey have con-
structed idols, substitutes for God. In ancient times, the idols oen had
the form of statues representing a god—Poseidon, the god of the sea, or
Mars, the god of war. Nowadays in the Western world we are more so-
phisticated. Idols now take the form of mental constructions of a god or
a God-substitute. Money and pleasure can become idols. So can “human-
ity” or “nature” when it receives a person’s ultimate allegiance. “Scientic
4
On the biblical view of transcendence and immanence, see John M. Frame, e Doctrine of the Knowledge
of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1987), especially 13–15; and Frame, Doctrine of God,
especially 107–115. On the relationship to cosmonomic philosophy, see Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy,
appendix A.
18 Basic Questions
law,” when it is viewed as impersonal, becomes another God-substitute.
Arithmetical truth, as a particular kind of scientic law, is also viewed
as impersonal. In both ancient times and today, idols conform to the
imagination of the one who makes them. Idols have enough similarities
to the true God to be plausible, but dier so as to allow us comfort and
the satisfaction of manipulating the substitutes that we construct.
In fact, however, a close look at 2 + 2 = 4 shows that this escape route
is not really plausible. Law implies a law-giver. Someone must think the
law and enforce it, if it is to be eective. But if some people resist this
direct move to personality, we may move more indirectly.
Scientists and mathematicians in practice believe passionately in the
rationality of scientic laws and arithmetical laws. We are not dealing
with something totally irrational, unaccountable, and unanalyzable, but
with lawfulness that in some sense is accessible to human understanding.
Rationality is a sine qua non for scientic law. But, as we know, rationality
belongs to persons, not to rocks, trees, and subpersonal creatures. If the
law is rational, as mathematicians assume it is, then it is also personal.
Scientists and mathematicians also assume that laws can be ar-
ticulated, expressed, communicated, and understood through human
language. Mathematical work includes not only rational thought but
symbolic communication. Now, the original law, the law 2 + 2 = 4 that is
“out there,” is not known to be written or uttered in a human language.
But it must be expressible in language in our secondary description. It
must be translatable into not only one but many human languages. We
may explain the meaning of the symbols and the signicance and applica-
tion of 2 + 2 = 4 through clauses, phrases, explanatory paragraphs, and
contextual explanations in human language.
Arithmetical laws are clearly like human utterances in their ability to
be grammatically articulated, paraphrased, translated, and illustrated.
5
Law is utterance-like, language-like. And the complexity of utterances
that we nd among mathematicians, as well as among human beings in
general, is not duplicated in the animal world.
6
Language is one of the
5
Vern S. Poythress, “Tagmemic Analysis of Elementary Algebra,” Semiotica 17/2 (1976): 131–151.
6
Animal calls and signals do mimic certain limited aspects of human language. And chimpanzees can be
taught to respond to symbols with meaning. But this is still a long way from the complex grammar and mean-
God and Mathematics 19
dening characteristics that separates man from animals. Language, like
rationality, belongs to persons. It follows that arithmetical laws are in
essence personal.
7
The Incomprehensibility of Law
In addition, law is both knowable and incomprehensible in the theologi-
cal sense. at is, we know arithmetical truths, but in the midst of this
knowledge there remain unfathomed depths and unanswered questions
about the very areas where we know the most. Why does 2 + 2 = 4 hold
everywhere?
e knowability of laws is closely related to their rationality and their
immanence, displayed in the accessibility of eects. We experience in-
comprehensibility in the fact that the increase of mathematical under-
standing only leads to ever deeper questions: “How can this be?” and
“Why this law rather than many other ways that the human mind can
imagine?” e profundity and mystery in mathematical discoveries can
only produce awe—yes, worship—if we have not blunted our perception
with hubris (Isa. 6:9–10).
Are We Divinizing Nature?
But now we must consider an objection. By claiming that arithmetical
laws have divine attributes, are we divinizing nature? at is, are we tak-
ing something out of the created world and falsely claiming that it is
divine? Are not arithmetical laws a part of the created world? Should we
not classify them as creature rather than Creator?
8
I suspect that the specicity of arithmetical laws, their obvious
ing of human language. See, e.g., Stephen R. Anderson, Doctor Dolittle’s Delusion: Animals and the Uniqueness
of Human Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
7
In their ability to undergo transformation and reformulation, scientic laws also show an analogy with
the ability of human language to represent multiple perspectives. For more on the language-like character
of scientic law and mathematics, see Vern S. Poythress, “Science as Allegory,” Journal of the American Sci-
entic Aliation
35/2 (1983): 65–71, http:// www .frame -poythress .org /science -as -allegory/, accessed June
18, 2014; Vern S. Poythress, “Newton’s Laws as Allegory,” Journal of the American Scientic Aliation 35/3
(1983): 156–161, http:// www .frame -poythress .org /newtons -laws -as -allegory/, accessed June 18, 2014; Vern S.
Poythress, “Mathematics as Rhyme,” Journal of the American Scientic Aliation 35/4 (1983): 196–203, http://
www .frame -poythress .org /mathematics -as -rhyme/, accessed June 18, 2014.
8
In conformity with the Bible (especially Genesis 1), we maintain that God and the created world are distinct.
God is not to be identied with the creation or any part of it, nor is the creation a “part” of God. e Bible
repudiates all forms of pantheism and panentheism.
20 Basic Questions
reference to the created world, has become the occasion for many of us
to infer that these laws are a part of the created world. But such an infer-
ence is clearly invalid. e speech describing a buttery is not itself a
buttery or a part of a buttery. Speech referring to the created world is
not necessarily an ontological part of the world to which it refers.
e Bible indicates that God rules the world through his speech.
9
He
speaks, and it isdone:
By the word of the L the heavens were made,
and by the breath of his mouth all their host. (Ps. 33:6)
For he spoke, and it came to be;
he commanded, and it stood rm. (Ps. 33:9)
And God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light. (Gen.1:3)
God also continually sustains the world by his word: “he upholds the
universe by the word of his power” (Heb. 1:3). God’s word has divine
wisdom, power, truth, and holiness. It has divine attributes, because it
expresses God’s own character. God expresses rather than undermines
his own deity when he speaks words that address the created world.
We may then conclude that the same principle applies in particular
to numerical truths about the world. God governs everything, including
numerical truth. His word species what is true. e apples in a group
of four apples are created things. What God says about them is divine. In
other words, his word species that 2 + 2 =4.
e key idea that the law for the world is divine is even older than
the rise of Christianity. Even before the coming of Christ people noticed
profound regularity in the government of the world and wrestled with
the meaning of this regularity. Both the Greeks (especially the Stoics)
and the Jews (especially Philo) developed speculations about the logos,
the divine “word” or “reason” behind what is observed.
10
In addition the
Jews had the Old Testament, which reveals the role of the word of God in
creation and providence. Against this background John 1:1 proclaims, “In
9
See the discussion in Poythress, Redeeming Science, chapter 1.
10
See R. B. Edwards, “Word,” in Georey W. Bromiley et al., eds., e International Standard Bible Encyclope-
dia, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988), 4:1103–1107, and the associated literature.
God and Mathematics 21
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word
was God.” John responds to the speculations of his time with a striking
revelation: that the Word (logos) that created and sustains the universe
is not only a divine person “with God,” but the very One who became
incarnate: “the Word became esh” (1:14).
God said, “Let there be light” (Gen. 1:3). He referred to light as a part
of the created world. But precisely in this reference, his word has divine
power to bring creation into being. e eect in creation took place at a
particular time. But the plan for creation, as exhibited in God’s word, is
eternal. Likewise, God’s speech to us in the Bible refers to various parts
of the created world, but the speech (in distinction to the things to which
it refers) is divine in power, authority, majesty, righteousness, eternity,
and truth.
11
e analogy with the incarnation should give us our clue. e second
person of the Trinity, the eternal Word of God, became man in the incar-
nation but did not therefore cease to be God. Likewise, when God speaks
and says what is to be the case in this world, his words do not cease to
have the divine power and unchangeability that belong to him. Rather,
they remain divine and in addition have the power to specify the situa-
tion with respect to creaturely aairs. God’s word remains divine when
it becomes law, a specic directive with respect to this created world. In
particular, 2 + 2 = 4 remains a divinely ordained truth when it becomes a
specic directive with respect to four apples on the kitchen table.
The Goodness of Law
Is 2 + 2 = 4 morally good? An arithmetical truth is not directly a moral
precept. But indirectly it requires us to conform to it. We have an ethi-
cal constraint to believe the truth, once we have become convinced of
it. We can also say that in a wider sense it is “good” for the universe
and for us that 2 + 2 = 4. It never lies. We would not be able to live, nor
would the universe hold together, without the consistency of arithmeti-
cal truths.
11
On the divine character of God’s word, see Vern S. Poythress, God-Centered Biblical Interpretation (Phil-
lipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1999), 32–36.
22 Basic Questions
The Beauty of Law
Is 2 + 2 = 4 beautiful? I think so. But not everyone is good at seeing
the beauty in mathematics. I think there is beauty in the simplicity of 2
+ 2 = 4. It is in harmony with the world. It is beautiful that its truth is
displayed repeatedly, in four apples, four pencils, and four chairs. It is
beautiful in its harmony with other arithmetical truths, with which it
can be combined.
e beauty in arithmetic shows the beauty of God himself. ough
beauty has not been a favorite topic in classical expositions of the doc-
trine of God, the Bible shows us a God who is profoundly beautiful. He
manifests himself in beauty in the design of the tabernacle, the poetry
of the Psalms, and the elegance of Christ’s parables, as well as the moral
beauty of the life of Christ.
e beauty of God himself is reected in what he has made. We are
accustomed to seeing beauty in particular objects within creation, such
as a buttery or a loy mountain or a ower-covered meadow. But beauty
is also displayed in the simple, elegant form of some of the most basic
physical laws, like Newton’s law for force, F = ma, or Einstein’s formula
relating mass and energy, E = mc
2
. e same goes for the simple beau-
ties in arithmetic and the more profound beauties that mathematicians
discover in advanced mathematics.
The Rectitude of 2 + 2 = 4
Another attribute of God is righteousness. God’s righteousness is dis-
played preeminently in the moral law and in the moral rectitude of his
judgments, that is, his rewards and punishments based on moral law.
Does God’s rectitude appear in mathematics? e traces are somewhat
less obvious, but still present. People could try to disobey arithmetical
laws, for example, when they are trying to balance their checkbook. If
they do, they may suer for it. ere is a kind of built-in righteousness in
the way in which arithmetical laws lead to consequences.
In addition, the rectitude of God is closely related to the tness of his
acts. It ts the character of who God is that we should worship him alone
(Ex. 20:3). It ts the character of human beings made in the image of God
God and Mathematics 23
that they should imitate God by keeping the Sabbath (vv. 8–11). Human
actions tly correspond to the actions ofGod.
In addition, punishments must be tting. Death is the tting or
matching penalty for murder (Gen. 9:6). “As you have done, it shall be
done to you; your deeds shall return on your own head” (Obadiah 15).
e punishment ts the crime. ere is a symmetrical match between
the nature of the crime and the punishment that ts it.
12
In the arena of
arithmetical law we do not deal with crimes and punishments. But recti-
tude expresses itself in symmetries, in orderliness, in a “ttingness” to the
character of arithmetic. is “tness” is perhaps closely related to beauty.
God’s attributes are involved in one another and imply one another, so
beauty and righteousness are closely related. It is the same with the area
of arithmetical law. Arithmetical laws are both beautiful and “tting,”
demonstrating rectitude.
Law as Trinitarian
Does 2 + 2 = 4 specically reect the Trinitarian character of God? Phi-
losophers have sometimes maintained that one can infer the existence of
God, but not the Trinitarian character of God, on the basis of the world
around us. Romans 1:18–21 indicates that unbelievers know God, but
how much do they know? I am not addressing this dicult question, but
rather reecting on what we can discern about the world once we have
absorbed biblical teaching aboutGod.
God has specied by his word that 2 + 2 = 4. us, in its origin the
truth that 2 + 2 = 4 is a form of the word of God. Hence, it reects the
Trinitarian statement in John 1:1, which identies the second person of
the Trinity as the eternal Word. In John, God the Father is the speaker
of the Word, and God the Son is the Word who is spoken. John 1 does
not explicitly mention the Holy Spirit. But earlier Scriptures associate the
Spirit with the “breath” of God that carries the wordout.
“By the word of the L the heavens were made, and by the breath
of his mouth all their host” (Ps. 33:6). e Hebrew word here for breath is
12
See the extended discussion of just punishment in Vern S. Poythress, e Shadow of Christ in the Law of
Moses (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1995), 119–249.
24 Basic Questions
ruach, the same word that is regularly used for the Holy Spirit. Indeed, the
designation of the third person of the Trinity as “Spirit” (Hebrew ruach)
already suggests the association that becomes more explicit in Psalm 33:6.
Similarly, Ezekiel 37 evokes three dierent meanings of the Hebrew word
ruach, namely “breath” (vv. 5, 10), “winds” (v.9), and “Spirit” (v.14). e
vision in Ezekiel 37 clearly represents the Holy Spirit as the breath of God
coming into human beings to give them life. us all three persons of the
Trinity are present in distinct ways when God speaks his Word. e three
persons are therefore all present in God’s speech specifying that 2 + 2 =4.
We can come at the issue another way. Dorothy Sayers acutely ob-
serves that the experience of a human author writing a book contains
profound analogies to the Trinitarian character of God.
13
An author’s act
of creation in writing imitates the action of God in creating the world.
God creates according to his Trinitarian nature. A human author cre-
ates with an Idea, Energy, and Power, corresponding mysteriously to the
involvement of the three persons in creation. Without tracing Sayers’s
reections in detail, we may observe that the act of God in creation does
involve all three persons. God the Father is the originator. God the Son,
as the eternal Word (John 1:1–3), is involved in the words of command
that issue from God (“Let there be light”; Gen. 1:3). God the Spirit hov-
ers over the waters (v.2). Psalm 104:30 says that “when you send forth
your Spirit, they [animals] are created.” Moreover, the creation of Adam
involves an inbreathing by God that alludes to the presence of the Spirit
(Gen. 2:7). ough the relation among the persons of the Trinity is deeply
mysterious, and though all persons are involved in all the actions of God
toward the world, one can distinguish dierent aspects of action belong-
ing preeminently to the dierent persons.
2 + 2 = 4 stems from the activity of God, the “Author” of creation.
e activity of all three persons is therefore implicit in the very nature of
the truth 2 + 2 = 4. First, 2 + 2 = 4 involves a rationality that implies the
coherence of thought. is corresponds to Sayers’s term “Idea,” represent-
ing the plan of the Father. Second, in its application to the world, 2 + 2 =
4 involves an articulation, a specication, an expression of the plan, with
13
Dorothy Sayers, e Mind of the Maker (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1941), especially 33–46.
God and Mathematics 25
respect to all the particulars of a world. is specication corresponds
to Sayers’s term “Energy” or “Activity,” representing the Word, who is
the expression of the Father. ird, the expression of the truth that 2 +
2 = 4 involves holding created things responsible to its truth: it involves
a concrete application to creatures, bringing them to respond to the law
as willed by the Father. is corresponds to Sayers’s term “Power,” repre-
senting the Spirit.
14
God Showing Himself
ese relations are suggestive, but we need not develop the thinking fur-
ther at this point. It suces to observe that, in reality, the word specifying
that 2 + 2 = 4 is divine. We are speaking of God himself and his revelation
of himself through his governance of the world. People working with
mathematics rely on God’s word in order to carry out their work. When
we analyze what 2 + 2 = 4 really is, we nd that arithmetic constantly
confronts us with God himself, the Trinitarian God; we are constantly
depending on who he is and what he does in conformity with his divine
nature. In thinking about arithmetic, we are thinking God’s thoughts
aerhim.
15
But Do People Who Calculate Believe?
But do people who work with numbers really believe all this? ey do
and they do not. e situation has already been described in the Bible:
For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God
has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal
power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the
creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are
without excuse. (Rom. 1:19–20)
e heavens declare the glory of God,
and the sky above proclaims his handiwork.
14
See also John Milbank, e Word Made Strange: eology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), on
the Trinitarian roots of communication.
15
See Poythress, God-Centered Biblical Interpretation, 31–50.
26 Basic Questions
Day to day pours out speech,
and night to night reveals knowledge. (Ps. 19:1–2)
ey know God. ey rely on him. But because this knowledge is morally
and spiritually painful, they also suppress and distortit:
For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or
give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and
their foolish hearts were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they be-
came fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images
resembling mortal man and birds and animals and creeping things.
(Rom. 1:21–23)
Modern people may no longer make idols in the form of physical images,
but their very idea of arithmetical laws is an idolatrous twisting of their
knowledge of God. ey conceal from themselves the fact that the “law”
is personal and that they are responsible to the Person.
Even in their rebellion, people continue to depend on God being
there. ey show in action that they continue to believe in God. Corne-
lius Van Til compares it to an incident he saw on a train, where a small
girl sitting on her father’s lap slapped him in the face.
16
e rebel must
depend on God, and must be “sitting on his lap,” even to be able to engage
in rebellion.
Do We Christians Believe?
e fault, I suspect, is not entirely on the side of unbelievers. e fault
also occurs among Christians. Christians have sometimes adopted an
unbiblical concept of God that moves him one step out of the way of our
ordinary aairs. We ourselves may think of “scientic law” or “natural
law” or mathematics as a kind of cosmic mechanism or impersonal clock-
work that runs the world most of the time, while God is on vacation. God
comes and acts only rarely through miracle. But this is not biblical. “You
16
Cornelius Van Til, “Transcendent Critique of eoretical ought” (Response by C. Van Til), in Jerusalem
and Athens: Critical Discussions on the eology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (n.l.:
Presbyterian & Reformed, 1971), 98. For rebels’ dependence on God, see Cornelius Van Til, e Defense of the
Faith, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1963); and the exposition by John M. Frame, Apologet-
ics to the Glory of God: An Introduction (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1994).
God and Mathematics 27
cause the grass to grow for the livestock” (Ps. 104:14). “He gives snow like
wool” (Ps. 147:16). Let us not forget it. If we ourselves recovered a robust
doctrine of God’s involvement in daily caring for his world in detail, we
would nd ourselves in a much better position to dialogue with atheists
who rely on that samecare.
Principles for Witness
In order to use this situation as a starting point for witness, we need to
bear in mind several principles.
First, the observation that God underlies the truth 2 + 2 = 4 does not
have the same shape as the traditional theistic proofs—at least as they
are oen understood. We are not trying to lead people to come to know
a God who is completely new to them. Rather, we show that they already
know God as an aspect of their human experience. is places the focus
not on intellectual debate but on being a full human being.
17
Second, people deny God within the very same context in which they
depend on him. e denial of God springs ultimately not from intellec-
tual aws or from failure to see all the way to the conclusion of a chain
of syllogistic reasoning, but from spiritual failure. We are rebels against
God, and we will not serve him. Consequently, we suer under his wrath
(Rom. 1:18), which has intellectual as well as spiritual and moral eects.
ose who rebel against God are “fools,” according to Romans1:22.
ird, it is humiliating to intellectuals to be exposed as fools, and it is
further humiliating, even psychologically unbearable, to be exposed as
guilty of rebellion against the goodness of God. We can expect our hear-
ers to ght with a tremendous outpouring of intellectual and spiritual
energy against so unbearable an outcome.
Fourth, the gospel itself, with its message of forgiveness and recon-
ciliation through Christ, oers the only remedy that can truly end this
ght against God. But it brings with it the ultimate humiliation: that my
restoration comes entirely from God, from outside me—in spite of, rather
17
Much valuable insight into the foundations of apologetics is to be found in the tradition of transcendental
apologetics founded by Cornelius Van Til. See Van Til, Defense of the Faith; and Frame, Apologetics to the
Glory of God.
28 Basic Questions
than because of, my vaunted abilities. To climax it all, so wicked was I that
it took the price of the death of the Son of God to accomplish my rescue.
Fih, approaching people in this way constitutes spiritual warfare.
Unbelievers and idolaters are captives to Satanic deceit (1Cor. 10:20; Eph.
4:17–24; 2ess. 2:9–12; 2Tim. 2:25–26; Rev. 12:9). ey do not get free
from Satan’s captivity unless God gives them release (2Tim. 2:25–26).
We must pray to God and rely on God’s power rather than the ingenuity
of human argument and eloquence of persuasion (1Cor. 2:1–5; 2Cor.
10:3–5).
Sixth, we come into this encounter as fellow sinners. Christians too
have become massively guilty by being captive to the idolatry in which
scientic and arithmetical law is regarded as impersonal. Within this cap-
tivity we take for granted the benets and beauties of science and math-
ematics for which we should be lled with gratitude and praise toGod.
Does an approach to witnessing based on these principles work itself
out dierently from many of the approaches that attempt to address intel-
lectuals? To me it appearsso.
2
The One and the Many
Numbers are related to an old philosophical problem, called the problem
of the one and the many. We can also describe it as the problem of unity
and diversity. How do unity and diversity t together? It is worthwhile
understanding a little about the problem.
1
The Philosophical Problem of One and Many
Philosophers in ancient Greece already confronted the problem. How
does the multiplicity of things that we observe relate to the unity of one
world and the unity belonging to every member of a particular class?
How does the unity of the class of cats relate to the particularity of Felix
the cat and each other cat? Parmenides and later Plotinus said that the
one was prior to the many.
2
But if we start with one thing, and it has no
dierentiation, how can it dierentiate later or lead to the observed dif-
ferences among things in the world? Heraclitus and the atomists said that
the many were prior to the one. But if we start with many things, how can
they then be related to one another, and why do they exhibit the common
characteristics of belonging to one class (like the class of cats)?
1
See Cornelius Van Til, e Defense of the Faith, 2nd ed., rev. and abridged (Philadelphia: Presbyterian &
Reformed, 1963), 25–26; Vern S. Poythress, Logic: A God-Centered Approach to the Foundation of Western
ought (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2013), chapter 18.
2
I simplify. Parmenides and Heraclitus are widely known for their contrasting positions on the nature of
change. Parmenides said that what was real never changed, and thus change was an illusion. Heraclitus said
that everything changed. ese two positions exhibit the problem of the one and the many within the frame-
work of time. Later philosophers focused on the problem of the one and the many as exhibited in classes of
things. What is common to everything in a class is the one; the many members of the class are the many.
Which is logically prior, catness (the one) or a plurality of cats (the many)?
30 Basic Questions
Medieval philosophy continued to consider the question. On one side
of the dispute were philosophical realists. ese people said that universal
categories like the category cat or horse were real. (is kind of realism
should not be confused with other modern views called by the same
name.) Like the followers of Plato, they thought that the categories existed
prior to any particular cats or horses. e categories were like original
patterns or archetypes. ey were the universal patterns that explained
why all cats share common features. Each cat, when it came into exis-
tence, conformed to the prior pattern of the universal category, which
might be called catness.
Medieval realism started with the unity of a category. So how did it
explain diversity? e medieval philosophers believed in God, so they
believed that God creates each cat. He uses the same pattern, namely
catness. But if he uses the same pattern, why does each cat not come
out exactly the same, like candies made using the same mold (the same
pattern)? Even candies made with the same mold show minute dier-
ences, which may be due to imperfect mixing of the ingredients, or slight
dierences in the making process. So a person could try to say that the
cats are dierent because the matter used to make them is dierent, or
the making process shows slight dierences. But this explanation just
pushes the problem back in time. What generated the dierences in the
matter? What generated the dierences in the processes? e processes
presumably have a universal category to describe the unity that belongs
to them. So what leads to the dierences when we compare two instances
of the same process?
Opposite to the medieval realists were the nominalists. ey said that
the many was prior to the one. We start out with many cats in the world.
en we give them a common name, the name cat. According to the
nominalists, the name is nothing but a name. (e word nominalism is
cognate to the Latin word nomen, which means “name”). A name like
cat does not label a universal category that is out there in the world. e
category of catness is only in here in our minds. We have invented it. And
its invention depends on the prior existence of the many cats out there.
Clearly, nominalists think that the diversity of cats is rst, and the unity
of the category is derived.
The One and the Many 31
Nominalism had the opposite problem from realism. Its problem was
to account for the unity. We start with many cats. Why is there anything
in common between the many cats, any commonality that would lead us
to group them all under a single category of “cat”? Nominalism suggested
that the category is our invention, corresponding to nothing out in the
world. It is simply an idea. It is an illusion. Or, if a nominalist did not want
to go this far, he could say more guardedly that the unity is a secondary
construction, based on the primary reality of the diversity of cats. But if
we start with pieces that are purely diverse, how can we later create unity?
Even if the unity is pure illusion, we need to explain where the unity in
the illusion came from. Moreover, it is not plausible to claim that there is
nothing “really” similar about the dierentcats.
Unity and Diversity in the Trinity
According to Trinitarian thinking, the unity and diversity in the world
reect the original unity and diversity in God. First, God is one God.
He has a unied plan for the world. e universality of the truth 2 + 2 =
4 reects this unity. God is also three persons, the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit. is diversity in the being of God is then reected in the
diversity in the created world. e many instances to which 2 + 2 = 4
applies express this diversity: four apples, four pencils, four horses, etc.
God is the original, while the unity and diversity in the created world are
derivative. So we may say that God is the archetype, the original pattern,
while the instances of unity and diversity in the created world are ectypes,
derived from and dependent on the archetype.
We can put it in another way. God governs the world by speaking
(chapter1). God has both unity and diversity. So when he speaks—
through the Word of God, who is the second person of the Trinity—his
speech has unity and diversity. e unities in God’s speech specify the
unities in the world that he has made; its diversities specify the diversities
in the world that he hasmade.
We can also illustrate unity and diversity in a third way. e unity of
God’s plan has a close relation to the Father, the rst person of the Trinity,
who is the origin of this plan. e Son, in becoming incarnate, expresses
32 Basic Questions
the particularity of manifestation in time and space. He is, as it were, an
instantiation of God. us he is analogous in his incarnation to the fact
that the universal law 2 + 2 = 4 expresses itself in particular instances
like four apples.
What is the role of the Holy Spirit? In addition to other roles, the
Holy Spirit expresses by his presence the fellowship between the Father
and the Son (John 3:34–35). His role in fellowship has been termed the
associational aspect.
3
e Holy Spirit is the archetype for the associational
aspect. A universal law like 2 + 2 = 4 and the particular instances, like
four apples, also enjoy a relation of association. e one inheres in the
other. In general terms, the associational relation between the one and the
many that instantiate the one is an ectypal associational relation.
The Numerical Character of the World
God’s plan is the source for the numerical character of the world, as it is
the source for every aspect of the world. God’s plan is consistent with his
character and reects his character. He is Trinitarian in his character, and
so his plan exhibits unity and diversity, and the unity and diversity in the
world arise as a result.
In God we nd the foundation for numbers. In the world that God
has created, we sometimes deal with one, two, three, four, or more apples.
Why? Because there are many apples in the world. e apples have diver-
sity. ey also have unity. ey all belong to one class, the class of apples.
When we have four apples on the table, and we wish to count how
many there are, we have already made the decision to treat all the apples
on the table as members of one class, the class consisting of the apples
on the table. is class has its own unity and diversity. It has the unity of
being one class, and the diversity of the four apples in the class. e four
apples belong to one class, exhibiting the associational aspect. Counting is
possible only when we have the unity of one class (the four apples taken
together), the diversity of members in the class (each apple), and an as-
sociational relation of belonging: that is, the individual apples belong
3
See the further discussion in Vern S. Poythress, “Reforming Logic and Ontology in the Light of the Trinity:
An Application of Van Til’s Idea of Analogy,” Westminster eological Journal 57/1 (1995): 187–219, reprinted
in Poythress, Logic, appendix F5; Poythress, Logic, chapter 18.
The One and the Many 33
together with the other apples on the table, and they all belong to the
same class.
In sum, in our everyday experience, the very idea of number de-
pends on features of the world that embody unity, diversity, and asso-
ciations. God is the archetype for unity and diversity and association.
What we see in the world is the eect of God’s word, expressing his
plan and his character. He has made the world with ectypal unity and
diversity. e combination of these gives us the numerical character of
the world.
We have collections of one, two, three, four, or more apples. And
we have collections of one or more pears or peaches or pencils. Every
class of four apples is an instantiation of the idea of “having four mem-
bers.” e number four expresses the commonality among all instances
of four apples, peaches, and the like. In this respect, the number four is
the one, showing the unity belonging to all the instances. e instances
are the many, showing the diversity. e relation between the unity of the
number four and the diversity of four apples or peaches or pencils is an
associational relation. us the number four depends on the unity and
diversity in the Trinity.
e same, of course, is true of any other natural number: one, two,
three, four, and so on. Each number, such as 114, is a unity, and the col-
lections of 114 apples or 114 peaches are diverse instantiations of the
unity.
Now we can notice another unity in diversity and diversity in unity.
All the natural numbers together have a unity. ey are all natural num-
bers! And they have a diversity: each one, such as 114, is distinct from
the others.
All of this is so natural, so ordinary, that we are accustomed to taking
it for granted. But we can thank God for it. God made it so. Because God
is stable, faithful, and consistent with himself, the numbers are stable
and the relations of unity and diversity are stable. We live in a world,
rather than an absolute chaos. More specically, God made it so by his
word, specifying that it would be so. God speaks. He speaks according to
his Trinitarian character. Numbers reect his character. By reecting his
character, they show us who Godis:
34 Basic Questions
For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God
has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eter-
nal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since
the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. (Rom.
1:19–20)
3
Naturalism
e problem of the one and the many has a long history. But is it still
meaningful in our day? Many people would say that it is not. It seems
to them like an articial problem. ey might say that it was a question
that occupied philosophers before we really understood the nature of
the world. But we do not need such things now. We have science to give
us answers.
Science gives us fascinating insights and shows its usefulness through
the technological spin-os that we enjoy. But does science give us answers
to the most fundamental questions? It does only if we extrapolate science
beyond its core achievements.
The Difference between Limited Science and Naturalism
In the Western world of our day, the philosophy of naturalism or materi-
alism
1
has come to have a wide inuence. Materialism says that the world
consists in matter and energy and motion. It says that there is no God. Or
if some kind of god exists, he is irrelevant.
Naturalism or materialism gains prestige from science. Science, it is
said, tells us the way things really are. It tells us that the universe all boils
1
e term naturalism is sometimes used more broadly to describe any philosophy that says that the world
of “nature” is all that there is. (is view implies that there is no God.) Materialism is a particular form of
naturalism that says that nature reduces to matter and motion. For simplicity, we are using the two terms as
virtual synonyms. To complicate matters further, the word materialism is also used to describe a commitment
to and fascination with money and material things. is kind of commitment is a serious problem in our time,
but is outside the scope of our discussion.
36 Basic Questions
down to matter and energy and motion. But this kind of argument fails
to notice a gap between two conceptions of science. In the rst concep-
tion, science as a discipline connes its attention to matter and energy
and motion, in order to study them in depth. Matter and energy and
motion—and complex arrangements of them into biological cells and
geological formations and stars—become the focus of study.
en, in a second conception of “science,” this focus for science is
postulated to be the only thing that really exists. According to this sec-
ond conception, “science” tells us that the universe is matter and energy
and motion and nothing more. But in the process, the word science has
changed its meaning. People have imported into the meaning a philo-
sophical assumption, namely the assumption that the chosen focus for
the practice of science is the only legitimate focus, and that it leaves out
nothing that is important. is conclusion is not actually the product
of detailed investigations into chemistry or star formation. It is an extra
hidden assumption. It can never really be justied by detailed scientic
experimentation, because such experimentation already presupposes the
limited focus on matter. In the nature of the case, it cannot make pro-
nouncements about that which it has not studied.
Science as Focused
Does science with a limited focus answer the problem of the one and the
many? No, because the problem of the one and the many is a philosophi-
cal problem that is deeper than science. Scientic investigation starts with
the assumption that the world is both unied and diverse. Typical ex-
perimental science uses the assumption repeatedly. A scientist compares
a single experiment on a single bit of matter to other experiments of the
same kind on other bits of matter. at is one of the principles about re-
peating experiments. But to repeat an experiment, the scientist has to rely
on the fact that it is identiable as the same experiment. ere must be a
basic unity. At the same time, the repetition implies that there are two or
more instances of the experiment. e multiple instances show diversity.
e dierent instances represent the many. e scientist thus is using the
interlocking of one and many. He presupposes it rather than explainingit.
Naturalism 37
Materialism Trying to Answer the Problem
Materialism is the philosophical extension of science that says that there
is nothing except matter and energy and motion. Can materialism answer
the problem of the one and themany?
On one level, materialism says that human beings evolved in such a
way that they see the world as one and many. e one and the many come
about as part of our subjective perception. But is the world “out there”
actually one and many? Or it is merely that we “see” it that way? Is our
way of seeing just an accidental byproduct of mutations and chemistry
in our brains? Let us suppose that our way of seeing is an illusion. en
what about the repeated experiments that scientists perform? e idea
of a repeated experiment relies on the one and the many and their inter-
locking. us, the idea of a repeated experiment is also an evolutionary
illusion, and therefore the science that is built on this way of seeing is an
illusion. Since materialism claims to be built on science, materialism itself
is also an illusion. is is not good news for materialism.
In fact, most materialists think that the world “out there” is one and
many. At the level of material particles, there are many particles. And
particles of the same kind share common properties, which means that
there is a oneness or unity to all the particles of the samekind.
So where did the unity and diversity come from? Materialists would
say that it came from the Big Bang, which through complex quantum
mechanical processes led to the creation of a huge number of particles.
ere are dierent kinds of particles. At the level of particles that
make up atoms, there are three basic kinds of particles: protons, neutrons,
and electrons. ey all show some similarities in behavior (for example,
they all have a “spin” of 1/2). So there is unity. But the three types dier
as well. So there is diversity. ere is additional diversity because there
are huge numbers of particles of any one of these types.
Or we can go inside the protons and neutrons and say that each
proton and each neutron is made up of three quarks. e quarks (in
the current state of physical theory) are of six kinds (“avors”), named
whimsically “up,” “down,” “strange,” “charm,” “bottom,” and “top.” In ad-
dition, they come in three “colors.” We see unity in the fact that all these
38 Basic Questions
kinds are quarks, and diversity in the fact that there are dierent kinds
of quarks.
What, then, is the origin of this unity in diversity? Materialists have
no complete explanation for the Big Bang itself, the initial event. But
they would say that the laws of physics explain the unity and diversity in
particles that we see today. Given the Big Bang plus the laws of physics,
they would say that we can expect the unity and diversity among the par-
ticles. And this unity and diversity in the particles eventually gives rise to
unity and diversity at all the other levels, including the levels of ordinary
human observation. It sounds good, until we ask more questions.
Where do the laws of physics come from? As human formulations,
they contain massive unity and diversity built into them. is unity and
diversity comes from the ability of human beings to understand unity
and diversity in their minds. But physicists have arrived at the present
formulations by interacting with the world, which already had the unity
and diversity in its particles. e unity and diversity in the particles leads
to the unity and diversity in the formulation of the laws. And then these
laws are supposed to explain the unity and diversity in the particles! It
looks circular.
e obvious answer is to distinguish human formulations of the
laws from the laws themselves—the laws “out there,” governing the uni-
verse. e human formulations are chronologically subsequent to the
existence of the particles. e particles are chronologically subsequent
to the existence of the laws “out there.” So the laws “out there” explain
everythingelse.
What Explains the Laws?
e laws out there already display the interlocking of unity and diversity.
ere are at a low level several laws, one for each kind of particle. It is hoped
that physics can arrive at a nal, unied formulation, sometimes called “the
eory of Everything.” Even if it did, the theory would contain unity and
diversity within it. It would be one theory, and its oneness would exhibit
unity. At the same time, it would be a theory that applied to all the dier-
ent kinds of particles. e dierent kinds of particles represent diversity.
Naturalism 39
In addition, the diversity has to be present in another way. e very
conception of a physical “law” implies unity and diversity. Each law is a
unity. And each law applies to many particular instances of phenomena
in the world. e application represents its diversity.
It should be evident by now that physical explanations do not get rid
of the philosophical problem. ey just promote the problem to another
level. Instead of dealing with the problem on the level of ordinary human
experience, we “promote” it into a problem about material particles. en
we promote it from there to a problem about the nature of physicallaws.
If we focus on the laws “out there,” in distinction from our later
human formulations, the laws show the attributes of God, just as the
truth about 2 + 2 = 4 showed his attributes.
2
e presence of the inter-
locking of unity and diversity in the laws reects the archetypal unity and
diversity of God. We have not escaped God by promoting the problem
up into thelaws.
ere is an additional problem. For their formulation, the laws of
physics require mathematics—rather advanced mathematics. e ad-
vanced mathematics is built up, layer by layer, starting from conceptions
of number and space. e investigation of number has already turned
up the problem of unity and diversity in its midst. And of course our ex-
pression “layer by layer” implies multiple layers, which implies diversity
(more than one layer) and unity (a unity where higher layers build on and
are in harmony with lower layers). So if we explain the physics by using
mathematics, we have promoted the problem of unity and diversity one
more stage, into mathematics. We have not “solved”it.
In addition, we confront still another form of unity and diversity.
ere is unity between the mathematics that the physicists use and the
physics to which they apply it. e mathematics “works” when applied
to the real world. At the same time, the mathematics is not identical
with the physics. Some mathematics has direct physical application,
and some does not. Why does there exist a universe to which the math-
ematics applies?
e naturalist would say that the universe exists because of the Big
2
Poythress, Redeeming Science, chapter 1.
40 Basic Questions
Bang. But we are not really asking about the Big Bang. We are asking,
“Why is there such a thing as physical law, as distinct from a purely math-
ematical truth?” e Bible has a clear answer: God spoke the world into
existence. He specied laws that are in harmony with his character. e
inner harmony of his nature is reected in the harmony between math-
ematics and physics. By contrast, materialism has no answer. In material-
ism, the laws of physics have to function as a substitute forGod.
Materialism is an awkward philosophy. In its typical formulation, it
says that nothing exists except matter and energy and motion. But what
it really ought to say, at the very least, is that there is matter and energy
and motion, and in addition laws. e laws are neither matter nor energy
nor motion, but something else, an immaterial, conceptual something,
involving mathematics.
3
The Origin of Mathematics
Can we say that mathematics originated because there are multiple ob-
jects in the world? We as human beings learn mathematics with the help
of our minds, combined with help from an environment that contains
multiple objects. But combining our minds with our environment still
does not produce an adequate explanation for mathematics. To be sure,
we as human beings come to learn mathematics gradually. But the mate-
rialist has to have mathematics behind everything else. e mathematics
has to be there before the universe existed. And it has to be in harmony
with physical laws, that is, laws that are not merely mathematics but actu-
ally control what happens, should a universe ever come into existence. To
an ordinary observer, this combination of mathematics and physical laws
formulated in mathematics is a very complex combination of ideas. It is
ideas, not matter. It sounds highly immaterial, and highly nonnatural, in
the sense that the mathematics and the laws of physics are not just “part
of” nature. ey have to exist in order to call nature into existence in the
rst place.
In short, mathematics has to be there already, if the materialist is to
have any hope of constructing a plausible philosophy. If mathematics in
3
On materialism, see also Poythress, Inerrancy and Worldview, chapter 3 and pages 229–230.
Naturalism 41
fact testies to God, as we have argued in the previous chapters, material-
ism is hopeless.
Some people have hoped to give a more ultimate explanation for
mathematics itself by reducing it to logic. We will look at this attempt
later. For the moment, we can content ourselves by observing that, even
if this attempt could succeed, it would only push the problem of the one
and the many back into logic. Logic needs the one and the many to get its
foundations started. So this route does not solve the problem.
4
The Nature of Numbers
What is the nature of numbers? And what is the nature of the truths about
numbers, truths like 2 + 2 =4?
Arithmetic Specified by God’s Speech
We have already begun to answer the question by observing in chapter1
that the truth 2 + 2 = 4 has the attributes of God, such as omnipresence,
eternity, omnipotence, and truthfulness. God spoke the world into exis-
tence. As one aspect of his speech, he specied the numerical character of
the world. His speech reects his character. So the truths that he speaks
have his attributes.
But we can also see that truths like 2 + 2 = 4 are accessible to our
minds. And we can see that the truths have a bearing on the world around
us. Two apples plus two apples is four apples. e truth that 2 + 2 = 4 is
transcendent, in the way that God’s speech transcends the world. At the
same time, it is immanent. It holds for apples.
Perspectives on Realms
ree dierent realms come together when we look at 2 + 2 = 4, namely
the realm of transcendent law, the realm consisting in things within the
created world (apples), and the realm of our minds. ese three are in
harmony. To be sure, our minds are not infallible. We can make mistakes
in arithmetic. But we can also correct mistakes. And we know that there
The Nature of Numbers 43
are formulas that are correct and others that are not. We can come to
know that 2 + 2 = 4 and that 2 + 2 does not equal 5. When our minds are
in good working order, they match the transcendent law (2 + 2 = 4) and
they match realities about apples.Why?
God has ordained all three. He species the general truths (2 + 2 = 4).
He created the world with apples in it. And he created human beings with
minds. e three realms enjoy a fundamental harmony with one another,
because God is in harmony with himself and is consistent with himself.
He created a world that is consistent, according to hisplan.
Perspectives on Ethics
John Frame’s three perspectives on ethics can help us to appreciate this
harmony. Frame argues that we can approach questions in ethics from
at least three dierent perspectives, with three dierent starting ques-
tions.
1
e normative perspective asks what are the norms for ethics. It
focuses on God’s commandments, such as the Ten Commandments. e
situational perspective asks what promotes the glory of God within our
situation. e existential perspective, also called the personal perspective,
asks what our attitudes and motives should be. It focuses on us as persons.
According to the Bible, these three perspectives are in harmony be-
cause God ordains them all. He speaks the norms; he creates the situa-
tions; and he creates the persons who are in the situations. Not only are
they in harmony, but each points to and arms the other two. e norms
in Scripture tell us to love our neighbors, which is an attitude. So they tell
us to pay attention to our attitudes, which are the focus of the existential
perspective. And to love our neighbors in action, we have to assess the
situation and ask what actions would help them in their situation. So the
norms in the Bible push us to pay attention to the situation. Or suppose
that we start with the situation. We ourselves are in a sense in the situa-
tion, so we have to pay attention to our attitudes. is attention makes
us use the existential perspective. In addition, God is the most important
person in our situation. When we pay attention to God, we have to pay
1
John M. Frame, Perspectives on the Word of God: An Introduction to Christian Ethics (Eugene, OR: Wipf &
Stock, 1999); John M. Frame, e Doctrine of the Christian Life (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed,
2008).
44 Basic Questions
attention to his norms, what he desires our moral activity to look like.
When we pay attention to his norms, we are using the normative perspec-
tive. (See diagram4.1.)
Diagram 4.1: Frame’s Three Perspectives on Ethics
ese three perspectives are relevant not only for ethics, narrowly
conceived, but for all of life. All of life requires ethical responsibility.
When we use these perspectives on the whole world, we nd that we are
arming the observations we already made about 2 + 2 = 4. e equation
2 + 2 = 4 represents (1)a norm, (2)a truth about the world, and (3)a
truth that we as human beings can know. It involves all three perspec-
tives, normative (law), situational (the world), and existential (us). ese
three are in harmony.
Not only are they in harmony, but they lead to one another. Each im-
plies the other two. For example, the norm that 2 + 2 = 4 implies that two
apples plus two apples will always be four apples, in the world in which we
live. us the normative perspective implies the situational perspective
(which includes apples). In addition, the norm that 2 + 2 = 4 implies that
we as knowers should think in conformity with the truth 2 + 2 = 4. e
normative perspective implies the existential perspective.
Now let us start with the existential perspective. If we know that 2 + 2
= 4, using the existential perspective, we know that it is true even before
we knew it or any other human being was alive to know it. Our knowl-
edge implies transcendence. 2 + 2 = 4 is always true. It is a norm. us
the existential perspective, which starts with our acts of knowing, leads
The Nature of Numbers 45
to the normative perspective, which focuses on the transcendence of the
truths that we know. In addition, if we know that 2 + 2 = 4, we can infer
that two apples plus two applies is four apples. e existential perspec-
tive, which focuses on our knowing, leads to the situational perspective,
which focuses on apples.
Perspectives on Numbers
We can use the same three perspectives on a particular number, such as
two. It is easiest if we start with the situational perspective. e number
two has a relation to all the collections that have two things. ese col-
lections embody and illustrate the number two. We can consider two
apples, two pencils, two cats. ese collections are in the world. We notice
them when we use the situational perspective. e situational perspective
naturally leads to our seeing the number two as a tool for dealing in a
practical way with the collections of things in the world.
Second, let us consider the existential perspective. We as human be-
ings have to be able to think about two for any of these observations
about the world to be meaningful to us. We have the word two, and we
know how to use it. We can observe collections of two objects, and we
can think about what it means to say that there are two objects. We have
a general conception of the meaning of the word two. is conception
of two within our minds can be distinguished from the collections “out
there.” Yet it is also related to the collections. We understand the meaning
of two partly by considering its relations to the collections. In fact, this
relationship represents one instance of one and many, unity and diversity.
e unity here is the unity of the number two, a unity that exists in its ap-
plications to all the collections of two things. e diversity is the diversity
of the collections—apples, pencils, cats, and soon.
ird, let us consider the normative perspective on the number two.
e number two is common to all the collections of two things. It is the
same number. It represents a pattern of general thinking, and there are
norms for the pattern. e number two correctly describes some collec-
tions, but not others. And there are norms for the use of the number two
in relation to other numbers. e laws of arithmetic are norms. ese
46 Basic Questions
norms include all the arithmetic truths in which the number two appears.
e norms have to be distinct from our minds, because in our minds (or
in doing arithmetic on paper) we can make mistakes. e norms also
have to be distinct from the world, because they are general truths, not
just collections of two things in the world.
Other Perspectives on 2 + 2 = 4
We can use other perspectives to consider the richness of the world that
God has made. For example, we can consider 2 + 2 = 4 from the perspec-
tive of its relation to other truths internal to mathematics: other arith-
metic truths, truths about fractions, about multiplication (for example,
2 × 2 = 4), and truths in higher mathematics that rely on the basic truths
of arithmetic. All the truths of mathematics cohere in a harmoniousway.
Next, let us look at 2 + 2 = 4 from the perspective of experience in
time. We can count objects. Suppose that there are four apples on the
table, in two groups of two each. We count one group: one apple, two
apples. We count the second group: one apple, two apples. Having n-
ished, we count the whole collection: one, two, three, four. rough this
process we have veried that 2 + 2 = 4. is process shows that 2 + 2 =
4 has a relation to time and temporal development. In fact, the philoso-
pher Immanuel Kant claimed that human intuitive knowledge of number
originated from the perception oftime.
We can in fact distinguish two distinct perspectives that focus on
time. e rst is our subjective experience in time. We do counting in
time, and we have a subjective experience of the passage of time, which
includes the passage of moments of time or successive heart beats or
successive steps in walking. We are aware of the fact that we can count in
time. e second perspective is the perspective on the world. e world
“out there” has temporal organization.
2
We can also look at numbers from the perspective of space. e apples
on the table occupy dierent positions in space. From this perspective,
2
Immanuel Kant maintained that our subjective sense of temporal structure was derived from the categories
of our minds, rather than the nature of the world as it is in itself. For a critique of this approach, see Poythress,
Logic, appendix F1. Time manifests itself both subjectively (the existential perspective) and in the world (the
situational perspective).
The Nature of Numbers 47
the truth that 2 + 2 = 4 is illustrated by considering a single static picture
of four apples. ey lie there in two spatial groups of two. 2 + 2 = 4 means
that two apples in one spatial group, plus two apples in a second spatial
group, together make up a larger spatial group, and this larger group has
four apples. As with the perspective focusing on time, the perspective
focusing on space can be divided into two, depending on whether we
focus on our subjective perception of space (existential focus) or on the
organization of the world “out there” (situational focus). In addition, we
are aware of a norm: 2 + 2 = 4 always holdstrue.
Mathematics in the Physical Sciences
We can also look at numbers from the perspective of physical sciences.
e relation of numbers to time and space leads to the use of numbers in
the physical sciences: physics, astronomy, chemistry, geology, and biology.
Mathematics plays a powerful role in physics, astronomy, and chemistry
in particular. Numerical truths are constantly being used. In addition,
some kinds of sociology and experimental psychology use numbers and
statistics as an integral part of their investigation of regularities in human
thought and behavior.
Sets as a Perspective
Next, we can look at 2 + 2 = 4 from the perspective of sets. We have been
talking about collections of apples. Can we generalize the idea of a col-
lection? In mathematics, a set is an abstract generalization of our intuitive
idea of collections. In eect, we start with a collection, and then in our
minds “strip away” all the information except the information about what
the members of the collection are. In mathematics, a set whose elements
are 1 and 2 is represented by enclosing the list of elements in braces: {1, 2}.
e members or elements of a set are the items included in the collection.
us the set {1, 2} has members 1 and2.
Using sets, we can reexpress the truth that 2 + 2 = 4. As applied to
sets, it means that if we have a set with two elements, and a second set
with another two elements, which are distinct from the elements in the
48 Basic Questions
rst set, and then we make another set that contains all the elements from
both, this new set will have four elements.
For example, suppose that on the table we have distinct pieces of fruit:
one apple, one peach, one banana, and one pear. We group these fruits
into two sets. e rst set, which we call set A, has as its members the
apple and the peach: A = {apple, peach}. e second set, which we call set
B, has as its members the banana and the pear. B = {banana, pear}. From
these two sets we form a third set, T, which has as its members all the
members of A and B. T = {apple, peach, banana, pear}. is set is called
the set union of A and B. In general, the set union T of two sets A and B
includes all the members that are in either A or B or both. In the particu-
lar case we are considering, A and B have no common members. A and
B each have two members. e set union T has four. is fact illustrates
the principle that 2 + 2 = 4. (See diagram4.2.)
Diagram 4.2: 2 + 2 = 4, Illustrated by Sets
Are we just saying the same thing that we have already said? In some
ways it sounds the same. But we can see that the result, namely the fact
that the union T has four members, is independent of the details about
which kinds of fruit were on the table. We can see that 2 + 2 = 4 is true in
general, not just for a particular choice of fruits. We can do general rea-
soning about sets (ignoring the details about which fruits we are using, or
which members we are using that are not fruits, but vegetables or rocks or
other objects). e general reasoning about sets shows that the numerical
truths have general validity.
The Nature of Numbers 49
In fact, Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell used this very
route in order to try to derive the properties of numbers using logic as the
starting point.
3
From logic they proceeded to develop an idea of predi-
cates. (Predicates are abstract representations of properties like “is red” or
“is a mammal.”) Next, for each predicate they dened a class consisting of
the objects that have the property signied by the predicate. Two classes
represent the same number if their members can be put into one-to-one
correspondence. By this means numbers can be represented through the
classes.
Without endorsing Whitehead and Russell’s philosophy, we can use
logic as a perspective on numbers and a perspective on mathematics as
a whole. Much of higher mathematics today is presented using axioms
and deductions from axioms. e rigor of formal logic is used to provide
a rigorous basis for the mathematics that is presented. Mathematics is
indeed logical, and mathematicians can show how vast conclusions can
be deduced from simple axioms, appropriately chosen.
Next, we can use language as a perspective on mathematics. Math-
ematicians communicate using language. ey supplement ordinary lan-
guage with special mathematical symbols, so that mathematical results
are a product both of language in general and of the ability to produce
new symbols with special mathematical meanings. Even the symbols “+”
for “plus” and “=” for “equals,” which we use in the formula 2 + 2 = 4, are
special symbols. ere are many other mathematical symbols, some of
which are less well known because they are used only in specialized areas
or only in advanced mathematics. e special symbols are made possible
by the exibility of ordinary language, which allows us to supplement it
with newly invented symbols, and allows us to dene the meaning of the
new symbols. Mathematics can therefore be analyzed as a part of natural
language.
4
Axiomatic mathematics can also be analyzed as a kind of special-
ized language, a formal language, that has specialized rules for deriving
conclusions from premises. e perspective of formalized language is
3
Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1927).
4
Poythress, “Tagmemic Analysis of Elementary Algebra.”
50 Basic Questions
useful in analysis of mathematics, and is closely related to the perspec-
tive of logic.
5
Mathematics and Social Interaction
We can also consider the relation of mathematics to social interaction.
Before they learn arithmetic, children have already developed some basic
intuitions about numbers through interaction with the world, with their
parents, and with others. ey know that there is a dierence between
having two teddy bears and having one, and they may learn the names
for the rst few numbers—one, two, and three, and maybe more. Either
from parents or at school, they learn more through social interaction. e
teachers teach them some arithmetic, and they also interact with fellow
students both in the classroom and on the playground, where they may
sometimes play games that use numbers within the games.
Social interaction also takes place among professional mathemati-
cians. A mathematician may interact either with fellow mathematicians
or with scientists in physics, chemistry, computer science, or other sci-
ences in looking for suitable problems to solve, and in exploring how best
to solve them. If he develops a new approach to a mathematical problem,
or oers a proof of a new theorem, he interacts with mathematicians by
presenting the approach or the proof for their inspection. Sometimes
other mathematicians nd a gap or a problem in a proof, or even a coun-
terexample: the proposed proof fails. Mathematicians show their human
limitations in the fact that a single mathematician working by himself
may not see the gap that others nd later. Mathematics depends on social
interaction for verifying the work of individual mathematicians.
Teachers of mathematics must also pay attention to pedagogical is-
sues. How can they present concepts and methods in mathematics so that
they make sense to new students, and how can they give the students not
only facts and rules but insights and interest? How can a teacher bring
discipline and order into an unruly classroom, so that the students are
in an environment where they can concentrate on learning? How can
teachers motivate students who do not care whether they pass, and do
5
Poythress, Logic, chapters 55–57.
The Nature of Numbers 51
not see the point? People are complicated, and skill in teaching involves
much more than competence in knowing the subject-matter, in this case
competence in some area of mathematics.
6
Cultural Influence
We may also consider the inuence of mathematics on larger social and
cultural issues. Some people consider mathematics a key example of rig-
orous, clean thinking. So it becomes a model for how science should
proceed. Or it becomes a model for science in a second sense, that a
piece of science that uses numerical calculations has more prestige and
receives more attention and admiration than a piece that does not use
numbers. is eect can be observed in social sciences, where it biases
some practitioners to prefer to study only measurable or quantiable as-
pects of human interaction. e result may be that only what is measur-
able counts as scientically “signicant.” And then, if science is also the
model for all knowledge, only what is measurable counts as signicant for
all of life. is kind of tendency in thought does not reduce everything to
matter and motion, the way that materialist philosophy does, but rather
it reduces everything to quantity and measurement.
We may also ask what may be the inuence of a secularist conception
of mathematics. If our culture conceives of mathematics as existing out
there independent of God, and it thinks that God is irrelevant to math-
ematics, does this assumption tend to reinforce secularizing forces all
across society? If God is irrelevant to mathematics, then maybe he can be
made irrelevant to all other sectors of society, if we succeed in analyzing
them mathematically.
Harmony between Perspectives
God has ordained that numbers function in relation to all the perspectives
that we have considered—and more as well. He has ordained the truth
that 2 + 2 = 4 as a permanent, universal truth. He has also established it in
6
Helpful material on the social, pedagogical, and cultural aspects of mathematics can be found in Russell W.
Howell and W. James Bradley, eds., Mathematics in a Postmodern Age: A Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids,
MI/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2001).
52 Basic Questions
relation to many other truths: truths of arithmetic, truths in higher math-
ematics, truths in physical sciences, truths about collections of apples,
truths about people in their social interaction and pedagogy, and truths
about cultural inuence (see diagram 4.3). ese all enjoy harmony with
one another because they originate from one God who is in harmony
with himself.
In a philosophical approach informed by the God of the Bible, we
can enjoy the richness of the world. e world has many dimensions,
many complexities, and many beauties. We have no need to try to explain
the richness of the world by deriving it all from one aspect. We do not
need to say that arithmetic generates everything else in the world. Nor
do we need to say that logic generates everything. Or physical objects.
Everything is what it is. Everything is unique. And everything is related
to everything else. God’s plan and God’s rule over everything produces
both coherence and distinctiveness. e coherence and distinctiveness
represent another expression of the one (coherence) and the many (dis-
tinctiveness).
Nothing is reducible to anything else. Our approach opposes reduc-
tionism, the philosophical attempt to claim that one aspect of the world is
the most ultimate and that everything ought to be explained completely
from this one aspect. For further discussion of the general principle that
the world is rich and that reductionisms are inadequate, we must direct
people to the fuller discussion of what philosophy and metaphysics look
like when they are reformed by the Bible’s instruction.
7
For example, naturalism or materialism, which we discussed earlier
(chapter3), tries to reduce everything to the material or physical level.
It claims that everything is “really” matter and energy and motion. An-
other philosophy, called empiricism, tries to reduce everything to sense
experience. Still another philosophy, idealism, tries to reduce everything
to ideas in themind.
All of these reductionistic philosophies have diculties. e most
basic diculty is that things are dierent from one another. Even
though there is impressive harmony, nothing is really explained in all its
7
Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy.
The Nature of Numbers 53
Diagram 4.3: Multiple Relationships
54 Basic Questions
dimensions through a reductionism. e materialist claims that a rain-
bow is nothing but physical light rays acting according to physical laws of
refraction. But has he explained the beauty of the rainbow? e empiricist
says that the rainbow is nothing but visual sensations conveyed to the
brain from the retina and optic nerves. Has he explained the beauty? e
idealist says that everything is in our mind. But has he explained the ways
in which the world around us surprisesus?
Similar principles hold when it comes to explaining mathematics.
Philosophers of mathematics have attempted to explain the nature of
number and the nature of arithmetic truth. But most of these attempts
have been reductionistic (see appendix A). It is better to appreciate the
world as God made it. Numbers and arithmetic truths exist in relation-
ship to a whole world, and this world is multidimensional. God made it
that way. ere is no reason to ght against it, trying to imagine numbers
as they might be if they could be perfectly isolated from the world.
8
8
e analogous attempt to isolate logical truth from the world is discussed in Poythress, Logic.
Part II
Our Knowledge of
Mathematics
5
Human Capabilities
If we are to travel further in understanding the ways in which God is the
source for mathematics, we need to consider briey the nature of our
capabilities as human beings. What can we hope to understand about
God? Andhow?
e Bible indicates that God is Creator and we are creatures. He is
innite and we are nite. So we cannot understand him exhaustively. e
word comprehend is used in a technical sense in theology to express the
limits of human understanding. eologians say that we cannot compre-
hend God; that is, we cannot understand him completely, as he under-
stands himself. We can nevertheless know God—in fact, everyone does
know God, according to Romans 1:19–21, even those who are in rebel-
lion against him and are trying to suppress the knowledge.
The Image of God
e Bible indicates that God made man in his image (Gen. 1:26–27). We
are not merely products of a gradualistic, impersonalistic, purposeless
evolutionary process. Being made in the image of God implies that we
are like him. In Genesis 1 the Bible does not go into detail about all the
ways that we are like God. But from the rest of the Bible we can see that
there are many likenesses. We can reason; we have a sense of morality;
we can use language; we can make personal commitments; and so on.
Alongside many other capabilities, as human beings we are capable of
58 Our Knowledge of Mathematics
thinking God’s thoughts aer him. In particular, we can know that 2 + 2
= 4, a truth that is in God’s mind before it is inours.
Because of the distinction between Creator and creature, we can say
more specically that we think God’s thoughts aer him analogically.
Our thinking processes are not simply identical with God’s. And they do
not need to be. God knows everything because he knows himself and his
plans. We need to grow in knowledge. We need to observe things in the
world, and receive instruction from other people. rough fellowship
with God, and through fellowship with people whom God puts in our
path, God teaches us knowledge (Ps. 94:10; compare Job 32:8).
We need to arm both the similarities and the dierences between
God’s knowledge and ours. Let us use the example of 2 + 2 = 4 to do it.
God is the origin of the truth that 2 + 2 = 4. It is true because he speaks
it. We are receptive of its truth. God knows its meaning exhaustively, in
relation not only to its embodiments in four apples and four peaches, but
in relation to every other truth whatsoever. We know only some of these
relationships, and we know them partially. But we also know truly. 2 + 2
= 4 is indeed totally true, both for us and for God. It is true for us because
rst of all it is true forGod.
Transcendence and Immanence
We can go further in understanding human knowledge by using insights
from John Frame. John Frame produced a diagram, now called Frame’s
square, for summarizing God’s transcendence and immanence.
1
It expresses
the dierence between a Christian view of transcendence and immanence,
on the one hand, and a non-Christian view on the other. (See diagram5.1.)
e le-hand corners of the square, labeled 1 and 2, represent the
Christian understanding of transcendence (corner 1) and immanence
(corner 2), as taught in the Bible.
2
God’s transcendence means that he
has absolute authority, and that he controls the world. God’s immanence
means that he is present in the world.
1
John M. Frame, e Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1987), 14.
2
It is important to understand that many people today who would claim to be Christian are confused and
do not consistently think and live according to a Christian view of transcendence and immanence. In fact,
“Christian” teachers who represent modernist forms of Christianity may teach in accord with the right-hand
side of the square, the non-Christian view.
Human Capabilities 59
Diagram 5.1: Frame’s Square on Transcendence and Immanence
e two right-hand corners of the square, labeled 3 and 4, represent
the non-Christian understanding of transcendence (corner 3) and im-
manence (corner 4). Non-Christians dier among themselves. But much
non-Christian thinking maintains that God’s transcendence means he is
uninvolved (or even that he does not exist). He is remote. A non-Chris-
tian understanding of immanence says that God is identical with the
world or limited by the world. e two horizontal sides of the square
represent the fact that there are supercial similarities between the two
sides. ey can sound the same. Each can use the words transcendence
and immanence. Each side might sometimes say that God is “exalted”
(transcendence) or that he is “nearby” (immanence). But they mean dif-
ferent things, even when the language is similar. (See diagram5.2.)
e diagonals of the square represent contradictions. e non-Chris-
tian view of transcendence (corner 3), by saying that God is uninvolved,
contradicts the Christian view on immanence (corner 2), which says
that he is present and involved. e non-Christian view of immanence
(corner 4), by saying that God is subject to the limitations of the world,
contradicts the Christian view of transcendence (corner 1), which says
that he sovereignly controls the world and is not limited byit.
60 Our Knowledge of Mathematics
Diagram 5.2: Frame’s Square with Explanations
We can apply Frame’s square to the understanding of a particular
numerical truth, such as 2 + 2 = 4. According to a Christian view of
transcendence (corner 1), God’s authority stands behind the truth of 2 +
2 = 4. God controls numbers rather than being subject to them. Second,
according to a Christian view of immanence (corner 2), God through his
presence in the world holds the world to its conformity with the truth
2 + 2 = 4. Two apples plus two apples make four apples because God is
present with the apples, expressing his truth. God also is present in our
minds, so that we can come to know that 2 + 2 =4.
ird, according to a non-Christian view of transcendence (corner
3), God is uninvolved with numerical truth—numerical truth is just an
abstraction, just “out there” (or maybe just “in here,” if truth is completely
subjectivized). God is also uninvolved with apples. is non-Christian
view contradicts the Christian view of immanence (corner 2). Fourth, ac-
cording to a non-Christian view of immanence (corner 4), God is limited
by numbers. ey control him by restricting what he can do. He has no
Human Capabilities 61
authority over the truth that 2 + 2 = 4. is view contradicts the Christian
view of transcendence (corner 1). (See diagram5.3.)
Diagram 5.3: Frame’s Square for Numbers
Transcendence and Immanence in Issues of Knowledge
We can apply the same principles when we consider the issue of knowl-
edge. God knows that 2 + 2 = 4. And human beings know that 2 + 2 = 4.
What is the relationship?
According to a Christian view of transcendence (corner 1), God is the
original, authoritative source and knower of 2 + 2 = 4. He knows it ex-
haustively. According to a Christian view of immanence (corner 2), God
through his presence makes the truth 2 + 2 = 4 accessible to and known
to human beings, who know it derivatively and analogically.
According to a non-Christian view of transcendence (corner 3), God
does not exist or does not know anything or is uninvolved in human
knowing of 2 + 2 = 4. According to a non-Christian view of immanence
(corner 4), we as human beings can be the standard for knowing. Our
62 Our Knowledge of Mathematics
knowledge of 2 + 2 = 4, according to our own autonomous standards,
can be used to specify what God’s relation must be to the truth that 2 +
2 = 4. As usual, the non-Christian view contradicts the Christian view.
(See diagram5.4.)
Diagram 5.4: Frame’s Square for Knowing Numbers
Much more could be said about issues of human knowledge and the
human process of coming to know. We must leave that to other books.
3
It
is enough for the present for us to understand that human knowledge of
numerical truths, such as 2 + 2 = 4, derives from prior, archetypal divine
knowledge. It is imitative and analogical. God calls on us to praise him for
his innite knowledge, and to acknowledge his authority in knowledge.
is principle includes our knowledge that 2 + 2 = 4. We are to conduct
our lives and our thinking about mathematics in the light of God’s great-
ness and his being worthy of praise and glory.
3
See Frame, Doctrine of the Knowledge of God; Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy; Esther Lightcap Meek,
Longing to Know (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2003).
6
Necessity and Contingency
Now we focus on the question of whether mathematical truths are neces-
sary. Is it necessary that 2 + 2 = 4? Or is this truth something characteristic
only of the way that God created our universe? We may ask similar ques-
tions about other truths of mathematics, both truths about numbers and
truths in more advanced mathematics, such as calculus and group theory.
An Intuition of Necessity
As a rst intuitive reaction, many people might say that mathematical
truths are necessary. We could not imagine a world in which 2 + 2 = 4
was not true. Mathematical truths seem to be “basic” and not specic
to our universe. By contrast, the existence of apples or the existence of
physical laws like Newton’s laws of motion has a connection to the par-
ticular world in which we live. We could imagine a world where things
were vastly dierent.
Let us suppose that this intuition about necessity is correct, and that
mathematical truths are all necessary. en how does this necessity relate
toGod?
One route that people have tried is to conceive of this necessity as
something independent of God or even superior to God. Allegedly, God
is limited by the fact that he must conform to the truths of mathematics,
and that any world that he creates would have to conform to the truths
of mathematics.
64 Our Knowledge of Mathematics
But the idea of God being limited by mathematics makes mathemat-
ics superior to God, and in that respect it becomes a kind of “god above
God.” Its authority is more ultimate than God. If we follow the Bible’s
teaching about God, that will not do. God is the only Lord, the ultimate
Lord. How then could mathematical truths be an additional necessity?
Necessity and Contingency with Respect to God
We can nd an answer if we reect on the character of God. e Bible
indicates that God is omnipotent, all powerful. Sometimes people think
that omnipotence means that God could do anything at all, even some-
thing contradictory or something morally evil. But that is not right. God
cannot do anything that would violate his own character. For example,
he cannotlie:
God is not man, that he should lie,
or a son of man, that he should change his mind. (Num. 23:19)
... God, who never lies, promised before the ages began ... (Titus1:2)
He cannot deny himself (2Tim. 2:13); he cannot contradict himself; he
cannot do anything morally evil, because that would be inconsistent with
his goodness.
Omnipotence, then, does not mean that God could do anything that
we could imagine, but that he can do anything that he wants to do: “Our
God is in the heavens; he does all that he pleases” (Ps. 115:3). Since what
pleases God or what God wants is always consistent with his character,
there is no diculty.
In particular, since God is himself rational and is the source for
human reason, he never does anything irrational. He is never inconsis-
tent. He is consistent with himself, and his self-consistency is the founda-
tion for logic.
1
In the same way, we can infer that God is the foundation for mathe-
matics. He is the source both for that which is necessary and for whatever
in mathematics is contingent.
1
Poythress, Logic, especially chapter 13.
Necessity and Contingency 65
What is contingent is whatever could have been otherwise in a dier-
ent universe, or could have been otherwise if God had never created a
universe at all but had simply remained himself. e Bible indicates that
God is self-sucient. He does not need the universe. It was not neces-
sary for him to create anything outside himself. And, having decided to
create a universe, it was up to him to decide what kind of a universe he
would create. So the details of this universe—the fact that it has apples
and horses and not unicorns—are a product of his free decision. ey
could have been otherwise.
e Bible indicates that God had a plan even before he began to cre-
ate, and that his plan for the universe and for history was comprehensive:
... having been predestined according to the purpose of him who
works all things according to the counsel of his will, ... (Eph.1:11)
... even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that
we should be holy and blameless before him. (v.4)
Given that God has planned something, it is necessary that it take place.
But this subordinate “necessity” derives from two kinds of sources:
(1)God’s faithfulness, which is an aspect of his eternal character, and
(2)God’s plan, which could have been otherwise. So this kind of “neces-
sity” is not on the same level as the necessities of God’s character. God’s
character could not be dierent from what it is. But his plan could have
been dierent, had he so chosen. eologians have long distinguished be-
tween necessary knowledge that God has of his character and free knowl-
edge that he has concerning his plan and concerning contingent facts
about the world. In both cases God is the absoluteGod.
Necessity and Contingency with Respect to Mathematics
What are the implications for the truths of mathematics? Some truths
of mathematics, or perhaps all truths of mathematics, may be necessary
in an absolute sense, because they are implications of God’s character
and his self-consistency. But we must also consider whether some or all
truths of mathematics might be contingent, in that they are a product of
66 Our Knowledge of Mathematics
the plan that he freely chose for creation and for the development of the
world that he created.
As we observed, most people’s intuition tends to put mathematical
truths on the side of necessity. But we have to be careful, because our
minds are not the lords of the world. God is the Lord. Our minds are
derivative. God has made our minds so that we are naturally in tune
with the world that he has made. But he could have made a very dierent
world from ours. Is it possible, then, that mathematical truths seem to
us to be necessary only because we are adapted to a world in which the
truths hold? Is it possible that God in his plan specied mathematical
truths as contingent truths about our world? Might some other world
have dierent truths? And what if God had not created any world at all?
Would mathematical truths still hold? Or did God bring such truths into
existence, as it were, only when he planned to create a world?
Knowing God
Such questions are interesting. But we must be cautious in trying to an-
swer them. We need to recognize our limitations as creatures. Frame’s
square concerning transcendence and immanence is relevant. On the
one hand, when we use a Christian view of transcendence, we cannot
presume to dictate to God what is and is not possible for him. We as crea-
tures cannot see into the depths of God to know the exact implications
of his self-consistency. We cannot just content ourselves with a surface
level of reasoning, in which we say, “Well, mathematical truths seem to
me to be necessary, so they must be necessary for God as well.” at
kind of reasoning is in danger from corner 4. Corner 4 says that we use
our own minds as the ultimate standard for what can be the case, rather
than acknowledging that we must receptively submit to God’s superiority
(corner1).
According to the Christian view of immanence, God has made him-
self known. We can be condent on the basis of what he has revealed
to us. So we can reason about the status of mathematical truth. We can
observe that God has revealed to us his Trinitarian character. He is one
God in three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. When we
Necessity and Contingency 67
say, “one God,” we use the number one; when we say, “three persons,” we
use the number three. We talk about the truth in language that God has
given us. is language enables us to talk both about God and about the
world. God has designed it so that it is adapted to the world.
So people might be tempted to argue that the words one and three
and their meanings belong exclusively to this world, and do not really
apply to God. “God,” they would argue, “is inaccessible in language. God
is not really either one or three.” But now the people who talk in this way
have made a transition to corner 3 in Frame’s square. ey are saying that
God is unknowable. eir position does not respect the fact that God has
revealed himself. He reveals who he actually is, not a fake or a substitute.
Otherwise, we would all be idolaters, because we would be worshiping
the fake rather than the true God. If we return to corner 2, the Christian
view of immanence, we have to say that God has told us that he is one
God in three persons. Both his being one God and his being three per-
sons are eternally true. ey did not “become” true merely because God
decided to create a world and decided to reveal himself to creatures in
the world. We really do know God. He really is one God. ere really are
three persons, and these three exist eternally. is truth is mysterious to
us, because we can never comprehend or know exhaustively the meaning
of the Trinity. But we believe that what God says is true. And we are right
in doing so. ese things are true of God eternally, even though we as
creatures have come to know them only in the course of time and in the
course of our experience of fellowship withGod.
We need to struggle to keep on the le-hand side of the square. It
is not always easy to discern when we have begun to dri toward the
right-hand side or when we have compromised with the right-hand side.
It becomes challenging in particular when we ask deep questions about
what is necessary and what is not.
2
We do not know God in the same way that God knows himself.
God’s knowledge is innitely deep. God knows his own unity as one
God in a way dierent from the way that we do. He knows his own Trin-
itarian character and the distinctiveness of each person in the Trinity
2
On necessity, see also Poythress, Logic, chapters 65–66.
68 Our Knowledge of Mathematics
in his own unique way as God. e dierences follow from God’s tran-
scendence.
At the same time, God is one God. e oneness of God exists before
there ever was a world of creatures that could understand for themselves
the idea of oneness. Likewise, God is three persons. e threeness of the
three persons exists before there ever was a world of creatures.
As we observed (chapter2), God’s nature provides the original in-
stance of the one and the many. He is the archetype. He is the original
pattern. When he creates a world, he creates according to his character
and by the power of his speech, his Word. Oneness and threeness and all
the other numerical properties that we nd in the world are the product
of his speech. But that does not imply that every aspect of the numeri-
cal properties that we see is merely contingent. e numerical properties
have contingent aspects, in the sense that they are properties that apply
to instances in the world, like four apples and four peaches. But they are
at the same time expressions of the faithful and wise character of God.
ey also express his self-consistency. God’s faithfulness and wisdom and
consistency are necessary, because they are aspects of his character.
It is not necessary that the truth 2 + 2 = 4 should be instantiated in
a particular case with four particular apples. But it is necessary that, if
there are four distinct apples, they would conform to the self-consistency
ofGod.
It seems to me that the numbers one and three have a unique role in
God himself. We can also say that there are two other persons besides
God the Father, so we have a manifestation of the number two as well.
We do not have the same for the number four or for larger numbers. God
does not need more than three persons in order to be himself.
Can we go further than this point? As usual, we must be cautious.
But can we say that God knows all the possibilities for worlds that he
could create? Would he know all these possibilities, even if he had de-
cided never to create a world, but just to remain himself? Cautiously, with
the voice of a creature, I say that I think so. If so, would his knowledge
include the knowledge of numbers of creatures in any world that he might
decide to create? I thinkso.
If, cautiously, we include in our reckoning God’s knowledge of pos-
Necessity and Contingency 69
sibilities, it seems that we can conclude that numbers exist eternally. Now
the Greek philosopher Plato thought that abstract concepts like the con-
cept of the good or the beautiful existed eternally, independent of God.
By analogy, an imitator of Plato could postulate that numbers as abstract
concepts exist eternally as abstractions, independent of God. But our
view of God’s absoluteness leads to another view: numbers exist, not as
Platonic abstractions, but as an aspect of God’s knowledge. And, because
of the principle of the one and the many, we can say that they do not
exist in God’s mind as pure unities, utterly detached from a plurality of
possible instantiations. Rather, they enjoy a relationship to the plurality
of creatures in worlds that God might choose to create.
But we can still ask whether numbers have to be the same with respect
to all the worlds that God might choose to create. e number four has
an instantiation in four apples within this world. It would not have the
same instantiation in a world in which apples did not exist. e one and
the many interlock. Likewise the single number four interlocks with its
possible instantiations in this world and in other possible worlds. So there
is complexity as well as unity.
Granted this complexity in unity, we could go on to ask whether the
laws of arithmetic, such as 2 + 2 = 4, might actually be dierent in an-
other universe. Could God create a universe in which 2 + 2 = 5? My
own intuition suggests not. But of course I am a creature; my intuition is
not infallible. If 2 + 2 = 4 is true in any universe that God might create,
does it restrict God’s omnipotence? Let us remember the meaning of om-
nipotence. God cannot do anything that would be inconsistent with his
character. e basic question is whether the consistency of God’s char-
acter implies that 2 + 2 = 4 is true in any universe that he might choose
to create. We will take up this issue only aer thinking more about the
meaning of numbers in our universe.
Does It Matter?
Does it matter whether numbers are eternal, or whether they are neces-
sary or contingent? Our reections in this chapter still leave us with mys-
teries. As creatures, we cannot comprehend God’s Trinitarian character.
70 Our Knowledge of Mathematics
Let us not overestimate our capabilities. And let us not suppose that we
need to know more than God has given us to know and enables us to
know. For most purposes, it is enough to understand that all truth comes
from God, including the truths about numbers, and that numbers them-
selves are among the gis that God has given. ey are not Platonically
independent ofGod.
In addition, we need to make sure that we preserve our understanding
of the reality of the Trinitarian character of God. God is one God in three
persons. e words one and three have meaning when we talk about God.
We should not think that we have to travel beyond numerical meanings
in order correctly to describe God. We should not lapse into a kind of
thinking where we treat God as distant and unknown (corner 3 of Frame’s
square). On the other hand, we should also maintain that God is not
one and three in exactly the same way as one apple and three apples are.
God is God and is unique. Nothing in creation gives us an exact model.
ese observations maintain the truth of God’s transcendence (corner 1
of Frame’s square). If we thought that we had an exact model, we would
be using the model to try to make God conform to our way of thinking
as a standard. We would be following the pattern of non-Christian im-
manence in corner4.
If we understand these truths, we need not think that remaining mys-
teries are a threat to our ability to serveGod.
Part III
Simple Mathematical
Structures
7
Addition
We can now begin to consider briey some of the specic areas that are
part of mathematics. We want to grow in glorifying and praising God in
these areas. One of the areas is arithmetic. Children learn how to add,
subtract, multiply, and divide. ey start with whole numbers. Later they
learn how to add and subtract with fractions and decimals. What does
God have to do with learning addition?
Children’s Learning in Relationships
As we indicated, children learn through interacting with the world and
through interacting socially with other people, especially teachers. So
there is a complex social dimension to their knowledge, and this includes
their knowledge of addition.
Some children may learn addition by rote. ey memorize the ad-
dition table. en they practice applying what they have learned to
problems:
Teacher: 2 + 2 = ? Child: 4.
Teacher: 2 + 1 = ? Child: 3.
Teacher: 3 + 4 = ? Child: 6. Teacher: no, 7. Child: 3 + 4 = 7.
But a child who learns just by rote may know nothing about the meaning
of 2 or 3 or the relationships of numbers and addition to the larger world.
In that case, the child will not see how to apply what he learns to practical
74 Simple Mathematical Structures
cases, such as buying apples at the grocery store. To learn the addition
table in isolation from everything else is poor pedagogy. And it makes
learning harder for the child, because he does not see what is the point.
So children should be learning in the context of life. If so, they are
learning in the context of God’s world. ey are continually relying on
the coherence of the world, which God has established. ey are seeing
richness that God has planned in his wisdom and given to them in his
bounty. As we observed in chapter4, truths about numbers have multiple
relationships with many areas of study. Children learn at least a bit about
this multitude of relationships, and they absorb a good deal without being
explicitly told. God has ordained all these relationships. His wisdom and
his bounty are expressed in the numbers. And they are expressed in the
truths concerning numbers. e truth that 2 + 2 = 4, and every one of the
truths that the child learns, are truths from God. Every truth reveals the
omnipresence, eternity, immutability, omnipotence, and beauty of God,
as we have observed (chapter1).
Children are also learning in the context of the world. e teacher
shows them instances of two apples plus two apples making four apples.
Children absorb the truth by using the relationships between the one
truth, 2 + 2 = 4, and the many instances (with apples).
Children learn in the context of their own subjective experience. It is
they who have the experience of “seeing the point” or maybe of continu-
ally struggling when they have not seen it. We can see that the normative,
situational, and existential perspectives are pertinent. e child learns
normative truths (2 + 2 = 4) in the context of illustrations in the situation
(apples) and in the context of his own subjective experience (illustrating
the existential perspective).
All of us who learned arithmetic learned this way. But elementary
arithmetic has become “second nature” to most of us. We have probably
forgotten the details of how we learnedit.
e easiest way to understand addition is to focus rst of all on objects
in the world, and the groupings of those objects. e teacher shows the
child two groups of two apples each, or two groups of two pencilseach.
We know from the Bible that God has created the world so that there
are distinct apples and distinct pencils, and that we can group them to-
Addition 75
gether. We know that his word species all the truths about arithmetic
and the relationships of these truths to the many aspects of the world.
But can we saymore?
Re-creation
ere are many perspectives that we could use to deepen our understand-
ing. I focus rst on re-creation.
1
In the beginning God created the world,
as described in Genesis 1. Adam failed in his task. Christ came as the
Last Adam (1Cor. 15:45). By his death and resurrection, he redeemed
a new humanity. ose who trust in him are saved from the corruption
and death that Adam brought into the world. ey look forward to the
bodily resurrection from the dead and to entrance into the new heavens
and the new earth that God will create aer Christ returns (Rev. 21:1).
Tabernacle and Temple
When Christ became incarnate, “the Word became esh and dwelt
among us, and we have seen his glory, glory as of the only Son from the
Father, full of grace and truth” (John 1:14). e expressions for dwelling
and glory point back to the tabernacle of Moses (Exodus 25–40) and the
temple of Solomon (1Kings 5–8). ese two structures were symbolic
dwelling places for God that anticipated the nal dwelling of God with
man that took place in Christ. John 2:21 conrms the relationship be-
tween the temple and Christ by saying, “But he was speaking about the
temple of his [Christ’s] body.”
Christ’s coming inaugurated a redemptive re-creation. He healed the
blind and the lame, in anticipation of the nal healing of the body that
will be accomplished in the new heavens and the new earth and the new
resurrection bodies that believers will receive in the future, when Christ
returns (1Cor. 15:44–49).
e Old Testament tabernacle and Solomon’s temple pregure these
realities. ey point forward to Christ as the temple. But they also antici-
pate the “temple” character of the heavenly Jerusalem in Revelation 21:
1
I discuss this theme and related themes concerning the tabernacle in Poythress, Redeeming Science, chapters
11, 12, 17, and 20. On implications for mathematics, see ibid., chapter 22.
76 Simple Mathematical Structures
“I saw no temple in the city [Jerusalem], for its temple is the Lord God
the Almighty and the Lamb” (v.22). e tabernacle of Moses and the
temple of Solomon accordingly have symbolism that has anities with
the creation as a whole, and in particular with heaven as the dwelling
place of God. e lampstand in the tabernacle corresponds to the lights
of heaven. e bread on the table for the bread of presence corresponds to
the manna that comes from heaven. e ark corresponds to the throne of
God in heaven, and the cherubim on the ark corresponds to the cherubim
who surround God’s throne in heaven.
2
In sum, the tabernacle and the temple reect God’s presence in
heaven. God instructs Moses, “Exactly as I show you concerning the
pattern of the tabernacle, and of all its furniture, so you shall make it”
(Ex. 25:9). Moses receives the pattern on Mount Sinai, where God comes
down from heaven. It is a heavenly pattern. And it is explicitly a pattern
to make “a sanctuary, that I may dwell in their midst” (v.8). Solomon in
1Kings makes the temple as a symbolic dwelling place for God, but in
his prayer of dedication he recognizes that heaven is God’s dwelling in a
more ultimate sense: “And listen in heaven your dwelling place, and when
you hear, forgive” (1Kings 8:30). “But will God indeed dwell on the earth?
Behold, heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain you; how much
less this house that I have built!” (v.27).
ese structures have signicance for mathematics because they dis-
play simple mathematical relationships.
3
In the tabernacle, the Most Holy
Place has the shape of a perfect cube, 10 × 10 × 10 cubits. e Holy Place
is 10 × 10 × 20 cubits. Some of the furniture also has simple, harmonious
proportionalities in its dimensions.
e simple proportionalities belong to the small house, which is an
image of heaven and in fact of the whole universe as the large house lled
by God’s presence (Jer. 23:24; compare 1Kings 8:27). e fact that the
small house is a copy or image of the big house suggests that the big house
may also display harmonious proportionalities. And indeed this turns
out to be true, as the mathematical character of basic physical laws attests.
All of these structures derive from God. eir beauty reects the
2
See further Poythress, Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses, chapters 1–5, 8.
3
See further Poythress, Redeeming Science, chapter 20.
Addition 77
beauty of God. eir harmonies reect the harmony of God. It is true
of the tabernacle, and it is true of the universe as the large-scale house.
e pictorial symbolism in the tabernacle conrms what we have in-
ferred from the explicit teaching of the Bible, namely that numbers in
our minds and numbers in the world reect the numerical ordering that
God has normatively specied by his speech. In other words, numbers
derive fromGod.
Imaging
How do numbers derive from God? Again, many perspectives are pos-
sible. But we can look at the question through the lens provided by the
theme of imaging. e tabernacle is an image of God’s dwelling in heaven.
Within the tabernacle, the Most Holy Place is the most direct and intense
image of God’s presence. In it are (1)the ark, the most holy object of fur-
niture, (2)the cherubim, who present an image of the cherubim in God’s
presence in heaven, and (3)the Ten Commandments, God’s speech from
heaven, which are deposited inside the ark (Ex. 25:16). e Holy Place is
a less intense image. e priests are allowed to enter it every day, whereas
the Most Holy Place can be entered only by the high priest, once a year.
In some ways the Holy Place is like an image of an image: it “images” the
Most Holy Place, by having the same dimensions in width and height (10
cubits), and being an exact proportion in length: 20 cubits, compared to
the 10 cubits length for the Most Holy Place. Just as the Most Holy Place
is a kind of dynamically constructed reection and extension of heaven,
the Holy Place is a kind of dynamic extension to the Most Holy Place. It
has a derivative holiness, derived from being next to the greater holiness
of the Most Holy Place.
20 cubits is 10 plus 10. e tabernacle as a whole, composed of the
two rooms together, is 30 cubits long, or 20 + 10 cubits. We see simple
arithmetical relationships. ese relationships include the relationship of
addition. e Holy Place is a kind of “addition” to the Most Holy Place,
and the dimensions add to one another in a simpleway.
is one example is a key example, because the tabernacle is an
image for the whole universe as a large-scale house. By God’s design,
78 Simple Mathematical Structures
arithmetical relationships hold for the tabernacle. ey can also be ex-
pected to hold for the universe as a whole. e relationships of 20 cubits
= 10 + 10 cubits, and 30 cubits in length from 20 cubits + 10 cubits, are
particular key examples. By generalizing from these examples, we con-
rm that by God’s design arithmetical truths hold for the entire universe.
Where did all these designed harmonies come from? ey came from
God. ey are “images,” in the broad sense of the term, of God’s dwelling
in heaven. We know from New Testament teaching that the nal dwelling
of God is not simply his dwelling in heaven but his dwelling in Christ.
“For in him [Christ] the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily” (Col.2:9).
Origins in the Trinity
e word bodily shows that the verse in Colossians is focusing on Christ
as the incarnate redeemer. But his role as incarnate redeemer presupposes
his deity and therefore his eternality as the Word who was in the begin-
ning (John 1:1). He always was with God. is eternal presence with God
takes the form of indwelling. Jesus speaks of the fact that the Father is
“in” him and he is “in” the Father (17:21). at mutual indwelling is the
archetype for the dwelling that the Father and the Son will have in believ-
ers: “If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love
him, and we will come to him and make our home with him” (14:23). is
dwelling of God in man takes place through the Holy Spirit: “You know
him [the Holy Spirit], for he dwells with you and will be in you” (v.17).
ese descriptions of indwelling come in the context of redemption.
But when God acts to redeem us, he acts in harmony with who he really
is, and he reveals himself to us in accord with who he is. us, the re-
demptive descriptions indicate not only that God exists in three persons,
but that the three persons indwell one another. eologians have given a
name to this indwelling: coinherence.
us, the coinherence of persons in God is the archetype for God’s
dwelling in heaven, and then for the tabernacle and the temple. e tab-
ernacle is an image of the archetype.
e origin of imaging is also found in God. e Son, the second per-
son of the Trinity, is called “the image of God” (2Cor. 4:4), “the image
Addition 79
of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15), and “the radiance of the glory of God
and the exact imprint of his nature” (Heb. 1:3). e Son as the original
image is the archetype for the pattern when God says, “Let us make man
in our image, aer our likeness” (Gen. 1:26). Man is a subordinate or
derived image, an image of an image. is pattern is similar to the tab-
ernacle, which is the image of God’s dwelling in heaven, which in turn is
an image of God’s dwelling in himself in the coinherence of the persons
of the Trinity.
In fact, the language of sonship is closely related to imaging. When
Adam fathers his son Seth, it is said, “he fathered a son in his own likeness,
aer his image, and named him Seth” (Gen. 5:3). Seth undoubtedly looked
a little like his father, as most sons do, and he was like him in other ways as
well. is likeness is one aspect of being a son to a father. Why? is pattern
of sonship on earth is imitating (imaging!) the pattern of eternal Sonship
in God. e Sonship that the Son enjoys in relation to the Father includes
the Son being the image of the Father. When God created man on earth,
he intended that the human relation between father and son would be an
image of the eternal relation between God the Father and God theSon.
e father-son relation on earth is a dynamic one. Adam fathered a
son, Seth. In the old-fashioned language of the King James Version, he
“begat” a son. “Begetting” is fathering. is language applies to God the
Father in relation to the Son. In Acts, the language of “begetting” applies
to the fact that the Father raised the Son from thedead:
What God promised to the fathers [patriarchs of Israel], this he has
fullled to us their children by raising Jesus, as also it is written in
the second Psalm,
“You are my Son,
today I have begotten you.” (Acts 13:32–33)
God the Father’s relation to the Son was also manifested earlier in time,
when Jesus became incarnate:
e Holy Spirit will come upon you [Mary], and the power of the
Most High will overshadow you; therefore the child to be born will
be called holy—the Son of God. (Luke1:35)
80 Simple Mathematical Structures
As we have already seen, what God accomplishes redemptively ex-
presses what he is in his character. So theologians have spoken of the
eternal begetting of the Son. e conception of Jesus in Mary’s womb took
place in time. But it expresses in time an eternal relationship, which we
cannot comprehend, but which we know is in accord with what happened
in time when the Son became incarnate. e Father eternally begets the
Son, expressing an eternal relationship between the two persons. e
Holy Spirit is present, in coinherence, just as the Holy Spirit was present
to “come upon”Mary.
e eternal begetting of the Son is also the eternal imaging, in which
the Father begets the Son as his exact image. is imaging is the arche-
type, while other instances of imaging are ectypes.
is reality about God is relevant for tracing the origins of addition.
A key instance of addition is found in the tabernacle and its rooms. One
room, the Holy Place, is an addition to the original room, the Most Holy
Place, through imaging. e original for this pattern is found in the imag-
ing in the Trinity, which is also begetting.
We must here take care to underline the uniqueness of God. God
is the Creator, and we are creatures. ere is nothing like God. He is
unique. e begetting and the imaging in God are therefore unique. But
precisely in his uniqueness, his glorious uniqueness, God is the archetype
for created, derivative patterns. Precisely because he is God, he can create
a world distinct from himself, which reects or images who he is. Addi-
tion, on the level of our earthly conception, exists because, rst of all and
primarily, the Father begets the Son in the presence of the Holy Spirit and
in the love of the Holy Spirit. e Son is distinct from the Father, not the
same. ey are two persons.
It is precisely in accordance to his character, then, that God creates
a world in which there can be an addition of an outer room of the tab-
ernacle to an inner room. And we, as creatures, can think about adding
one room to another, or one measurement to another. 10 cubits plus 10
cubits makes 20 cubits.
8
The Idea of What Is Next
As we have seen, the pattern for imaging begins in the Trinity, in that the
Son is the exact image of the Father. e pattern could have started and
ended there, because God did not have to create a world. But he did. In
this world, he made more images of himself. ere are multiple images.
e most striking image is Adam, made “in the image of God.” Adam
fathered a son, Seth, in his image:
When Adam had lived 130 years, he fathered a son in his own likeness,
aer his image, and named him Seth. (Gen.5:3)
Seth fathered Enosh (v.6), whom we may infer was made in the image
of God and also in the image of Seth. Enosh fathered Kenan (v.9). And
the line continued.
We can also see a second kind of imaging process with the taber-
nacle. e Most Holy Place is an image of heaven. e Holy Place is an
image of heaven and of the Most Holy Place. e tabernacle courtyard,
surrounding the tabernacle, is also a holy space, and so is a kind of image
of the Holy Place. Israel and Palestine and the holy land are images of
the tabernacle and of its courtyard. And Israel was supposed to be a
model to the nations, if they served God as they should (Deut. 4:6–8).
It is clear that images can engender further images. e whole human
race has come into existence by a process of repeated fathering, begin-
ning withAdam.
82 Simple Mathematical Structures
Varieties of Succession
All these cases use the idea of “what comes next.” Seth, the son of Adam,
is next aer Adam, and Seth’s son is next aer him. e process of imag-
ing, by engendering a next thing, becomes a source for repeatedly in-
creasing the number of things—the number of human beings, in one
case, and the number of holy objects, in another.
is idea is clearly one of the ideas present when we view the numbers
as a sequence. Each number has a next one aer it: 2 aer 1, 3 aer 2, 4
aer 3, and soon.
God exercised creativity in making a world when it was not a neces-
sity for him. Seth had a son even though he might not have. ese cases
are analogous to the case with numbers, and we can view the numbers
(from one of many possible perspectives) as summarizing a pattern of
imaging or engendering. Numbers in their sequence represent the pat-
tern of “what comes next” as a generalized pattern.
Because of the creativity involved, sequences of engendering can be
of several types. e engendering could stop aer the rst replication:
A to B. Or it could stop aer four replications: A to B to C to D to E. Or
one stage could father several later stages: A could produce B
1
, B
2
, B
3
,
and B
4
. One of these second-stage B elements, let us say B
1
, would then
produce C
1
, C
2
, and C
3
. C
2
produces D
1
, and so on. e process as a whole
produces a pattern like a genealogical tree going from a father to all his
descendants. (See diagram8.1.)
Diagram 8.1: Genealogical Tree
4
The Idea of What Is Next 83
Among these possible creative choices, we may choose the simple one
in which each item, once produced, imitates the previous production by
producing one more item. en we get a line of items:
A B C D E.
If we imagine the line proceeding indenitely, we have represented the
natural numbers as aline:
A B C D E F G H I J ….
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ….
If we imagine something unusual, like returning at some point to the
rst item A, we get a model that can be the starting point for what has
been called “clock arithmetic” or “modular arithmetic.” (See diagram8.2.)
Diagram 8.2: Clock Arithmetic
Some people might not want to call the system of hours on a clock “arith-
metic” at all, since it diers from the familiar arithmetic. But the ex-
pression “clock arithmetic” explains intuitively what is happening. On a
12-hour clock, aer we reach 12 o’clock, we can add one more hour and
get back to 1 o’clock. 12 “+” 1 = 1 when we are moving around a clock.
In the expression 12 “+” 1 = 1, I have put the plus sign + in quotation
marks, to remind us that this “plus” symbol no longer has exactly the
same meaning as it does in ordinary arithmetic. But there are some fas-
cinating similarities to ordinary arithmetic, if we should choose to study
how to add and subtract on clocks.
84 Simple Mathematical Structures
Natural Numbers
e simplest way of proceeding to what is next is to have one next thing
that is new. We can always stop, and then we get a list of numbers, ending
with the last, let us say 6. is list corresponds to a list of 6 apples or 6 dis-
tinct things. If we are thinking in terms of numbers rather than particular
objects like apples, we are generalizing. at kind of generalization, as we
have already seen, is one aspect of the meaning of 6. But now we are tying
its meaning into the process of engendering or imaging. at is another
aspect of its meaning. (God ordains all the aspects; we do not need to
reduce them all toone.)
Rather than stopping at 6, we can imagine ourselves going on inde-
nitely. Do we ever get the entire list of whole numbers? No. We are nite,
so we get weary or we run out of time. But we should notice that we have
the capability, as people made in the image of God, of exercising a kind
of miniature version of transcendence.
1
We can stand back from what we
have been doing and look down on our previous actions, regarding them
as a whole. In standing back, we imagine something of what it would be
like to take a God’s-eye view of what we have been engrossed in. We re-
main nite, but still we imitate God. We can imagine in some ways what
it means for him to transcend the world, because we can in a miniature
way “transcend” our surroundings and our immediate task. We have this
gi from God. We are imitating him, though on the level in which we
remain creatures.
So as we stand back from the process of creating a succession of num-
bers, we can see by our miniature transcendence that we could go on
indenitely. We could go on forever. We cannot literally go on forever
in this life, but we can imagine an indenite repetition of the process of
engendering. We can do so because we are made in the image of God.
By this imagination, we can understand what it means to be a natural
number or a whole number. Mathematicians use the expression natural
number to describe any number in the sequence that we imagine produc-
ing, starting with 1 and going on indenitely.
1
See further Poythress, Logic, chapter 45.
The Idea of What Is Next 85
God’s Thoughts
Our idea of the sequence of numbers is not independent of God. We are
trying to think God’s thoughts aer him, analogically. God is the original
thinker. Our thoughts never surprise him. He has already thought them.
He knows the end from the beginning (Isa. 46:10).
We can infer, then, that God knows the natural numbers. He knew
them all along, before he even created mankind. He reveals his thoughts
to us as we study numbers.
2
We can now return to the question of numbers within other universes
that God might create. Might the system of natural numbers and the sys-
tem of addition with respect to natural numbers be dierent in another
world than what it is here? We have seen in the case of clock arithmetic
that there is a sense in which there is more than one “system” of “arith-
metic” even within this world. And the genealogical tree indicates that
there are many possible “systems” of succession. But when people ask
about numbers in another universe, they are probably not asking that
kind of question. ey are asking about natural numbers, the numbers
that are familiar to us in ordinary arithmetic. We can also assume that
they are not merely asking about alternate notations or symbol systems
to designate numbers in written script. We can designate numbers using
Roman numerals: I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, etc. Or we could spell out the
names: one, two, three, four, ve, …. ese variations are interesting.
But in another world, would the truths about numbers remain thesame?
What we mean by natural numbers is closely connected to the con-
cept of the sequence of natural numbers. And it is connected to our abil-
ity, by miniature transcendence, to see the numbers as an indenitely
extending sequence. is sequence is based on imitating the imaging
or “engendering” process, which starts with 1 being succeeded by 2. We
imitate the process again and again. All of this thinking is rooted in God,
who is the Trinitarian God. God remains the same. So there is a stability
and reliability to the number sequence. Arithmetic truths remain true al-
ways and everywhere. Because they have their foundation in God and in
the Son who is the eternal image of God, we can conclude that the truths
2
On God’s involvement in knowledge of an ordinary sort, see ibid., chapter 15.
86 Simple Mathematical Structures
are necessary, once we follow along the path of thinking God’s thoughts
aer him analogically.
But there is a caution. Our understanding of numbers is connected
not only with the mind of God but with our experiences of four apples
and four peaches. Apples and peaches might not exist in another uni-
verse, and the application of arithmetic truths to apples and peaches
would not make sense if these particular fruits did not exist. e laws
would still apply to grapes or pears if these fruits existed, or to foxes or
blades of grass. We can still apply the truths if we imagine some new fruit
that does not exist. But that is dierent. Because of the interlocking of
the one and the many, we ought to resist the idea that we can completely
separate the knowledge of numbers from the knowledge of ways in which
they are illustrated in practice, within this world.
9
Deriving Arithmetic
from Succession
e idea of succession can be used as a starting point to derive all of arith-
metic. In 1889 Giuseppe Peano, building on the work of predecessors,
treated the relationship of succession as fundamental. Starting with that
relationship, he formulated precise axioms from which he could deduce
all the elementary truths of ordinary arithmetic.
Peano’s Axioms
e successor relationship can be described using a special symbol S. To
express the fact that 2 is the successor of 1, we write that S1 = 2. Likewise,
S2 = 3, S3 = 4, and S4 = 5. In order not to clutter the formulation of the
axioms, we can assume that each natural number is named by using only
the symbol 1 and the symbol S for successor. So the number 3 is SS1, with
two occurrences of the symbol S. 4 is SSS1. And so on. For large numbers
this notation becomes cumbersome. But the point is not to have an ef-
cient notation, but to have simple axioms.
Here are the axioms:
1
1. 1 is a natural number.
2. e successor of any natural number is also a natural number:
that is, for all natural numbers n, Sn is a natural number.
1
For technical completeness, the axioms would also have to include axioms describing the properties of
the equality relation =. Peano’s axioms are used in several forms, not all of which are logically equivalent.
88 Simple Mathematical Structures
3. No natural number has 1 as its successor: for all numbers n,
Sn≠1.
4. No two natural numbers have the same successor: if m ≠ n,
Sm≠Sn.
5. Suppose that M designates any property
2
that might or might
not hold for a particular number n. Suppose that (a) M is true
for 1 and (b) if M is true for a number n, it is also true for Sn.
en M is true for all natural numbers.
ese ve axioms, simple as they appear to be, can be used to dene
addition and multiplication, and then to deduce all the elementary results
of ordinary arithmetic (see appendix C). It is an impressive achievement
to have found a way of representing arithmetic in such a simple way.
ere is a beauty to the simplicity of the axioms, and naturally this beauty
is a reection ofGod.
We have already discussed the fact that numbers enjoy a multitude
of relationships with many aspects of life (chapter4). e relationship
to Peano’s axioms is one such relationship. e usefulness of the axioms
does not mean that numbers are reduced to the axioms; rather, given
our antireductionist philosophy, it means that numbers enjoy logical
relationships to these axioms, or to other axioms that we might pick.
ere are many possible choices of axioms that would lead to the same
results. Peano’s axioms are in some ways the simplest. But they enjoy
relationships to other axioms. For example, one possible alternative set
of axioms starts with zero rather than one as the lowest number. Axiom
3 then has to be adjusted to say that no number has zero as its successor.
All the other axioms are the same. is new system of axioms results,
of course, in a slightly dierent denition of the natural numbers, since
with the new set of axioms zero is included among the natural numbers.
But the properties of the numbers are the same. We could also pick a set
of axioms in which addition and multiplication are already dened. All
the possibilities for dierent axioms reside in the mind of God before we
2
ere are complexities about what is allowed as a “property” M. If we allow only properties that can be
expressed using a formal logical language with rst-order quantication, we have enough to establish many
elementary truths of arithmetic, but not enough to dene uniquely everything about natural numbers. We
must leave such issues to more advanced books about the axiomatization of arithmetic.
Deriving Arithmetic from Succession 89
as human beings start thinking about them. ey enjoy relationships to
alternative sets of axioms, in accordance with the wisdom of God and his
self-consistency. In this area, as in all others, we can praise God for his
wisdom and richness.
In addition, we can observe that if we are going to understand Peano’s
axioms properly, we already have to know about numbers. Truths about
numbers can be derived from Peano’s axioms, but Peano’s axioms can also
be derived from truths about numbers. e successor relationship can be
seen as a special case of addition: Sn for any number n can be seen as an
alternate notation for the concept of addition by 1 that we already have
in mind. Sn is shorthand for n + 1. Or consider Peano’s notation for the
number 4, namely SSS1. We have to be able to count the number of oc-
currences of the symbol S in the expression. So we are already dependent
on numbers and on counting when we start.
The Foundations for Peano’s Axioms
We can consider Peano’s axioms one by one, and reect on ways in which
they have foundations in the character of God. Let us begin with axiom1:
1. 1 is a natural number.
is axiom makes sense in a world in which God has ordained the pat-
terns for arithmetic truths. ese patterns have their archetype or origin
in God’s self-consistency. e number 1 has its archetypal origin in the
unity of God, who is oneGod.
2. e successor of any natural number is also a natural number:
that is, for all natural numbers n, Sn is a natural number.
Axiom 2 has its roots in the idea of succession or “what is next.” We have
indicated in the previous chapter how this idea has its roots in imaging
and “engendering,” which go back to the Son, who is the original, arche-
typal image, begotten by the Father in an eternal begetting.
3. No natural number has 1 as its successor: for all numbers n,
Sn≠1.
90 Simple Mathematical Structures
Axiom 3 species that we are not dealing with clock arithmetic. e suc-
cession of numbers never circles around to come back to the beginning.
is principle follows when each round of producing a successor imitates
the rst round by producing a new successor rather than repeating an
older one. e idea of newness goes back to the newness that took place
when God created the world.
4. No two natural numbers have the same successor: if m ≠ n,
Sm≠Sn.
Axiom 4, like axiom 3, species that each new successor is indeed genu-
inelynew.
5. Suppose that M designates any property that might or might not
hold for a particular number n. Suppose that (a) M is true for 1
and (b) if M is true for a number n, it is also true for Sn. en M
is true for all natural numbers.
Axiom 5 is clearly a key axiom, because it implicitly involves the entire
succession of natural numbers. It is called the axiom of mathematical
induction. e process of mathematical induction is a form of reasoning
that starts with a particular property M, and wants to show that it is true
for all natural numbers. It establishes the general truth about M by going
through the two steps (a) and (b). e steps (a) and (b) are sucient, be-
cause, using these steps, we can see how the property can be established
for each natural number in succession.
Let us see how it works. Suppose that steps (a) and (b) are true for a
particular property M. We reason as follows:
1. M is true for 1 (by step (a)).
2a. If M is true for 1, M is true for 2 = S1 (by step (b)).
2b. M is true for 2 (from lines 1 and 2a).
3a. If M is true for 2, M is true for 3 = S2 (by step (b)).
3b. M is true for 3 (from lines 2b and 3a).
4a. If M is true for 3, M is true for 4 = S3 (by step (b)).
4b. M is true for 4 (from lines 3b and 4a).
5a. If M is true for 4, M is true for 5 = S4 (by step (b)).
5b. M is true for 5 (from lines 4b and 5a).
Deriving Arithmetic from Succession 91
By repeating this process a sucient number of times, we can estab-
lish that M is true for any natural number that we choose. e distinct
element in axiom 5 is to say that then it is true not just for a particular
number that we choose, but for all natural numbers whatsoever. at
conclusion is possible only if we see the overall pattern. We stand back
from the process of reasoning, and see a general pattern. We extrapolate
the pattern forward along the series of numbers, and we see that the prin-
ciple encompasses all of them. In the process of reasoning, we have used
our ability to have miniature transcendence, to see a whole even when it
is indenitely extended. We are imitating the mind of God. We are nite,
but with this kind of projection forward we depend on his innity.
3
(For
examples using mathematical induction, see appendices C andD.)
us all of Peano’s axioms reect the wisdom and greatness of God,
each axiom in its own way. When we reason about arithmetic, we reason
in imitation of God’s prior knowledge of all truth, including arithmetical
truth. Praise theLord!
We may also observe that these axioms are in harmony with all the in-
dividual truths of arithmetic, and that both axioms and individual truths
are in harmony with the world that God has made, where two apples plus
two apples equals four apples. And all these areas together are in harmony
with human minds, because we are made in the image of God. Because
we share his image, we can teach the next generation to know truths in
harmony with what we know and in harmony with what God knows. God
is in harmony with himself, and ordains a world that reects his harmony.
3
For mathematical induction, see also Poythress, Logic, chapter 45.
10
Multiplication
Like addition, multiplication is established by God and originates inGod.
Proportions in the Tabernacle and the Temple
We can return to consider the tabernacle of Moses and the temple of
Solomon. e rooms in the tabernacle and in the temple show simple
proportionalities in their dimensions. e Holy Place in the tabernacle is
10 × 10 × 20 cubits, in comparison to the Most Holy Place, 10 × 10 × 10
cubits. e Holy Place can be viewed as an image or addition to the Most
Holy Place, giving us an example of addition. It can also be viewed as a
room obtained, guratively speaking, by multiplying the Most Holy Place
by two in length. Simple proportions show a harmony. is harmony
reects on the created level the eternal harmony among the persons of
the Trinity.
1
e tabernacle and the temple both show multiple patterns. e re-
lationships between the Most Holy Place and the Holy Place show nu-
merical patterns, as we have seen. ey also show spatial patterns. e
Most Holy Place is a perfect cube, with length, breadth, and height all
10 cubits. ese dimensions make up a space in which there can be pat-
terns of motion and human activity, as a priest enters and performs his
duties. e furnishings show patterns of physical support. And the tab-
ernacle displays beauty in its furnishings. e multiple aspects, such as
1
See further Poythress, Redeeming Science, chapters 20–22.
Multiplication 93
the numerical, the spatial, the physical, and the beautiful, all combine
into a single structure.
is combination of aspects occurs also in the larger world that God
made. Quantitative and spatial aspects of the world belong together with
many other aspects, according to God’s design. e implication is that
God in his wisdom has made the world a whole. e combination into
one whole as well as the individual aspects when contemplated separately
display his wisdom. Quantitative and spatial aspects, which form the stu
for mathematical reection, belong together with many other aspects.
Mathematics is not more ultimate or less ultimate than many other as-
pects. us we should not be tempted either to glorify mathematics or to
despise it as unimportant.
We can also note that multiplication is closely related to addition.
Adding a number to itself is equivalent to multiplying the number by two:
3 + 3 = 3 × 2 = 6. Adding a number to itself for a total of four occurrences
of the number is equivalent to multiplying by4:
3 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 3 × 4 = 12.
is property can even be used as a denition of multiplication, if we like
(see appendix C). Or we can use a perspective where we start with addi-
tion and multiplication as distinct operations, and then show that they
interlock harmoniously.
Multiplication in the World That God Made
Multiplicative properties nd embodiments and illustrations in many
ways in the world that God has made. For example, the area of a rectangle
is the length multiplied by the width (diagram 10.1).
Many basic physical laws involve the mathematics of multiplication.
One of the most famous laws is Newton’s second law of motion,
F = ma.
It says that the force F is equal to the mass m multiplied by the acceleration
a. Einstein’s famous equation
E = mc
2
94 Simple Mathematical Structures
says that energy E is equal to mass m multiplied by the speed of light c
multiplied by c a second time (the square).
Diagram 10.1: Area
Multiplication of Animals
Genesis 1 describes God’s ordering of the world. Among his commands,
he species that animals and mankind should multiply:
And God blessed them, saying, “Be fruitful and multiply and ll the
waters in the seas, and let birds multiply on the earth.” (v.22)
And God said to them [human beings], “Be fruitful and multiply and
ll the earth and subdue it, and have dominion...” (v.28)
Of course, the verses here are not describing “multiplication” in a techni-
cal mathematical sense. e meaning is more general: God is directing
the animals and human beings to increase in number. But when we pay
attention to how this increase takes place, we discover a relationship to
multiplication in the mathematical sense. A species does not increase
merely by each pair producing a single new ospring. A single pair can
produce several ospring, and these ospring in turn may each produce
several ospring.
Suppose we simplify, and picture a situation where a pair of horses
produces four ospring. e second generation has four horses, twice
as many as the rst generation. If these four horses pair up, each of the
pairs can produce four ospring in the third generation, for a total of
eight horses in the third generation. ere are twice as many in the third
Multiplication 95
generation as in the second. If we repeat the pattern, we can have twice
eight or 16 horses in the fourth generation. In the 10th generation there
would be 1,024 horses, and in the 20th generation 1,048,576. In the 30th
generation there could be 1,073,741,824, over a billion horses. e num-
bers become huge. We can see a dramatic dierence between this kind
of multiplication and a simple process of addition where, say, we add one
new horse for each generation.
e pattern of reproduction that God has established reects mathe-
matical truths that have their foundation in God. Among these truths are
truths concerning multiplication. We can see that truths about multipli-
cation are integrally related to the normative, situational, and existential
perspectives. First, the normative perspective leads to focusing on truths
of multiplication as general truths that hold for horses, cats, or any other
objects that we choose to count. Multiplication works in general, and we
can logically derive truths of multiplication from simple starting axioms
(see appendix C). Second, the situational perspective leads to focusing on
how multiplication works with horses, cats, and other objects. ird, the
existential perspective leads to focusing on our capability as persons to
understand how multiplication works and how it is signicant. e three
perspectives harmonize, according to God’s design.
We can thank God that in this and many other ways he gives ability
to human beings not only to understand the wonders of his world, but to
use regular arithmetical patterns for our benet, as when we undertake
to breed animals.
11
Symmetries
Within mathematics we can nd many symmetries. Let us reect on a
few ofthem.
What Is Symmetry?
A symmetry is displayed whenever one kind of change in viewpoint leaves
something fundamentally the same. For example, the human body has bi-
lateral symmetry: a person looks about the same in a mirror, even though
the mirror reverses the positions of the le and right sides. Le and right
eyes correspond; le and right hands correspond; le and right legs cor-
respond. (See g. 11.1.)
Fig. 11.1: Symmetric Face
By contrast, a starsh has what is called a radial symmetry. A starsh
has ve arms, all of which are about the same shape. So rotating the star-
sh around its center by 1/5 of a complete revolution leaves the starsh
looking about the way it did before. A starsh has in addition mirror
Symmetries 97
symmetry, shown by the fact that it looks about the same in a mirror.
(See g. 11.2.)
Fig. 11.2: Symmetric Starfish
An earthworm has a cylindrical symmetry, so that it looks about the
same aer any amount of rolling. (See g. 11.3.)
Fig. 11.3: Symmetric Cylinder
e cells in a honeycomb show a sixfold symmetry. A rotation by an
angle of 60 degrees or any multiple of 60 degrees leaves the structure the
same. e cells also look the same in a mirror. (See g. 11.4.)
Fig. 11.4: Symmetric Honeycomb
98 Simple Mathematical Structures
The Origin of Symmetry in God
Symmetries within this world exist because of God’s plan. He made them.
Within God himself, there is an archetype for symmetry, namely the fact
that all three persons of the Trinity are equally God. e three persons
are distinct from one another, and their roles are distinct in relation to
one another, but they all share the characteristics of God—eternality, om-
nipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, faithfulness, goodness. ey are
“symmetric” with respect to these characteristics. is symmetry is the
archetype. All earthly symmetries are ectypes, created reections.
Symmetry has a close relation to beauty. People tend to think that a
human face with symmetry is more beautiful than one that lacks sym-
metry at some point. e beauties in this world reect the archetypal
beauty ofGod.
Symmetries in Arithmetic
Arithmetic shows simple symmetries. Each of these symmetries ulti-
mately reects the beauty ofGod.
Addition is commutative, meaning that the order of two numbers
makes no dierence:
1 + 3 = 3 + 1 = 4;
2 + 3 = 3 + 2 = 5;
5 + 7 = 7 + 5 = 12;
6 + 9 = 9 + 6 = 15.
(For a demonstration of commutativity, see appendix C.) is property
is a symmetry with respect to the order in addition.
Addition is associative, meaning that the grouping of three numbers
makes no dierence:
(1 + 2) + 4 = 1 + (2 + 4);
(2 + 1) + 5 = 2 + (1 + 5);
(7 + 3) + 2 = 7 + (3 + 2).
(For a demonstration of associativity, see appendix C.) is property is a
further symmetry with respect to grouping in addition.
Symmetries 99
Together, the commutativity and associativity in addition imply that
the order of addition makes no dierence even with a long sequence of
numbers to add. (See diagram 11.1.)
Diagram 11.1: Addition Harmony
us there is a complex symmetry in the fact that a rearrangement of
order leaves the sum thesame.
Multiplication is commutative:
2 × 3 = 3 × 2 = 6;
3 × 4 = 4 × 3 = 12;
3 × 7 = 7 × 3 = 21;
5 × 11 = 11 × 5 = 55.
is commutativity is a symmetry for multiplication.
Multiplication is associative:
(2 × 3) × 4 = 2 × (3 × 4) = 24;
(2 × 5) × 3 = 2 × (5 × 3) = 30;
(3 × 6) × 4 = 3 × (6 × 4) = 72.
We can appreciate all these symmetries as beauties that God has
placed within arithmetic for our enjoyment. Many more complex sym-
metries and beauties await us in mathematics. e further one travels in
the study of mathematics, the more there are, and the more we should be
stimulated to praise God. An excellent resource is found in James Nickel,
Mathematics: Is God Silent?
1
1
James Nickel, Mathematics: Is God Silent? (Vallecito, CA: Ross, 2001).
12
Sets
Sets are widely used in mathematics. And some people have tried to re-
duce all of mathematics to the theory of sets. So we need to reect on the
nature of sets as mathematical objects.
What Is a Set?
A set is a collection of objects. We can indicate what set we have in mind
simply by listing the objects that are in the collection. For example, the
collection consisting of apple #1, apple #2, and peach #1 is a set. When
there are only a few items in the collection, we can describe the set by put-
ting the list of items inside braces. e set S that consists in three objects,
apple #1, apple #2, and peach #1 is describedthus:
S = {apple #1, apple #2, peach #1}.
e objects in a set are called members or elements of the set. e symbol
∈ is used to denote set membership.
1
e expression
(apple #2) ∈ S
means that apple #2 is a member of the setS.
A set is a collection in which we ignore all the information except the
information about what objects it has as its members. e technical con-
1
e symbol ∈ is a form of the Greek letter epsilon. But as a unicode character it is distinct from the Greek
alphabet. Unicode characters U2208 and U220A are both used for this purpose.
Sets 101
cept of set is “blind” to all the extra information and extra relationships
and associations that we have in our minds from our life as a whole. So
the set is the same set, no matter what order we choose in which to list
the elements, and no matter how many times we list the same element:
{apple #1, apple #2, peach #1} = {peach #1, apple #1, apple #2}
= {apple #2, apple #2, apple #2, apple #1, peach #1, apple #2,
apple#1}.
e idea of a set singles out by mental abstraction just those proper-
ties on which we are focusing, and for sets the key property is member-
ship in the set. e general properties of a set that make it a set represent
the abstraction, while particular instances of sets, like the set {apple #1,
apple #2, peach #1} represent concrete embodiments or illustrations of
the abstraction. e abstraction is one in nature, while the embodiments
are many. Because of the equal ultimacy of the one and the many, the
abstraction and its embodiments belong together, each helping to dene
the other.
If there are many members to a set, it may be more ecient to de-
scribe the set by describing the properties that are true of every member
of the set. For example, the set of all odd numbers less than 100 can be
described in ordinary English just as we have done. ere is also a stan-
dard way that mathematicians have for writing out the description in an
abbreviatedform:
the set of odd numbers less than 100 = {x | x is a natural number and
x < 100 and x isodd}
e bar symbol “|” means “such that.” e notation {x | x is odd} means
“the set of all elements x such that x isodd.”
Foundations for Sets in God
As usual, the foundation for the idea of sets is in God. Let us see how. e
idea of a set depends on three principles: (1)each element in the set is
distinguishable and xed—it is well dened; (2)there is a clear criterion
for distinguishing which objects are in the set and which are not; (3)there
102 Simple Mathematical Structures
is a relationship of belonging or “membership,” according to which the
elements that meet the criterion for being in the set are said to be mem-
bers or elements of the set. e relationship of belonging is denoted by
the special symbol∈.
e principles (1)and (2)both depend on the possibility of making
distinctions. How can we make distinctions? God is distinct. He is one
God. And God is three persons. e three persons are distinguishable
from one another. At the same time, the three persons belong together:
each person is God. Each person, we might say, is a member of the God-
head. We saw in chapter2 that the three persons of the Trinity give us
the archetype for three principles: classication, instantiation, and as-
sociation. e principle of classication is the archetype for criteria for
distinctions. e principle of instantiation is the archetype for the indi-
viduality that belongs to elements that meet or do not meet criteria. And
the principle of association is the archetype for the relationship of belong-
ing or membership. All three principles interlock. We cannot really have
one without the others. All three presuppose the others, in harmony with
the fact that all three persons of the Trinity belong together as oneGod.
God, we said, is the archetype. When God created the world, he cre-
ated ectypes that reect his wisdom, his faithfulness, and his knowledge.
In the description in Genesis 1 we can see, among other things, that God
makes distinctions:
And God separated the light from the darkness. God called the light
Day, and the darkness he called Night. (Gen. 1:4–5)
And God said, “Let there be an expanse in the midst of the waters,
and let it separate the waters from the waters.” And God made the
expanse and separated the waters that were under the expanse from
the waters that were above the expanse. And it was so. And God called
the expanse Heaven. (vv.6–8)
And God said, “Let the waters under the heavens be gathered together
into one place, and let the dry land appear.” And it was so. God called
the dry land Earth, and the waters that were gathered together he
called Seas. (vv.9–10)
Sets 103
And God said, “Let there be lights in the expanse of the heavens to
separate the day from the night. And let them be for signs and for
seasons, and for days and years,...” (v.14)
Distinctions among the things that God has made come about be-
cause God speaks the distinctions into existence. e names that he gives,
such as Day, Night, Heaven, and Earth, dene distinct elements within
the world. He separates things, which has the result that the things sepa-
rated are then distinguishable. Among other things, these distinguishable
things can then function as distinct elements within aset.
Genesis 1 is describing God’s work of creation by way of overview. But
this overview, by illustrating the use of distinctions, implies a more gen-
eral principle. God species all the distinctions that exist. We as human
beings can think God’s thoughts aer him. When we do so, we rely on
distinctions that are already in place, because God speciedthem.
In our day, there are many languages of the world. ey include dier-
ing vocabularies, and the vocabularies may sometimes focus on dierent
kinds of distinction. e vocabularies do not always match one another.
But whatever distinctions exist in whatever languages, God has thought
about them beforehand.
e idea of a set utilizes distinctions in a simple, clean way. It strips
away all other kinds of detail about the things in God’s world and presents
the simple idea of being a member of a set or not. An item is either inside
the set, by being a member, or outside the set, by not being a member.
at inside-outside distinction is a separation. We draw up or “create” the
separation when we dene a particular set with apple #1, apple #2, and
peach #1 as its members. We are “creative.” But of course our creativity
is derivative. We are made in the image of God our Creator. God has
thought through all the distinctions and separations before wedid.
Perspectives on Sets
Sets can be understood using the normative, situational, and existential
perspectives. e normative perspective focuses on the normative proper-
ties of sets. Particular truths hold for sets. ese truths have a transcendent
104 Simple Mathematical Structures
source—ultimately they come from God’s self-consistency, and they de-
pend on the fact that God has specied distinctions and separations.
Second, the situational perspective focuses on the situation: objects
in the world that God has created. We can treat these objects, like apples
and peaches, as members of collections. Truths about sets hold for such
collections in the world.
ird, the existential perspective focuses on persons. We as human
beings have to be able to grasp the meaning of talking about a collection,
or talking about its members. We have to be able to use our minds to
think about distinctions, and to be clear in our minds as to what distinc-
tions we are using at anytime.
As usual, these three perspectives lead to one another. In our minds
we think about the world. So the existential perspective leads to the situ-
ational perspective. And when we think about the world, we presuppose
norms, including norms for what is true of sets. at is, our thinking
includes awareness of norms, and so we are led to the normative perspec-
tive. e norms hold true for things in the world, and so the normative
perspective leads to the situational perspective. e norms hold true for
how we should think, and so the normative perspective leads to the ex-
istential perspective.
e three perspectives harmonize because God has ordained them
all. He species the norms; he creates the world; and he creates human
beings in his image.
Sets and Numbers
Are sets part of the foundation for numbers? As we indicated, it is com-
mon for contemporary mathematicians to consider set theory as a “foun-
dation” for everything else. What this oen means is that mathematicians
can start with axioms for sets, and “build up” or derive all the truths about
mathematics from this starting point. Our viewpoint here is antireduc-
tionistic. e derivability from axioms displays the fascinating relation-
ship between sets and numbers, and displays God’s wisdom in ordaining
a relationship. But the relationships are rich and multidimensional.
For example, we are already tacitly using what we know about nu-
Sets 105
merical features of the world when we think about sets. Each element of
a set is one element. e distinctiveness of the element already presup-
poses the number one. If there is more than one element in the set, the
distinction between elements gives us two or three elements in the set.
We know this even if we do not mentionit.
We cannot think about sets without thinking God’s thoughts aer
him. We must have a kind of communion with God, even if we are mor-
ally and spiritually in rebellion against him. In this communion with
God, we already know something about numbers.
We can also see that in God himself we nd numbers (one God;
three persons) and distinctions (distinctions between persons). Neither
is “prior to” the other, since both belong to God from eternity. Number-
ing presupposes distinctions between the persons that we number. Con-
versely, distinctions presuppose the idea of unity and diversity, which is
numerical.
So we can look at the subject in at least two opposite ways. On the one
hand, the idea of distinction depends on the “prior” idea of numbers. Or
we can see numbers as depending on the “prior” idea of distinction. Both
actually go together. In appendix E we give a brief picture of one direction
of dependence. Numbers can be seen as depending on the idea of distinc-
tion that is present in the idea of a set. So we can explore how elementary
set theory can provide axioms that lead to the properties of numbers.
Part IV
Other Kinds of Numbers
13
Division and Fractions
e whole numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, … are easiest to understand, because they
apply to collections of apples or peaches. But there are other kinds of
numbers, such as fractions. What is the nature of fractions? e math-
ematician Leopold Kronecker is alleged to have said, “God made the inte-
gers; all else is the work of man.” Is that so? Or did God give us fractions
and other kinds of numbers aswell?
Division
Fractions are useful when we have to deal with dividing up some quantity.
So let us think about division. Division undoes the result of a multiplica-
tion. So consider a case involving multiplication. Suppose the grocery
store has packages containing 12 hotdogs. We buy 3 packages. How many
hotdogs do we have? e principle of addition says that we can add up the
hotdogs in each package, for a total of 12 + 12 + 12 = 36 hotdogs. Adding
12 to itself for a total of three occurrences of the number 12 is the same
as multiplying 12 by3.
12 + 12 + 12 = 12 × 3 = 36.
What we are seeing so far is harmony ordained by God between ad-
dition and multiplication, and harmony between the arithmetic on the
one hand and the nature of the world (the world with its hotdogs) on the
otherhand.
110 Other Kinds of Numbers
Now let us pose a problem that requires thinking in the other direc-
tion. Suppose we are planning a party with 18 guests, and we estimate
that they will eat two hotdogs each. How many packages do we have to
buy at the store? We rst do a multiplication: 18 guests times 2 hotdogs
per guest is 36 hotdogs. If the hotdogs come in packages of 12, how many
packages do we need to buy? With 12 hotdogs per package, one package
will give us 12 hotdogs; 2 packages will give us 12 × 2 = 24; 3 packages will
give us 12 × 3 = 36 hotdogs; and so on. Getting an answer to the problem
involves “undoing” the multiplication problem 12 × 3 = 36, to conclude
that 3 packages are enough to provide 36 hotdogs for the party.
is kind of problem crops up frequently, so people have invented a
notation for division: 36 ÷ 12 = 3, or 36/12 = 3. When we analyze division,
we can see that it displays normative, situational, and existential aspects.
In the normative perspective, there are rules for carrying out division,
and rules for the relationship between division and multiplication. ere
are also rules that involve harmonies between division and addition. For
example, dividing rst by one number, then by another, is the same as
dividing by the product of the two numbers:
(36/3)/4 = 36/(3 × 4) = 3
(20/2)/5 = 20/(2 × 5) = 2.
Dividing a sum of two numbers by a number d has the same result as di-
viding each of the original two numbers in the sum by the same number
d, and then adding:
36/3 = (12 + 24)/3 = (12/3) + (24/3) = 4 + 8 = 12.
10/2 = (8 + 2)/2 = (8/2) + (2/2) = 4 + 1 = 5.
In the situational perspective, division applies to situations in the
world, like the situation with our 36 hotdogs.
Existentially, we as human beings can understand in our minds the
hotdog problem, and carry out a process of division that leads us to an an-
swer. Once we have the answer, we then proceed to interact with the world
by purchasing the hotdogs and—along with the guests—eating them. As
usual, God ordains the harmony between the three perspectives.
Division and Fractions 111
We can also observe the presence of interlocking between one and
many. e one in this case is the general truth that 36 ÷ 12 = 3. e many
are the many instances in the world where this numerical relationship is
exhibited—with hotdogs, hotdog buns, hamburger patties, chicken legs,
and so on. As usual, the interlocking of one and many depends on God
and has its archetype inGod.
We may also observe that there is a kind of symmetry between divi-
sion and multiplication. We have said that division “undoes” multiplica-
tion. e two operations of multiplication and division are two sides of
one coin. If division undoes multiplication, multiplication also undoes
division. If we have divided 36 by 12 to get 3, we can get back to 36 by
multiplying 3 by 12. Symmetry in this world derives from God, who is
the archetype for beauty.
Another symmetry about division arises because division can be
viewed from two dierent perspectives.
1
Consider again the hotdog
problem where we know that we need a total of 36 hotdogs. When we
purchase them, they come in packages of 12. Now 36/12 = 3. So we know
we need to buy 3 packages. But suppose that our problem is that we have
36 hotdogs and 12 people who will eat them. How many hotdogs will
each person eat? We obtain the answer in the same way: 36/12 = 3. Each
person will have 3 hotdogs.
e two problems have the same solution in arithmetic. In both cases,
we have to divide 36 by 12. But in the world of hotdogs and packages
and people, the two problems are quite dierent. e purchase problem
involves dividing 36 hotdogs into piles of 12 hotdogs each, and asking
how many piles there will be. e eating problem involves dividing 36
hotdogs into 12 piles, one pile per person, and asking how many hotdogs
each person will get. e two problems have the same numerical answer,
namely 3. is sameness is a kind of symmetry in the world, a symmetry
about dividing 36 hotdogs into 12 piles or dividing them into piles each
of which consists in 12 hotdogs.
e same, of course, is true in other cases of division. 20 hotdogs
divided into 5 piles results in each pile having 4 hotdogs (20/5 = 4). 20
hotdogs divided into piles with 5 in each pile results in 4 piles (20/5 = 4).
1
I owe this insight to Gene Chase.
112 Other Kinds of Numbers
We can see that this symmetry will always be there if we pictorially
represent the division problem by means of a rectangular arrangement
of hotdogs (g. 13.1).
Fig. 13.1: The Hotdog Problem
e hotdogs are arranged in four rows of ve hotdogs each, for a total
of 20 hotdogs (5 × 4 = 20). If each row is a “pile,” we have four piles with
ve hotdogs in each pile. If, on the other hand, each column is a pile, we
have ve piles with four hotdogs in each pile.
Fractions and Division
Now let us consider fractions. Suppose that we have one pie that we want
to divide among six people. is is a problem similar to the problem of
dividing up 36 hotdogs into packages of 12. But we start with only one
item, the one pie, rather than 36. e answer is that we cut up the pie.
God has given us power to cut up things that are in the world. And he has
given us minds that can think through how to do it so that the resulting
pieces are about thesame.
We divide the pie into six pieces. Once the pie is in pieces, we can
adopt a new perspective in which we treat the pieces as individual objects,
and the whole pie as a collection of 6 pieces. (Our ability to use multiple
Division and Fractions 113
perspectives comes from God.) If we have 6 pieces, and we want to divide
them up equally among 6 people, how do we do it? We need to divide
the total of 6 pieces by the number of people, namely 6 people. 6 pieces
divided by 6 people is 6/6 or 1. Each person will get 1 piece.
But now we can also return to the original perspective, where we
regard the pie as a single whole. e pie is 1 item. How much does each
person out of the 6 get? He gets 1/6. Orally, we say “one sixth.” Writing it
or saying it that way extends the notation of division into fractions.
From one point of view, it is we who have created this extended nota-
tion. We have “invented” the fraction 1/6 in order to enhance our ability
to talk about the process of cutting things up. ere is a grain of truth in
the statement attributed to Kronecker, that “all else is the work of man.”
Mankind is creative, and we “invented” fractions. But who gave us our
creativity? We are made in the image of God, who is the original Cre-
ator. God is not surprised when we come up with the idea of fractions.
He thought of it before we did. And he made certain things within the
world that divide up naturally into smaller pieces. For example, aer an
orange is pealed, it divides up naturally into sections. Clam shells divide
naturally intwo.
Fractions display the same interlocking of three perspectives that we
observed with hotdogs. Fractions are not a merely subjective invention to
entertain us or keep our minds busy with some frivolity. To be sure, we
understand fractions mentally: that is the focus of the existential perspec-
tive. But we also know that there are norms for dealing with fractions cor-
rectly. We will have too few pieces, or else too many pieces, if we calculate
mistakenly when we undertake to cut the pie. (ink of cutting up three
wedding cakes into pieces for 200 guests. We had better do our arithmetic
correctly, or we may be embarrassed by not having enough pieces for all
the guests.) ere are norms for success, and these norms are the focus of
the normative perspective. Finally, in the situational perspective we focus
on the pie. It has to be cutup.
e three perspectives cohere because God has ordained all three,
and he has made sure that they cohere. at is why we can cut up a pie
in a reasonableway.
If God has ordained the three perspectives on fractions, it is a mistake
114 Other Kinds of Numbers
to reduce the three perspectives to one, namely the existential perspec-
tive. If we thought that the existential perspective was ultimate, then we
might conclude that fractions are wholly “the work of man.” at is, we
have just invented them in our minds, and they exist only because we
invented them. But that exclusive claim about human invention does not
explain why fractions work well when we are cutting up pies or wedding
cakes. Nor does it explain why we cannot just invent any rules that we
wish for working with fractions. e rules are norms. ey have to be
what they are, if they are going to match what is true for the world (the
situational perspective) and what is true for our minds (the existential
perspective).
e norms for fractions in many ways match the norms for other
forms of division. For example, a fraction of a fraction has as its de-
nominator the product of the denominators in the two steps of making
a fraction:
(3/8)/4 = 3/(8 × 4) = 3/32.
(1/3)/5 = 1/(3 × 5) = 1/15.
e addition of fractions satises a “distributive” law that is similar to
what takes place with multiplication and division of whole numbers:
(3 + 4)/8 = (3/8) + (4/8).
(1 + 3)/6 = (1/6) + (3/6).
ese truths are similar to:
(3 + 4) × 8 = 3 × 8 + 4 × 8
(1 + 3) × 6 = 1 × 6 + 3 × 6
In all this reasoning, whether from a normative, situational, or exis-
tential perspective, our minds are not working in independence of God.
God is present with us. He is present for salvation with those who believe
in Christ. But he is also present in common grace with those who rebel
against him. ey too can think God’s thoughts aer him. e “inven-
tion” of fractions is an invention empowered by God. It is not “merely”
human.
Division and Fractions 115
Rules for Fractions
When children learn to deal with fractions, they should be learning mul-
tiple relationships and multiple aspects. Fractions have relationships with
the world in which we cut up pies. ey have relationships to our minds.
ey have relationships to language, and especially to the mathematical
symbols that we use in “doing” fractions on paper. ey have relation-
ships to calculations done in the sciences. ey have relationships to
various kinds of advanced mathematics that have beauties of their own,
but not everyone needs to learn them. Appreciating fractions means ap-
preciating a rich world of relationships that God has ordained.
Within that context, children learn norms—rules. ere are informal
rules for the way in which written fractions relate to the world of cutting
up pies. ere are more formal rules for calculating with fractions. How
do we multiply two fractions? How do we add two fractions with the
same denominator (1/7 + 3/7)? How do we add two or more fractions
with dierent denominators (1/6 + 1/2 + 1/9)? ese rules must have
coherence with the world. If 1/6 + 1/2 + 1/9 = 3/18 + 9/18 + 2/18 = 14/18
= 7/9 on paper, is it also true that 1/6 of a pie plus 1/2 of a pie plus 1/9
of a pie makes altogether 7/9 of a pie? It is true. Praise the Lord for his
wisdom!
14
Subtraction and
Negative Numbers
Our next topic is negative numbers. We might ask, about negative num-
bers, the same question that we asked about fractions: are they real? Neg-
ative numbers seem to some people to be even more shy than fractions.
ey ask, “Can there be a collection with a negative number of members
in it? If not, aren’t negative numbers a mere gment of the mind of math-
ematicians?” What about Kronecker’s dictum, “God made the integers; all
else is the work of man”? Are negative numbers the work ofman?
Ledgers, Budgets, and Debts
Situations in the world illustrate the idea of counting negatively. When a
family or a government is trying to balance its budget, it reckons with in-
come and expenses. e income is “positive.” e expenses are “negative.”
e budget is “balanced” if the income and expenses match. Even better
than a balanced budget is one where there is a little surplus: the income is
more than the expenses, as a cushion. e surplus in the budget is the dif-
ference between the income and the expenses, calculated by subtraction.
For example, suppose that the monthly income for a family is $2,000
and the total expenses are $1,900. What is the surplus at the end of the
month? We rely on the fact that God has established nancial regularities
in this world. Money does not disappear into thin air; nor does it mate-
rialize from nowhere. e total amount of money that comes in during
Subtraction and Negative Numbers 117
the month (the income of $2,000) must all go somewhere. Some of it goes
out of the house to pay expenses. e rest, the surplus, will still be there at
the end. So the expenses plus the surplus are equal to the income. $1,900
plus surplus is $2,000. So what is the surplus?
$100 is the right amount to complete the addition problem: $1,900 +
$100 = $2,000. Situations like these are common. So schools teach chil-
dren how to solve the problem by subtraction. Subtraction undoes addi-
tion. If $1,900 + $100 = $2,000, then $2,000 - $100 = $1,900 and $2,000
- $1,900 =$100.
We can apply the normative, situational, and existential perspectives
to subtraction. First, consider the normative perspective. ere are rules
or norms for doing subtraction right. If we do not follow the rules, the
money at the end of the month will not match what we calculated. Sec-
ond, in the situational perspective we focus on the situation, which in-
volves income and expenses. ere is only so much money. ird, in the
existential perspective we focus on the persons. In this case, the person
involved in the situation is doing a calculation, either mentally or on
paper. e person has to understand the meaning of subtraction, and its
relation to the problem of guring the surplus at the end of the month.
He also has to know the rules for subtraction if his work is going to come
out right.
As usual, we can observe that God has ordained all three perspec-
tives. He put in place the norms; he has created the situation; and he
has created the people who can think his thoughts aer him. He has
ordained all three in such a way that they are in harmony. e budget
maker depends on the harmony in working out the budget. e point
here is that, even though subtraction is conceptually more complex
in some ways than addition, both addition and subtraction are due
toGod.
We can also see the principle of one and many. e one in this case
is the general principle that 2,000 - 1,900 = 100. e many are the many
cases in the world for which this arithmetical truth holds: a household
budget, or a business budget, or a business inventory, or a farmer’s har-
vest. e one and the many interlock, based on their foundation inGod.
118 Other Kinds of Numbers
Negative Numbers
Now we can introduce negative numbers. Suppose that in one month
the family income is $2,000 and the expenses are $2,100. What is the
surplus? e rule says that the surplus is the dierence between income
and expenses, namely $2,000 - $2,100. But this is no longer exactly the
same kind of subtraction problem, because the expenses are greater than
the income. We say that the household has a decit of $100, not a surplus.
If the family has put away some savings, they can dip into the savings
to tide themselves over. Let us say that they subtract $100 from a total
savings of $500, leaving them with $400 in savings. On the other hand,
when they have a surplus of $100 in one month, they can deposit it in
the savings, and if they started with $400 in savings, they will have $400
+ $100 =$500.
A surplus functions like an addition to savings or cash-on-hand. A
decit is like a subtraction. It is negative. We can also imagine the fam-
ily going into debt, so that they owe $100 to a friend or to the bank or
to a credit card company. e debt is also a negative amount, because it
is something from which the family has to recover in order to get to a
debt-free situation. ey can become debt-free only by counteracting the
debt with earnings.
ere are many situations like this one. Such situations in the world
are a justication for the concept of a negative number. A negative num-
ber is simply a number on the “other side” or the negative side of a ledger
or a budget or a system for tracking quantities. In the total process of
reckoning, it will be subtracted away from the total, whereas numbers on
the positive side will be added in. By virtue of the commutative and asso-
ciative properties of addition, it makes no dierence what order we use to
do the additions and subtractions. Each case with a budget or a tracking
system is a particular instantiation of the principle of negative numbers.
One particular helpful illustration of negative numbers uses the num-
ber line. It is so helpful that teachers frequently use it in the classroom to
teach the concept of a negative number. e number line is like a yard-
stick with markings on it for successive numbers, 1, 2, 3, etc. e numbers
get bigger going to the right. On the le of 1 is 0, which corresponds to a
Subtraction and Negative Numbers 119
balanced budget. To the le of 0 is -1, which can signify being 1 dollar in
debt, or being 1 short of a required quantity. To the le of -1 is -2, then -3,
and so on. In that direction one gets further in debt. e distance between
two numbers on the line represents how much one would have to gain or
lose to go from one position to the other.
As usual, we can apply normative, situational, and existential perspec-
tives to this representation through a number line. e normative per-
spective focuses on the rules for adding and subtracting on the number
line, and the coherence between three representations. We have (1)the
spatial representation through a line; (2)the numerical representation
through numbers on paper; and (3)the mental representation through
ideas in people’s minds. e situational perspective focuses on budgets
and inventories and other situations in the world where there can be ad-
dition to and subtraction from a total amount. e existential perspective
focuses on people’s understanding of how a number line works and how
budgetswork.
One of the “shy” properties of a negative number is that the negative
of a negative is a positive: -(-2) = 2. is rule seems counterintuitive to
many people when they rst hear it. But it has an illustration in the world.
If Bill is $5 in debt to Charlie, his situation is represented by the number
-5. e minus sign is there because Bill is below zero by being in debt. If
Bill adds $2 more to his debt, it is represented by adding -2. e negative
sign indicates that the 2 is a debited 2, rather than a credit of 2. (-5) + (-2)
= -7, for a total of $7 debt (the negative sign on 7 also indicates debt). But
suppose Charlie tells Bill that he will forgive $2 of the $5 debt. Forgiveness
is the negative of adding to the debt. It is the negation of -2, or -(-2). Bill
is now only $3 in debt. -5 -(-2) = -3. e net result is the same as if he had
received $2 as credit, that is, a positive2.
An alternative explanation would say that the rule -(-2) = 2 is the only
way of preserving the normal laws of addition and subtraction. Suppose
that we write 6 - 3 = 3. is can also be written as 6 - (1 + 2) = 3 or 6 -
1 - 2 = 3. When we drop the parenthesis, the minus sign preceding the
parenthesis has to be applied to all the numbers within the parentheses.
In eect, an entry of several numbers such as 1 and 2, one aer the other,
on the debit side of the ledger has the same result as calculating the sum
120 Other Kinds of Numbers
of all the debits normally (1 + 2) and then putting the resulting sum on
the debit side (-(1 + 2) = -3). Now observe that 6 - (5 - 2) = 3. If we carry
through the same rule about applying the minus sign, it comes out 6 - 5
-(-2) = 3, which simplies to 1 - (-2) = 3. Clearly this will work only if
-(-2) =2.
e explanation with Bill and Charlie is oriented to the situation of
debt, and uses the situational perspective to explain the rationale for -(-2)
= 2. e explanation in terms of laws of addition uses the normative per-
spective. Both lead to the same conclusion, because God has ordained
harmony in numbers.
The Nature of Negative Numbers
Negative numbers, like rational numbers, may seem to be a kind of
human “invention” when we compare them to the starting point with
positive whole numbers. ey involve an additional eort in human un-
derstanding. at eort is part of the focus of the existential perspective.
ey also involve an invention in notation (using the subtraction sign
“-” in a new way). is invention of notation is something that we as
persons do, so it is in focus in the existential perspective. But the in-
volvement of the other two perspectives shows that negative numbers are
not mere invention. ey correspond to norms and to situations in the
world. In addition, God knew about this “invention” before human be-
ings did. Human beings are thinking God’s thoughts aer him. It follows
that negative numbers have a reality, in relation to the purposes that they
serve in budgets, in physical measurements, and in other areas of study.
Zero
Similar observations can be made about the “invention” of zero. To have a
notation for zero is an important part of the decimal system of notation,
which enables us compactly to write larger numbers like 20 and 1,003.
Zero has a relation to notation, to our minds (the existential perspective),
to norms (2 + 0 = 2), and to situations in the world (a balanced budget
has 0 surplus and 0 decit). ese perspectives harmonize according to
God’splan.
15
Irrational Numbers
Next we consider irrational numbers. e name irrational already hints
at a history in which some people had diculty with them. Most math-
ematicians consider them thoroughly rational, in the ordinary sense of
the word, but the historical label irrational has stuck.
Definitions of Rational and Irrational Numbers
A rational number is a number that can be expressed as a ratio a/b of
two integers a and b. Rational numbers include whole numbers (3, 11,
524), negative numbers (-2, -13), fractions (1/3, 2/19), improper fractions
(fractions greater than 1: 12/5, 14/3), negative fractions (-1/3, -12/5), and
mixed numbers (2 ½, 5 ¾). (Mixed numbers are just an alternate way of
writings improper fractions: 2 ½ =5/2.)
An irrational number is a number that is not rational but that still
represents a quantity. e square root of 2, designated √2, is one such
number. It is dened to be the number such that its square is 2; that is,
when multiplied by itself the result is2:
√2 × √2 = (√2)
2
= 2.
e square root of 3, designated √3, is another irrational number. √3 ×
√3 = 3. However, the square root of 4 is rational. √4 = 2, because 2 × 2 =
4, and 2 is rational.
How do we know whether a square root is rational or irrational? It can
122 Other Kinds of Numbers
be shown by strictly mathematical argument that the square root of any
whole number is irrational, except in the case where the whole number
with which we start is a perfect square, that is, when it is the square of
some other whole number.
e ancient Greeks associated with the Pythagorean school discov-
ered the diculty with irrational numbers. e diculty is connected to
the Pythagorean theorem, which says that in any right triangle the square
of the length of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the
sides (diagram 15.1).
Diagram 15.1: Pythagorean Theorem
If the two sides have a length of 1 unit each, the square of the hypotenuse
must be 1
2
+ 1
2
= 2. e hypotenuse itself must then have a length equal
to the square root of 2, which is irrational. is result upset the Pythago-
reans, because they had a philosophical desire to see the whole universe
in terms of ratios of numbers, and the square root of 2 could not be ex-
pressed as a ratio of whole numbers.
Can we say anything coherent about the square root of 2? We can say
approximately what it is, using decimals. e decimal notation is a conve-
nient way for writing numbers in terms of powers of 10. For instance, 536
means 5 hundreds (5 × 100), plus 3 tens (3 × 10), plus 6 ones (6 × 1). is
procedure can be extended to deal with fractions. So 1/2 is 0.5 or 5 tenths
(5 × 1/10). 1/4 is 0.25 or 2 tenths (2 × 1/10 or 2 × 0.1) plus 5 hundredths (5
× 1/100 or 5 × 0.01). 1/3 is 0.33333 …. e decimal representation for 1/3
does not terminate: the sequence of threes goes on forever. But 1/3 can
be approximated to any desired degree of accuracy by including enough
Irrational Numbers 123
decimal places. And this is usually what is done with electronic calcula-
tors (though the internal workings of a calculator convert the decimal
representation to binary representation, and then reconvert to decimals
at the end of the calculation).
All fractions can be represented in decimal notation. Some of the
decimals terminate (1/8 = 0.125). Others go on forever (1/6 = 0.166666
…). e ones that go on forever repeat a pattern. us 1/9 = 0.11111 ….
e pattern may be several digitslong:
1/7 = 0.142857142857142857142857142857142857142857 ….
By contrast, the decimal representation of an irrational number does not
repeat:
√2 = 1.4142135623730950488 …
√3 = 1.73205080756887729353 …
√4 = 2.00000 (rational)
√5 = 2.23606797749978969641 …
It may feel as if irrational numbers are not “under control,” since we
cannot represent them exactly in a decimal expansion. But in a sense
we cannot do that for many rational numbers like 1/3 or 1/7, since the
decimal expansion goes on forever. Moreover, for square roots or cube
roots or many other irrational numbers, we can program a computer to
calculate the value to any desired degree of accuracy.
e concept of increasing accuracy includes within it the idea of trav-
eling toward a limit that is never actually reached. It has an anity to
what we observed earlier about our conception of the natural numbers.
We never reach the end or complete the process of listing the natural
numbers. Similarly, we never reach the end of the decimal expansion of
√2. Our niteness makes it impossible actually to reach the end. Never-
theless, by an imitation of God’s transcendence we can conceive of an
indenitely extended process. e irrational number is a kind of wrap-
ping up of the entire process, once we conceive of it as a whole. us, we
are relying on the innity of God as the foundation for our conception
of irrational numbers.
124 Other Kinds of Numbers
Irrationals in the World?
Are there instances or embodiments of irrational numbers in the world?
We can cut up an apple into 4 pieces, each of which is 1/4 of an apple. But
could we have √2 apples? It does not seem so. Because we are nite, we
cannot make an innitely sharp division, either of an apple or of a mea-
suring stick. e hypotenuses of some right triangles oer us instances
where irrational numbers crop up. But a right triangle is an idealization.
Triangles that we draw on paper do not have perfectly straight lines, and
the lines are not innitely thin, and we cannot guarantee that the base
angle is exactly a right angle. Even if we could guarantee all of these
things, we could not guarantee that the two sides would have exactly the
same length.
1
Clearly, we can conceive of irrational numbers in our minds. And we
can set up ways of calculating their values. In addition, irrational num-
bers can occur indirectly in scientic theories about the world.
2
When
the scientic theories match well with experiments, we are assured that
they have relevance to the world.
Nevertheless, irrational numbers do not have quite the “immediacy”
of relevance to the world that we can illustrate with small fractions like
1/2 or 2/3. But consider the fraction 2,056,197,131/5,414,760,808,353.
Does it have immediate relevance? If not, is it any more or less “real” than
the irrational number√2?
God has made us in his image. When we try to think his thoughts
aer him, we can nd ourselves thinking beyond the immediacy of our
environment. We can extend our minds, and grasp the meaning of a
fraction like 2,056,197,131/5,414,760,808,353 that we will never have an
opportunity to use in a practical way. Likewise, we can grasp the mean-
ing of√2.
So why were numbers like √2 called irrational? Perhaps one source
of uneasiness lay in the feeling that a person could never master such a
number. He could never completely control it in his mind, through a
1
In addition, Einstein’s general theory of relativity implies that a triangle in the real world is slightly “curved”
by a gravitational eld such as the eld produced by the earth (or even the eld produced by the body of
an observer). So the properties of Euclidean geometry do not hold precisely for triangles in our universe.
2
In particular, √2 occurs in quantum mechanics in connection with the principle of superposition. It does
not seem to be dispensable.
Irrational Numbers 125
direct knowledge of the entirety of its decimal representation. But if we
acknowledge God as the source for all our knowledge, we ought to ac-
knowledge that we can never completely master anything at all! ere is
mystery in all our knowledge, because it all reects God who is innite.
e irrational numbers just illustrate mystery more obviously.
Perspectives
We can see the hand of God in irrational numbers. He has provided three
perspectives. In the normative perspective, we have xed rules or norms
for irrational numbers. We can give rules for calculating their values as
precisely as we want.
3
We can give rules for using them in calculations.
In the situational perspective, we see that they have relevance to the world
indirectly, through scientic theories that use them. In the existential
perspective, we can see that we as human beings can understand both
the rules and the applications to the world.
As usual, God’s harmony with himself guarantees the harmony be-
tween the three perspectives. God has given us the fascination and mys-
tery of irrational numbers, as one aspect of a rich world and rich minds
that think about the world.
3
ere are exceptions to this kind of rule in the case of irrational numbers that can be proved to exist, but
where we know of no recipe for calculating them.
16
Imaginary Numbers
Next we consider imaginary numbers. From our previous survey of dif-
ferent kinds of numbers, the pattern should be clear. As we go, we are
traveling further away from the world of everyday experience. But God
gives coherence to these more distant regions, just as he does to everyday
experience. He knows all about these things before we do, and his own
archetypal coherence provides the foundation. We can enjoy each area of
mathematics as a gi from him. When we see beauty, we can thank him
and praise him for it, because it reects his original beauty.
What Are Imaginary Numbers?
e expression imaginary number hints at the diculty that people found
historically in trying to decide about the legitimacy of a new region of
mathematics. It is indeed new, in comparison with everything that we
have discussed so far. Historically, imaginary numbers were “manufac-
tured” numbers, deliberately introduced as an “articial” product, in
order to supply solutions to equations that otherwise would have no so-
lutions, or would not have enough solutions.
Consider the equation
x
2
= -1
Can we nd a solution? at is, can we nd a number x whose square is
-1? e square of 1 is 1. e square of -1 is also 1, since the product of
Imaginary Numbers 127
two negative numbers is positive: (-1) × (-1) = 1. It will not help to look
for a solution among rational or irrational numbers, since every square
of a positive or negative number is positive. We could say therefore that
the equation “has no solution.”
But mathematicians have tried to see what happens if they “invent”
a solution, in a way analogous to extending the number system from
whole numbers to fractions, from there to negative numbers, and from
there to irrational numbers. e mathematicians simply make up a new
symbol. e standard symbol is i. Mathematicians dene i as a “number”
whose square is -1. ey assume that the same basic laws hold for this
new “number” as for ordinary numbers. (Note that, in referring to laws,
they use the normative perspective.)
Once we have i, we can form multiples of i: 2i, i/4, and i√3. ese
also are imaginary numbers. e expression complex number is the name
given to numbers formed by adding a real number (rational or irrational)
to some multiple of i. For example, 2 + 5i, 1 - 3i, 1/2 + 3i/2, and √3 + i√2
are complex numbers. e numbers that do not involve i are called real
numbers, to indicate that they are distinct from complex numbers.
e normal laws of arithmetic, concerning addition, subtraction,
multiplication, and division, still hold for these new numbers, the com-
plex numbers. Using complex numbers, mathematicians can provide so-
lutions to any algebraic equation whatsoever. For example, by allowing
for complex numbers, they can show that any quadratic equation ax
2
+
bx + c = 0 has exactly two solutions (or one solution occurring twice).
Some quadratic equations already have solutions using real numbers. For
example, 2x
2
+ 3x + 1 = 0 has two solutions, x = -1 and x = -1/2. But other
equations, like x
2
+ 1 = 0 or x
2
+ x + 1 = 0 have no solutions using only real
numbers. Likewise, if we allow complex numbers, any cubic equation ax
3
+ bx
2
+ cx + d = 0 has exactly three solutions (or one solution occurring
three times, or two solutions, one of which occurs twice). On the other
hand, if we refuse to use complex numbers, quadratic equations may or
may not have any solutions. Complex numbers have won the hearts of
mathematicians, not only because of this beautiful result, but because of
many other beauties in the theory of complex functions.
Complex numbers have also won the hearts of scientists through
128 Other Kinds of Numbers
applications to the world of science. Particularly notable is quantum
mechanics, which uses complex numbers in an indispensable way. Why
should it be that this “invention” out of the minds of mathematicians,
who were looking for beauty in the world of abstract mathematics,
should centuries later nd applications in physics? God in his wisdom
has madeitso.
Perspectives on Imaginary Numbers
As usual, we can consider imaginary numbers from the normative, situ-
ational, and existential perspectives. e normative perspective observes
that imaginary numbers and complex numbers obey the same basic laws
as ordinary numbers, and they behave consistently. e beautiful prop-
erties of these numbers come from God, who is beautiful. at is some
assurance that these numbers are “real,” because they are known by God,
rather than merely “imaginary.”
e situational perspective observes the applications of imaginary
numbers to the world of science. ere is coherence between the norma-
tive laws and the way the world works.
e existential perspective observes that we can coherently under-
stand and reason about these numbers. Our reasoning, when done right
(normatively!) is in harmony both with the objective norms from God
and with the world.
17
Infinity
Is innity a number? We have already met with the idea of innity in
connection with the natural number system. e list of natural numbers,
1, 2, 3, …, extends indenitely. We might say that it goes on “forever” or
that there is an innite number of natural numbers. In the appendix on
set theory (appendix E) we consider innite sets, some of which are in a
sense even “larger” than the set of nonnegative integers. How should we
regard the idea of innity?
Human Limits
e idea of innity leads straight back to the earlier discussion that we
had about human knowledge in comparison to God’s knowledge (chap-
ter5). We are nite. At the same time, we know the innite God. We can
know about innity by knowing God. Our knowledge is genuine, just as
our knowledge about God is genuine, without being exhaustive. We do
not comprehend God, in the special sense of the word comprehend. We
do not ever achieve mastery in our knowledge of him, nor do we know
everything that he knows, nor do we know it in the same way that he
does. ere is mystery for us, because God exceeds our grasp.
e same truths are relevant when we consider innity in mathemat-
ics. As nite human beings, we never come to the end of the sequence of
natural numbers. We never exhaust innity. Rather, by imitating God’s
transcendence on our nite level, we see the general pattern of progres-
130 Other Kinds of Numbers
sion in the number sequence, and we imagine its indenite extension.
e same kind of principle applies to all the cases where the idea of inn-
ity crops up in mathematics. Innity is a kind of limit or extrapolation
from our mind, and we know well enough, when we reect about our
knowledge, that we never literally attain it. Nevertheless, we can work
with the idea, because God has given us the ability to do so, as people
made in his image.
Modern set theory (appendix E) has given us not one innity but
many. Besides the set of natural numbers, there are additional sets, such
as the power set of the set of natural numbers, and power sets built on top
of that, that extend upward indenitely. Set theory can dene when two
sets represent the “same level” of innity, namely when we can establish a
one-to-one correspondence between the members of the two sets. But it
can also be shown that there are “bigger” sets that are not in one-to-one
correspondence with the natural numbers. e details must be le to the
technicalities of set theory. But the result is that there is a whole series of
bigger and bigger innitesets.
What do we do with these ideas? Some mathematicians, the “nit-
ists,” are suspicious of all innities, even the smallest one, the innity of
natural numbers. Others embrace the whole series of larger innities with
delight. I am closer to the latter group, because I see the beauty of God’s
archetypal innity reected in the towers of innities in set theory. God is
good, and he has given us many wonders. e wonders include not only
the beauty of mountains and owers and sunsets, but—for those who
have the ability to appreciate them—the beauties of mathematics and
the beauties of these innities in set theory. It is all due to him. We can
embrace these innities as a gi, and rejoice.
At the same time, I have a sympathy for the nitists. ey have a
point—a grain of truth in their favor. ey are rightly sensitive to the issue
of human limitations and human niteness. ey rightly understand that
no one who is a human being can comprehend or exhaust innity. e sets
that are called “innite” sets are manipulated by mathematicians because
we have symbols and rules for manipulation. e rules represent truths
about miniature transcendence, and its imitation of God’s transcendence.
But they do not literally create innite sets as objects in the world, con-
Infinity 131
taining, let us say, an innite number of atoms. (Only a nite number of
atoms exist within the visible universe.)
When we reason about innite sets, we are continually projecting
beyond our limitations, on the basis of the analogy between our minds
and the mind of God. We do not fully understand what we are doing. And
indeed, in the early days of the theory of innite sets, as developed by
Georg Cantor, investigators confronted paradoxes.
1
It is easy to produce
a contradiction if we let our reasoning run away with us and do not ex-
ercise restraint. e history of set theory in the twentieth century can be
understood largely as a history of exploring and wrestling with our limi-
tations, and how we can avoid contradictions in our reasoning while we
are stretching our reasoning into realms that we can never fully master.
We best explore this realm when we do it for the glory of God and
for his praise.
1
See Poythress, Logic, appendices A1 and E2.
Part V
Geometry and Higher
Mathematics
18
Space and Geometry
Now let us turn to consider geometry. How does it relate to God? We may
condently assume that it is due to him, but can we saymore?
Space
Geometry as a subdiscipline within mathematics receives some of its
motivation from our ordinary experience of space. e ancient Egyp-
tians and Babylonians had to work out spatial relationships and mea-
surements with care in preparation for their great building projects, and
geometrical observations of a practical kind can be found as early as
1900 BC. Geometry seems to have had a practical origin in connection
with measurements in space. It reached a classical rigorous formulation
in Euclid’s Elements.
So let us start with the idea of space. e description of creation in
Genesis 1 implies that God has ordained the spatial structure of the world
in which we live. For the most part Genesis 1 focuses on things and ac-
tions within space, rather than on space itself. But it does indicate that
God “separated” major regions. God separated the heaven from the earth
in Genesis 1:6–8, and the sea from the dry land in verses 9–10. In Genesis
1 as a whole God created a large-scale dwelling place, which is lled with
his presence (Jer. 23:24).
e tabernacle of Moses, as we observed (chapters 7–8), is a minia-
ture dwelling place, a “copy” or “image” of God’s larger dwelling place
136 Geometry and Higher Mathematics
in heaven and in the universe as a whole. e tabernacle exhibits simple
numerical relationships and numerical proportions. At the same time, it
exhibits spatial relationships and spatial proportions in the two rooms
and in some of the items of furniture (the table for the bread of the pres-
ence is 1 by 2 by 1 ½ cubits). So the tabernacle invites us to see a relation-
ship between its shapes and the “shape” of the larger world, including its
spatial characteristics.
We can ask about the archetype for the tabernacle. e tabernacle
rooms are images or shadows of God’s heavenly dwelling place among
the angels. And does this dwelling place have a deeper root? It does. e
tabernacle and heaven both point forward to Christ, who is the dwelling
place of God (John 1:14; 2:21). e New Testament indicates further that
Christ’s fellowship with God the Father existed before the world began
(John 1:1). is fellowship takes the form of indwelling. John 17:21 indi-
cates that the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father, in a context
that reects back on eternal Trinitarian relationships (17:5,24).
is mutual indwelling, which includes the Holy Spirit, is called coin-
herence. Since God is unique and innite, the indwelling of the persons
of the Trinity in one another is mysterious to us. It is not a spatial rela-
tionship in the way that we experience it in the created world. God is not
spatially divisible, as if one part of him could be here and another there.
It is not “spatial” at all, if what we mean by “space” is determined just by
our experience of space in the created world.
Does that mean that the language of indwelling means nothing at
all? No, it does have meaning to us. It is indicating that there is an anal-
ogy, but not identity, between indwelling in the tabernacle, or the Holy
Spirit dwelling in a believer (John 17:23; compare 14:16–17, 23), and the
archetypal indwelling among the persons of the Trinity. e archetype,
as usual, is not equal to the ectype. Nevertheless, there is a relationship
between the two, as indicated by the expressions used. We cannot compre-
hend this relationship, because we are nite and God is God. But we can
understand the reality of analogy between the Holy Spirit dwelling in us
and the Old Testament symbol of the temple: “Or do you not know that
your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have from
God?” (1Cor. 6:19). e temple in turn, as we have observed, evokes
Space and Geometry 137
analogies with the tabernacle of Moses, with God’s heavenly dwelling,
and then nally with the archetype, the coinherence of persons in the
Trinity.
We may take the analogy one step further, and move from the picture
of the temple to the universe as a whole. e universe is the large-scale
dwelling place of God. So the spatial character of the universe has its
archetype in God, and more specically has an archetype in the coinher-
ence of persons in the Trinity.
Laws of Space: Geometry
Space reects God’s presence, and so testies to its creator. And laws
concerning space, such as the laws of geometry, have their origin, like all
laws, in the speech ofGod.
But what kind of space are we talking about? Here we must see that
Euclidean geometry, such as was axiomatized by Euclid and later rened
by mathematicians like David Hilbert, is related to space as we experi-
ence it, but is an idealization. If we draw a line on paper, it is not perfectly
straight, even if we use a ruler to help us. It is also not perfectly thin (no
width). Its intersection with a second line is not a dimensionless point,
but a bit of ink or a bit of pencil graphite that covers a small area. e
idea of a dimensionless point and the idea of a line with no width are
extrapolations, for the sake of avoiding the distractions and complexities
involved with lines that are 0.2 mmwide.
Euclid’s geometry illustrates the interlocking of the one and the many.
Consider a particular theorem within Euclid’s geometry, namely the theo-
rem that the two base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal. (An isosce-
les triangle is a triangle in which two of the sides are of equal magnitude.
e two angles opposite these two sides are then also of equal magnitude.)
is theorem is a general theorem. We are to understand that it holds for
all the particular cases of isosceles triangles, of various sizes and shapes.
e particular cases are many. e one truth is one. We understand the
meaning of the one truth through its many illustrations, and likewise we
understand the full meaning of the property of equal angles in a particular
triangle when we see it in relation to the general theorem. e general
138 Geometry and Higher Mathematics
theorem makes it possible for us not to repeat our reasoning every time
we have a new instance of an isosceles triangle. As we noted before (chap-
ter2), this interlocking of one and many depends onGod.
In the twentieth century the situation has turned out to be even more
complicated. Albert Einstein’s general theory of relativity postulated that
space (together with time, which is treated as a fourth dimension not
strictly isolatable from the spatial dimensions) is curved, not Euclid-
ean. Euclid’s famous parallel postulate turns out not to be strictly true
of the space in which we actually live.
1
e discovery of non-Euclidean
geometries (where the parallel postulate did not hold true) shocked the
intuitions of many mathematicians, and the physicists were even more
shocked when they heard from Einstein that these non-Euclidean geom-
etries had relevance to the real world.
Perspectives on Space and Geometry
What should a Christian think? We are seeing here a complex relation-
ship between John Frame’s three perspectives. Human intuitions are in
focus for the existential perspective. e intuitions, until the work on
non-Euclidean postulates in the nineteenth century, said that space had
to be Euclidean. But of course the intuitions had been trained by hun-
dreds of years of dominance by Euclid’s Elements, the classical text on
geometry. If people had paused to notice, they could have seen all along
that Euclid presented an idealization and that Euclid’s theorems exhibited
the mystery of the interlocking of one and many. ese characteristics
could make it easier to admit that God may do as he wishes, and that the
world we live in might not be Euclidean.
Frame’s normative perspective focuses on the laws of geometry. But
the laws that Euclid formulated are an idealization. So they approximate
but do not necessarily match what God has ordained to be true for the
world. is approximation, of course, was in the mind of God before it
was in our minds. God had it prepared as a stepping stone in the process
by which human beings would grow in understanding God’s world and
grow in praising him. Euclid’s formulation is still useful as an axiomatic
1
See Poythress, Logic, chapter 54.
Space and Geometry 139
system for the world of the mind, and it is used today by physicists and
mathematicians who are well aware that it does not perfectly match the
world aroundus.
Finally, we consider the situational perspective. is perspective fo-
cuses on the world. Here is where we appreciate the world as God has
given it to us, and we consent to believe that it is non-Euclidean, ac-
cording to Einstein’s description. We should also recognize that Einstein’s
description is not ultimate either. It is an insightful idealization of some
aspects of the world, not all. If we take to heart the fact that God made
a world of great richness, we avoid the temptation to be reductionistic
about space and geometry, as well as other elds.
Analytic Geometry
Another question confronts us, namely the relationship of space to num-
bers. ere is a rich relationship. René Descartes invented analytic geom-
etry, which was a rigorous way of describing lines and shapes in space
using algebraic, numerical tools. To each point in two-dimensional space
is assigned a pair of numbers (x, y), where x is the distance of the point
from a xed vertical axis and y is the distance of the point from a xed
horizontal axis (diagram 18.1).
Diagram 18.1: X and Y Axes
is technical arrangement allows people to use numbers not only
to talk about a single point, but about a straight line, a circle, an ellipse,
a parabola, and other geometrical objects. e arrangement uncovered
140 Geometry and Higher Mathematics
many beautiful harmonies between the two realms, the realm of number
and the realm of space.
You can imagine that these harmonies tempt some people to try to
reduce space to number. Space, in their thinking, is just number in an-
other form. But our ordinary experience contradicts this claim. If we take
God into account, we can infer that God gives us ordinary experience,
and not just the later mathematical analysis, as one aspect or form of re-
ality. So the reductionistic philosophical attempt is not justied. Rather,
we should say that God ordains harmony between the two realms. e
harmony is so thorough that the properties of one can be deduced from
the other. e relationships do not simply go one way, from number to
geometry. It is also possible to represent numerical truths in geometrical
form. For example, the addition of two numbers can be represented in
space by using a number line. We have one line segment, of length 2 to
represent the number 2, and another line segment, of length 3 to repre-
sent the number 3. When we lay them head to tail, the total lengthis5.
(See diagram 18.2.)
Diagram 18.2: Addition within a Coordinate System
Real Numbers
One of the questions that arise when we look at space is the question of
continuity. We can picture ourselves moving along a line gradually, until
we arrive at our destination. e gradual motion is a continuous motion,
without jerks or pauses. is perception leads by extrapolation to the idea
Space and Geometry 141
of space being innitely divisible and smooth in between any divisions,
as minute as they might be. e points along a line are comparable to real
numbers, expressed in innitely long decimal expansions. Both innities,
the one in space and the one in time, are idealizations. As usual, we can
recognize our niteness. But we can also recognize that we have ability,
given by God, to explore these idealizations and see what happens. From
these sources comes the theory of real variables.
And a beautiful theory it is. It builds on intuitions coming both from
our experience of number and our experience of space. But it also travels
beyond them. And mathematicians try to make “rigorous” the ways in
which they travel beyond them. In the development of the theory of real
variables, as in the development of set theory, paradoxes were encoun-
tered when the human mind tried to push toward innity. e story of
these developments is best le to other books. e paradoxes once more
indicate the mystery associated with our being nite and our also being
able to think God’s thoughts aerhim.
19
Higher Mathematics
Over the centuries mathematicians have developed more and more sub-
disciplines, and have continued to uncover extraordinary as well as or-
dinary beauties in new results. ese newer areas of exploration are all
gis of God, and all reect the beauty, wisdom, and faithfulness of God.
ey all become motivations for praise for those who have come to love
God through the work of Christ.
Subdisciplines
e new subdisciplines have arisen mostly through processes that involve
recognition of common patterns and common structures belonging to
more than one instance within already existing branches of mathematics.
For example, elementary algebra builds on arithmetic by seeing common
patterns belonging to many instances in which we deal with numbers.
Abstract algebra builds on elementary algebra, and generalizes from pat-
terns seen in common algebraic operations such as addition and multi-
plication.
In the discernment of common patterns, we see reliance on the in-
terlocking of the one and the many. e one in this case is the common
pattern. e many are the instances that illustrate or display the pattern.
Abstraction, which is a common feature of mathematics, is a process of
focusing on the one, the common pattern, in the midst of themany.
To some extent mathematics has also been inuenced by mathemati-
Higher Mathematics 143
cal problems posed within physics and other sciences. In the relation-
ship between mathematics and the sciences we see a conrmation of the
harmony between disciplines, a harmony that goes back to God, who
ordained themall.
The Discrete and the Continuous
A major distinction of subelds within mathematics arises from the dif-
ference between structures that are discrete and structures that are con-
tinuous.
1
Roughly speaking, a discrete structure is one in which every
individual element is isolated from every other. A continuous structure
is one in which individual elements belong to a whole in which one can
move continuously from one element to another. No element is isolated.
Discrete structures have a close relation to whole numbers, which are the
most intuitively accessible instance of a discrete structure. Each number
is distinct from its neighbors. Continuous structures have a close relation
to space and geometry. Our intuitive starting point for understanding the
idea of continuity uses pictures from space.
Algebra, in the most general sense, is the study of discrete structures.
Geometry and topology, which is a kind of generalization of ordinary ge-
ometry, study continuous structures. But the two sides enrich one another
through interaction. Algebraic geometry and algebraic topology show by
their names that they are combination disciplines. Real and complex anal-
ysis use the idea of continuity in a vital way, but still deal with elements
that are number-like. So these disciplines display the fruitfulness of cross-
over. Analytic number theory uses real and complex analysis on the way to
answering questions about the natural numbers. It too involves an inter-
action of the continuous (“analysis”) and the discrete (natural numbers).
Reliance on God
All these disciplines rely on a starting point that involves our intuitions
about number, or our intuitions about space, or both together. e disci-
plines also show an interaction of normative, situational, and existential
1
See Willem Kuyk, Complementarity in Mathematics: A First Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics
and Its History (Dordrecht-Holland/Boston: Reidel, 1977).
144 Geometry and Higher Mathematics
perspectives. e normative perspective is the most common to use in
exposition of mathematics, because textbooks and explanations focus on
establishing truths about mathematics. At the same time, problems and
exercises show how to apply the truths to particular examples. And many
areas of higher mathematics have applications in the sciences, so that the
situational perspective is appropriate. When we observe that mathemat-
ics depends on our intuitions about number and space, and on our abil-
ity to abstract and generalize from particular examples, we are focusing
on the capabilities of human beings, and so we are using the existential
perspective.
e crossover disciplines also rely repeatedly on the intrinsic har-
mony between number and space. As we have observed, this harmony
goes back to God, who ordained them both. e distinction between
number and space is the most outstanding distinction that is linked by
God-ordained harmony. But in a broader sense we can see less striking
distinctions throughout mathematics. Each number is what it is, and has
distinct properties.
For example, the number two is even, while three is odd. Two is the
only even prime (a prime is a number that has no positive integer divisors
except one and itself). ree is the lowest nontrivial triangular number.
(A triangular number is a number that is the sum of successive integers,
beginning with 1. ree is a triangular number, because 3 = 1 + 2. e
next triangular number aer 3 is 6 = 1 + 2 + 3.) Each number has some
properties that are unique toit.
In addition, each kind of number, such as fractions or negative num-
bers, has its own distinctiveness. According to our antireductionistic
stance (chapter4), each thing is what it is and is not exhaustively reduc-
ible to anything else.
2
An antireductionistic approach should positively
appreciate each mathematical object as well as each carnation, each squir-
rel, each oak tree, and each person. We arm the many, not simply the
one, as objects of appreciation. As our appreciation increases, our praise
to God should also increase. God’s wisdom, innity, and beauty are re-
ected in the things he has made and in the minds that he hasmade.
2
For the broader context for antireductionism, see Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy; Poythress, Symphonic eol-
ogy: e Validity of Multiple Perspectives in eology (reprint; Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2001).
Conclusion
When God created the world, he also ordained all the characteristics of
the world. It is he who species all the truths about the world, including
the truths of mathematics.
God’s speech reveals his character. His speech is divine, with divine
characteristics, and this speech includes truths about mathematics. Be-
cause every aspect of this world reveals God’s character, it is a delicate
question as to what reects the necessity of God’s character and who he
is, and on the other hand what reects the contingency of the decisions
God made to create a world such as the one we enjoy.
In any case, the world reects the character of God and reveals God,
so that we should respond in worship and praise. Christ the Lord is not
only the creator of the world, but also its redeemer. rough faith in him
we may be reconciled to God and turn from suppressing the truth about
God that he reveals in the world. But the process of recovery is gradual.
e Bible describes one aspect of the process as renewal of themind:
I appeal to you therefore, brothers, by the mercies of God, to present
your bodies as a living sacrice, holy and acceptable to God, which
is your spiritual worship. Do not be conformed to this world, but be
transformed by the renewal of your mind, that by testing you may
discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and
perfect. (Rom. 12:1–2)
As part of the renewal of our minds, we need to be renewed in our think-
ing about mathematics. We need to grow in seeing it as a gi from God
that reects the giver—and to give thanks with increasing devotion. May
this book help in the process.
Supplements
Resources
is book represents a beginning, rather than an end. Other people have
written already about the bearing of Christian faith on mathematics, and
still others will write more in the future. One major resource is found
in James Nickel, Mathematics: Is God Silent?,
1
which contains not only
much historical information but illustrations that are useful for teaching
mathematics. ere is also an early article, Vern S. Poythress, “A Biblical
View of Mathematics.”
2
Resources for teaching and for further discussion can also be found
with the Association for Christians in the Mathematical Sciences. is
Association provides a forum for discussions related to Christian faith,
theology, mathematics, and related elds such as computer science. It
has a number of resources, including a website, http:// www .acms online
.org/, a journal (Journal of the ACMS), and a biennial conference (in odd-
numbered years).
Steve Bishop has compiled an online bibliography for books and ar-
ticles on Christianity and mathematics.
3
It references a more extensive,
older (1983) bibliography by Gene B. Chase and Calvin Jongsma.
4
I am grateful for two writings
5
of D. H. . Vollenhoven that originally
1
James Nickel, Mathematics: Is God Silent? rev. ed. (Vallecito, CA: Ross, 2001).
2
Vern S. Poythress, “A Biblical View of Mathematics,” in Gary North, ed., Foundations of Christian Scholar-
ship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective
(Vallecito, CA: Ross, 1976), 158–188; http:// www .frame -poythress .org
/a -biblical -view -of -mathematics/, accessed December 29, 2012.
3
Steve Bishop, “A Bibliography for a Christian Approach to Mathematics” (June 7, 2008); http:// www .scribd
.com /doc /3268416/A -bibliography -for -a -Christian -approach -to -mathematics, accessed September 17, 2012.
4
Gene Chase and Calvin Jongsma, “Bibliography of Christianity and Mathematics, 1st edition 1983”; http://
www .asa3 .org /ASA /top ics /Mathematics /1983 Bibliography.html, accessed July 30, 2012. is bib liography was
published by Dordt College Press in 1983, but is now out of print.
5
D. H. . Vollenhoven, “Problemen en richtingen in de wijsbegeerte der wiskunde” [Problems and Directions
in the Philosophy of Mathematics], Philosophia Reformata 1 (1936): 162–187; D. H. . Vollenhoven, De wijs-
begeerte der wiskunde van theïstisch standpunt [e Philosophy of Mathematics from a eistic Standpoint]
150 Resources
drew my attention to the issues in understanding mathematics from a
Christian standpoint.
ose who want to set Christian thinking about mathematics within a
larger context might consult some of my books that consider a larger con-
text: science (Redeeming Science), probability (Chance and the Sovereignty
of God), philosophy (Redeeming Philosophy), and worldviews (Inerrancy
and Worldview).
6
(Amsterdam: Van Soest, 1918). On the philosophy of the law-idea, see Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy,
appendix A.
6
Poythress, Redeeming Science; Poythress, Chance and the Sovereignty of God: A God-Centered Approach to
Probability and Random Events (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2014); Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy; Poythress,
Inerrancy and Worldview.
Appendix A
Secular Theories about the
Foundations of Mathematics
People concerned with the philosophy of mathematics have discussed
for a long time what mathematics really is, and what numbers are. In
most of this discussion, God has been absent from the picture. And that
creates diculties. e major diculty is that omitting God falsies the
picture not only for mathematics but for anything at all that we want to
study. God is omnipresent, all-present. He is present in the whole world
and every aspect of the world. In addition, he is sovereign ruler over
the world, so that everything owes its existence to him. Leaving him out
means leaving out the primary source both for existence and for meaning.
Reductionisms
People have nevertheless done it. In the area of philosophy of mathemat-
ics, it has resulted in reductionism. Mathematics gets “reduced” to some
aspect of the world. e history of philosophy has seen several main com-
petitors for explaining mathematics: Platonism, empiricism, logicism,
intuitionism, formalism, and predicativism.
1
Each of these has a favorite
starting point. is starting point becomes the preferred platform for
explaining everything else in mathematics.
1
Leon Horsten, “Philosophy of Mathematics,” e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition),
ed. Edward N. Zalta, http:// plato .stanford .edu /archives /spr2014 /entries /philosophy -mathematics/, accessed
June 18, 2014.
152 Appendix A
Platonism starts with an ideal realm, which contains abstract ideas,
including numbers and all mathematical truths. is abstract realm al-
legedly exists before the mathematician starts his work. Empiricism starts
with sense experience, such as the experience of seeing four apples. Logi-
cism starts with logic. Intuitionism starts with human subjectivity, and
especially mental intuitions about numbers and mathematical objects.
Formalism starts with language, especially the polished formal languages
used in mathematical proof theory. Predicativism, a view in some ways
intermediate between Platonism and intuitionism, accepts the whole
numbers 1, 2, 3, … as unproblematic. ey can be accepted either be-
cause of their Platonic existence or through intuition. Predicativism ac-
cepts more complex mathematical objects only when these objects can
be “built up” gradually from the natural numbers, by one or more stages.
According to Platonism, mathematics really derives from the ideal
realm of truth. According to empiricism, mathematics arises from human
generalizations, beginning from sense experience of countable objects
and spatially extended objects. According to logicism, mathematics de-
rives from logic. And so on for the other views.
We can see that each of these approaches reduces mathematics to
its favorite starting point. ese approaches hope to explain the whole
of mathematics as an unproblematic derivation from this focal starting
point. But some of the approaches, it turns out, have gaps in their ex-
planations that cannot be lled. Others have implausibilities. And all of
them suer from a failure to explain fully the multidimensional character
of mathematics that we experience in practice as we use mathematics in
relation to the world and in relation to a variety of realms of thoughts.
God ordained a world with diversity. Even though the world exhibits har-
monies between physics and mathematics, between counting and space,
and so on, these harmonies do not dissolve the richness.
Some of the philosophical approaches can be classied using Frame’s
three perspectives on ethics. Platonism and logicism have an anity to
the normative perspective. ey postulate norms for mathematics, norms
that stem either from an ideal realm (Platonism) or from logic (logicism).
Empiricism in mathematics has an anity to the situational perspec-
tive. It focuses on the ties between mathematics and the world that we
Secular Theories about the Foundations of Mathematics 153
experience. Intuitionism has an anity with the existential perspective.
It starts with the human mind, and focuses on its subjective intuitions
about numbers. Formalism and predicativism are more dicult to clas-
sify. Formalism has a focus on formal languages, which have features
that are normative (rules for derivations) and features that are external
to human subjectivity (written language tokens are “in the world,” in the
situation). Predicativism believes both in norms—the objective existence
of less complex mathematical objects—and the necessity of care to make
sure of our intuitions with less complex objects before we build more
complexones.
Let us now briey consider some of the diculties involved with the
various secular approaches.
Platonism
Platonism says that numbers and mathematics belong to a realm of ab-
stract ideas, a realm that exists before mathematicians begin to study it.
In their everyday work, most mathematicians tend to operate with as-
sumptions resembling Platonism. ey assume that the objects that they
study exist and that the truth about them is “out there” to be obtained.
In addition, from a Christian point of view we can say that Platonism is
close to the truth. God already knows about all mathematical objects and
all mathematical truths before human beings start their investigations.
So the objects and the truths are “out there,” namely in the mind ofGod.
Platonism originated with the Greek philosopher Plato, who main-
tained that genuine human knowledge is knowledge of abstract forms or
ideas—the idea of the good, the idea of justice, the idea of beauty, and
so on. e natural numbers, the truths about numbers, and the truths
about geometry can easily be added to the list of ideas. Plato conceived of
the ideas as abstract concepts that exist independently of everythingelse.
In addition to Plato’s original view, there are possible modications.
Christian thinkers who wanted to adopt Plato altered his view by placing
the ideas in the mind of God. We will discuss this Christianized view in
the following appendix.
Secular Platonism for mathematics began to get into trouble in the
154 Appendix A
late nineteenth century, when logicians discovered logical paradoxes that
shook condence in human beings’ ability to access an alleged Platonic
realm. e paradoxes included Russell’s paradox about the set consisting
of all sets that do not contain themselves. Does this set contain itself?
Answering either yes or no leads to a contradiction. People also encoun-
tered the paradox of “the set of all sets.” Does this set include itself? en
it has to be bigger than itself.
2
If mathematicians could through their intuition directly access the
Platonic realm of mathematical ideals, why did they themselves some-
times produce contradictions in the form of these paradoxes? And if they
could not access the Platonic realm, what good did it do to postulate its
existence?
A Christian has a dierent kind of answer. We distinguish between
our own knowledge and intuition on the one hand, and God’s knowledge
on the other hand. Our own stumbling over paradoxes just indicates the
limitations of nite human knowledge. It is not a failure of God, who
remains consistent with himself.
In addition to these problems, Platonism does not really explain why
there is a harmony between three perspectives on mathematics. e nor-
mative perspective focuses on the realm of abstract ideas; the situational
perspective focuses on the usefulness of mathematics in the world around
us; and the existential perspective focuses on our ability to understand
mathematics and our intuitive understanding of basic mathematical con-
cepts like the concept of number. Why do these three agree? Platonism
has to introduce another factor: Plato postulated a creator (the “demi-
urge”) to make things in the world aer the model of the original abstract
ideas.
Empiricism
A second philosophical approach is empiricism. Empiricism in math-
ematics endeavors to derive mathematics by starting with sense experi-
ence. Empiricism has fared the worst in the twentieth century. It may
seem plausible to begin with ordinary experience of seeing objects in the
2
Poythress, Logic, appendix A1.
Secular Theories about the Foundations of Mathematics 155
world. But we already confront the problem of the one and the many.
Earlier we explained how our minds can generalize from experiences of
two apples to the number two, which is an abstraction in comparison
to the two apples. e number two is the “one,” in relation to the many
particular instances of two apples and two peaches. is process of gen-
eralization relies on the relation of the one to the many. So empiricism
also relies on this relation, which it cannot explain.
In addition, advanced mathematics has applications in physics, and
it seems impossible to explain this applicability by starting merely with
the simple facts about two apples or four apples. e growth of intense
mathematical applications in the twentieth century has decreased the
plausibility of empiricism.
A Christian answer is dierent. God made a world that conforms to ar-
ithmetical and geometrical laws. It is natural for us as embodied creatures
to start from experiences of this world. But when we start, we start with
minds made in the image of God. So our minds are in tune with the world.
And we can generalize from our experiences, because our minds are also
in tune with the mind of God. We can see the coherent functioning of
Frame’s three perspectives. In the normative perspective, we observe that
our minds are in tune with the mind of God. In the situational perspective,
we observe that our minds are in tune with the world, which God made.
And in the existential perspective, we observe that it is our minds, minds
of people made in the image of God, that do the mathematics.
Logicism
Logicism is associated with the work of Alfred North Whitehead and
Bertrand Russell. ey jointly undertook to write the three-volume work
Principia Mathematica,
3
in which they hoped to start with purely logical
principles and derive all of mathematics from these principles. But they
had to include an “axiom of innity,” which postulated the existence of an
innite number of objects. is principle did not appear to be simply a
matter of logic. In addition, in 1930 the program hit the rocks. Kurt Gödel
3
Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1927).
156 Appendix A
showed that no specic list of axioms could capture all the mathematical
truths about whole numbers.
4
Mathematics could not be derived from
logic alone.
5
Intuitionism
Intuitionism was a route in the philosophy of mathematics started by
L.E.J. Brouwer.
6
According to intuitionism, mathematics is the creation
of the human mind. e focus on the human mind is akin to Frame’s
existential perspective. But this perspective is forced to function within a
non-Christian context, as is evident from the fact that the human mind,
not the divine mind, becomes the standard for truth. As we might expect,
there are diculties.
According to Brouwer, no mathematical statement ought to be re-
garded as either true or false until it has been proved or refuted. Intuition-
ism is most famous because it denies the law of excluded middle, that is,
that a proposition must be either true or false.
How could anyone deny the law of excluded middle? Brouwer was
concerned about mathematical propositions whose truth is at present still
unknown. One such proposition, called Goldbach’s conjecture, says that
every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes.
7
As of 2014,
no one knows whether Goldbach’s conjecture is true. No counterexample
has been found, but neither has anyone proved that it is true for every
even number greater than 2. According to Brouwer’s view, Goldbach’s
conjecture should be regarded as neither true nor false until we nd a
counterexample or a proof.
Intuitionist assumptions have led to fruitful explorations in logic.
Even without accepting Brouwer’s metaphysical convictions about math-
4
Poythress, Logic, chapter 56 and appendix D1.
5
1983 saw the birth of neo-logicism, which evaded Gödel’s strictures by using more powerful assumptions
and more powerful logic (Horsten, “Philosophy of Mathematics,” §2.1). But critics have complained that its
foundational assumptions implicitly added arithmetic to logic, so there was no genuine “reduction” to logic.
6
Poythress, Logic, chapter 64; Mark van Atten, “Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer,” e Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition)
, ed. Edward N. Zalta, http:// plato .stanford .edu /archives /sum2011 /entries
/brouwer/, accessed June 18, 2014; Rosalie Iemho, “Intuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics,” e
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition)
, ed. Edward N. Zalta, http:// plato .stanford .edu
/archives /spr2014 /entries /intuitionism/, accessed June 18, 2014.
7
A prime number is a whole number whose only divisors are 1 and the prime itself. us 3 is a prime, because
its only divisors are 1 and 3. 5 and 7 are also primes. 4 is not, because 4 has 2 as a divisor. 9 is not, because 9
has 3 as a divisor.
Secular Theories about the Foundations of Mathematics 157
ematics, a logician can explore what can and cannot be deduced once we
avoid utilizing the law of excluded middle as a given assumption. Intu-
itionism also introduced the fruitful idea of a constructive proof. Roughly
speaking, a proof that is not constructive shows that some postulated
mathematical object exists, but does not actually “construct” the object or
pick it out. Rather, the proof proceeds by showing that the nonexistence
of such an object would lead to a contradiction. Classical mathematics
accepts both constructive and nonconstructive proofs, while intuition-
ism accepts only constructive proofs. All mathematicians agree that there
is a dierence, and that the dierence is logically and mathematically
interesting. So all mathematicians can in principle feel free to study and
search for constructive proofs. e quarrel is over the metaphysical status
of nonconstructive proofs.
us, intuitionism has led to some fruitful mathematical ideas. But it
has diculties as a philosophy.
First, an intuitionism of a Brouwerian sort does not provide an ad-
equate mathematical foundation for parts of mathematical analysis that
are regularly used in science. It does not really explain this kind of applica-
bility, nor does it even provide endorsement for using the mathematics in
the way that scientists use it. Scientists accordingly pay no attention to in-
tuitionism. And even most mathematicians want the benet from regions
of mathematics that cannot be established using intuitionistic principles.
Second, the key intuitionistic claim that a proposition is neither true
nor false until it is proved or refuted is counterintuitive, and seems to many
people to confuse truth with proof. Truth concerns what is the case. Proof
concerns what human beings can prove or demonstrate to be thecase.
As an example, consider Fermat’s last theorem. is famous theorem
was conjectured to be true by Pierre de Fermat in 1637, but was proved
only in 1994 by Andrew Wiles. Does Brouwer’s intuitionism say that it
was neither true nor false until it was proved in 1994? is way of putting
it seems to redene the normal meaning of “true” and “false.” Surely, ac-
cording to our ordinary way of speaking, the theorem was true in 1637,
but no human being knew it was true until Wiles produced a proof in
1994. Even then the rest of the world did not know it was true until Wiles
published the proof in1995.
158 Appendix A
Intuitionism has tried to evade this diculty by speaking of an “ideal
mathematician.” e ideal mathematician can run ahead of what we
know today, but still can never complete an innite process. e di-
culty here is that our limited knowledge does not permit us to say what
the ideal mathematician might achieve. It leaves us with a situation where
some mathematical propositions are true and known to be so, others are
true and not yet known to be so, and still others are not knowable by
human beings. Only the third category is viewed as neither true nor false.
ere is a grain of truth to intuitionism. If no human being knows
whether a particular mathematical proposition is true, do we even know
for sure whether we have a clear idea of what it would mean for it to be
true? Intuitionism is wrestling with the problems raised by the limitations
of human knowledge and the niteness of the human mind. Unfortu-
nately, as a philosophy it does not bring into the picture the innity of
God’s mind. It seems to assume that human minds are ultimate determin-
ers of truth, rather than imitators of truth that God already knows. With
this assumption, it concludes that a proposition cannot be true unless
some human being could come to know that itis.
Formalism
e philosophy of formalism says that mathematics is the study of formal
languages and “formal systems,” in which there are axioms and rules for
deduction. Mathematics explores what can be deduced from the chosen
axioms.
Much fascinating work can be done in studying deductions and proofs.
But this study is only one aspect of the whole of mathematics. Formalism
by itself does not explain why certain axioms are chosen in preference to
others. e axioms that are chosen are ones that are fruitful. e axioms
match the world or they match certain pieces of mathematics already done
less formally. Formalism does not account for these relationships that ex-
tend outside the formal system and are the key reason motivating its study.
Nor does formalism explain the ways that mathematicians search for
new results and new theorems. ey do not merely manipulate formal
symbols according to formal rules. ey use intuitive conceptions and
Secular Theories about the Foundations of Mathematics 159
pictures that guide them in a search for a more formal proof. us, even
when the mathematical results are formalized aerward, the formaliza-
tion captures only one aspect of the whole. It does not deal well with the
existential perspective, which includes the intuitions of mathematicians,
nor with the situational perspective, which includes the applicability of
mathematics to the world.
Gödel’s proof has had an eect on formalism as well as on logicism. It
established not only that one cannot build mathematics wholly on logic,
but also that one cannot build it wholly on a formalization of the axioms
within formal language.
8
Predicativism
Predicativism is a philosophical approach that is more complex, and
therefore more dicult to explain in simple terms. It accepts the natural
numbers as a given. e natural numbers are given either by our intuition
or by a Platonic realm or by both. But predicativism tries to avoid the
paradoxes, like Russell’s paradox,
9
by being modest about what sets can
be constructed using the natural numbers as abase.
For example, predicativism accepts by intuition the set whose mem-
bers are all natural numbers. It also accepts the set of positive even num-
bers, because this set can be dened as a subset of the natural numbers,
using a clearly dened property (“even”). It does not, however, accept a set
that is dened in a way that already implicitly refers to the set in question.
Such a denition is called impredicative.
10
e modesty is understandable, given that paradoxes have arisen
when people have become overcondent that their intuitions must match
the Platonic realm. But predicativism is less a complete philosophy than
it is a program recommending a certain kind of modesty. It does not
explain the multitude of relationships that we have seen between mental
mathematics (the existential perspective), mathematics applied to the
world (the situational perspective), and mathematics as a reection of a
transcendent norm (the normative perspective).
8
Poythress, Logic, chapters 55–58 and appendix D1.
9
Ibid., appendix A1.
10
Horsten, “Philosophy of Mathematics,” §2.4.
160 Appendix A
Other Philosophical Approaches
We may also mention briey some other philosophical approaches to
mathematics. First, William van Orman Quine advocated a philosophi-
cal methodology that came to be called philosophical naturalism.
11
He
suggested that our best knowledge was from scientic theories, and that
philosophy should take its clue from scientic knowledge. In philosophy
of mathematics, this approach means that we accept mathematics that is
used in the sciences. is approach has the obvious disadvantage that it
leaves unexamined the foundations of science.
Another position, structuralism, says that mathematics does not de-
scribe “entities” in an abstract, Platonic realm, but structures, which are
characterized by laws and relationships. e natural numbers, for ex-
ample, are a structure with rules for addition and multiplication, and we
can add to these rules more complex relationships (for example, expo-
nents, prime numbers, factorization, numerical representation in base
10 or base2).
is position has an anity with the multiperspectival position that
we have adopted. ere are multiple relations between numbers and the
human mind and the world. But by itself structuralism does not explain
why some structures with some laws are privileged over others in math-
ematical studies. So its explanation is still one-dimensional.
Another position, nominalism, tries to dispense with abstract entities
like numbers altogether, and to deal only with concrete instantiations,
which it enlists to play the roles formerly played by abstract entities. But
this position has diculties. It is beset, to begin with, by the same dif-
culties that beset medieval nominalism (chapter2). In addition, it does
not account well for the activity of mathematicians, who think about
abstractions.
Summary
In addition to the more specialized problems, the secular philosophies
share this same great problem: they suppress the revelation of the char-
acter of God in mathematics (Rom. 1:18–23).
11
Ibid., §3.2.
Appendix B
Christian Modifications of
Philosophies of Mathematics
Now we consider ways in which Christians have attempted to answer
questions in the philosophy of mathematics—questions about the nature
of numbers and mathematical objects, and the nature of mathematical
truths. ere are two main traditional approaches, modied Platonism
and modied empiricism.
1
Christianized Platonism
Christian thinkers who wanted to adopt Plato altered his view by placing
Plato’s realm of ideas within the mind of God. According to this think-
ing, Plato’s idea of the good exists within God’s mind. So does the idea of
justice, and the idea of a horse. When applied to arithmetic, this approach
implies that numbers and truths about numbers have their original exis-
tence in the mind ofGod.
is Christian alteration of Platonism is an improvement over Plato’s
own thinking. For one thing, it personalizes truth, by making truths not
impersonal abstractions but truths within a personal mind, the mind of
God. It also avoids the problem that would be generated if numbers and
truths about numbers were eternal realities independent of God. If they
1
James Bradley and Russell Howell, Mathematics through the Eyes of Faith (New York: HarperOne, 2011),
chapter 10, 221–243. I say “traditional,” but modied empiricism, as represented by cosmonomic philosophy,
is relatively recent (twentieth century) in comparison with modied Platonism, which goes back to Saint
Augustine.
162 Appendix B
were, it would seem to suggest that they constitute additional absolutes
alongside God. ey compete with God for ultimacy. But truths within
the mind of God obviously do not compete withhim.
Christianized Platonism also has a partial answer for the questions
about the relation between mathematics as a norm, mathematics as ap-
plicable to the world, and mathematics as mental operations in the mind
of man. ese three correspond to Frame’s normative, situational, and
existential perspectives, respectively. Secular philosophies of mathemat-
ics have deep diculty in explaining how the three harmonize (appendix
A above). Christianized Platonism, on the other hand, can say that they
harmonize because God uses the numerical ideas in his mind when he
creates the world, thus authorizing the situational perspective. And he
makes man in the image of God, with man’s mind in harmony with God’s
mind, and thereby establishes harmony between normative mathematics
in God’s mind and existential mathematics in man’smind.
However, Christianized Platonism still has diculties. It suers from
not having dealt fully with the problem of the one and the many (see
chapter2). Christianized Platonism makes the one, namely the original
idea in the mind of God, prior to the many, namely the horses or cats
or other created things that embody the idea. Likewise, with respect to
numbers, Christianized Platonism says that the abstract number 2 within
the mind of God is the original idea, and the collections of two apples and
two pears in the world are derivative from the idea. e unity of the num-
ber 2 is prior to the diversity of collections of two objects in the world.
Let us think about this problem. God’s plan for the world exists prior
to the world. e world derives from his plan. But his plan includes both
unity and diversity. He plans to create the species of horse as well as all
the individual horses belonging to the species. Likewise, his plan includes
both the number 2 and the diversity of collections of two objects. God
then executes his plan and brings it into realization in time by creating
both the species and some of the individual horses. He executes his plan
with respect to numbers by creating a world in which there are collections
of two apples and two pears. ese collections are “the many.” What is
common to the collections, namely being collections of two objects, is
Christian Modifications of Philosophies of Mathematics 163
“the one.” So in a more consistently Christian view, the one and the many
are equally ultimate.
ere are further diculties with Christian Platonism, concerning
its conception of the nature of ideas that it postulates in the mind of
God.
2
It does not thoroughly articulate the fact that God is Creator and
we are creatures, so that ideas in our mind do not exhaust the ideas in
God’smind.
Frame’s square on transcendence and immanence, discussed earlier
(chapter5), is relevant. According to a non-Christian view of divine im-
manence, our ideas, when they are true, are virtually identical to the ideas
in God’s mind. Our own minds can serve as a standard. While a Christian
would naturally deny this principle in most cases, do our minds serve
as a nal standard in the area of numbers and mathematics? Is our idea
of the number 2 identical with the idea in God’s mind? How can it be
identical without encompassing a knowledge of all the many dimensional
relationships between numbers and other things? And if it is not identical
to God’s idea, is there genuine human knowledge of2?
Platonism has always suered from the problem that the kind of
knowledge that it postulates must be virtually God-like knowledge of
the eternal ideas, if it is to be knowledge at all. Platonism, even Christian-
ized Platonism, runs the danger of breaking down the Creator-creature
distinction and falling into non-Christian immanence. Christianized Pla-
tonism in mathematics runs the same danger with respect to mathemati-
cal ideas and mathematical truths.
Christianized Empiricism
Christianized empiricism is the other major approach to Christian
philosophy of mathematics. Christianized empiricism has arisen most
prominently with a tradition called cosmonomic philosophy. Cosmo-
nomic philosophy is a rich and complex tradition, which we cannot here
discuss fully.
3
We may sketch out the main cosmonomic position briey, simplifying
2
Poythress, Logic, part I.C.
3
See Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy, appendix A.
164 Appendix B
at some points. Cosmonomic philosophy, in one of its common forms,
says that numbers and truths about numbers are part of the created order.
e same principle holds for space and for truths about space. e truths
about numbers and space have been created and are not eternal. is way
of construing numbers conspicuously avoids the diculties of Platonism,
which has to postulate the eternality of numbers and of ideas about space,
and thereby runs the danger of producing a second eternality in competi-
tion with the eternality of God. In cosmonomic philosophy, there can be
no such competition, because only God is eternal, while numbers and
space are not. (God knows from eternity what he will create, but that is
another matter.)
Cosmonomic philosophy distinguishes two aspects of the created
order: (1)created things, such as rocks, plants, animals, and human be-
ings; and (2)laws governing the created things. Collections of two apples
or two pears are created things. e laws governing collections of two
things, such as the law that 2 + 2 = 4, are laws and not things. ere
are many kinds of laws, which govern numbers, space, motion, physical
interactions, language, and so on. Together, these laws are the laws of
the cosmos—hence the term cosmonomic, which comes from two Greek
words, for cosmos and forlaw.
Cosmonomic philosophy is akin to empiricism in its view of num-
bers, because it maintains that numbers are rst of all characteristic of
the world around us. We learn from the world what numbers are. But it
avoids many of the problems of secular empiricism. It can arm all three
of Frame’s perspectives in harmony, because it acknowledges God as Cre-
ator. God created the laws concerning numbers (normative perspective);
God created the created things that are subject to the laws (situational
perspective); and God created human beings in the image of God (exis-
tential perspective). Since human beings are made in the image of God,
they can faithfully interpret what they see in the world, including what
they see concerning its quantitative nature. e same principle goes for
space as well as quantity. And from there the principle can be extended
to all of mathematics, which represents more complicated forms of law
that God ordained for the cosmos.
Cosmonomic philosophy might also give an answer to the problem of
Christian Modifications of Philosophies of Mathematics 165
the one and the many. God created both aspects of the world. So neither
needs to be prior to the other. (is solution is unlike Christianized Pla-
tonism, which gives denite priority to the one, the original idea in the
mind of God.) On the other hand, a critic might still wonder whether the
way in which cosmonomic philosophy gives its description of creation
involves some subtle prioritizing of the one to the many. e law appears
to be one in relation to the many created things that it governs. Since it
governs the many, it is in some sense prior tothem.
A biblically based approach can arm that God’s speech species
the whole creation. It species both the general principles, which express
unities, and the individual items and events, which express diversities.
But most expositions of cosmonomic philosophy do not appear to have
taken this route in discussing laws for the cosmos. ey treat the law as
general, not specically a law for one collection of two specic apples. But
perhaps this is only a supercial preference.
Cosmonomic philosophy has an appeal because it is more “modest”
about how we know the mind of God. We as human beings know the mind
of God only in the context of the world that God created and in the context
of our own nite minds. In fact, we never have a direct divine vision of
the ideas in God’s mind. Nor do we have a direct vision of numbers as one
kind of idea that allegedly exists in God’s mind. How, in fact, do we know
what the “organization” of God’s mind is like? Cosmonomic philosophy
would advise us to come down to earth and avoid speculation that is not
suitable for us as creatures, who live underneath and not above God’slaws.
e diculty here is the opposite of Christianized Platonism. e
diculty is that we may unwittingly fall into a form of non-Christian
transcendence. If we are not careful, we may dri into a form of thinking
in which we think that God is unknowable, distant, behind the law, while
the law is the only thing that we can actually access. If, for example, the
number 3 is created, and not eternal, how can we say that God is three
persons? We could say that he appears to us who are underneath the law
as three persons. But God who is behind the law cannot really be three
persons, because threeness is not eternal. Nor can we understand what it
would mean for the Word to be with God eternally, because that involves
using a distinction between the Word and God, as two persons, and thus
166 Appendix B
involves the number 2, which allegedly is merely a creation of God, and
did not exist eternally.
e people who developed cosmonomic philosophy were believers
in Christ, who held orthodox Trinitarian beliefs. I am glad that they did.
And I also trust that they genuinely intended that cosmonomic philoso-
phy would be compatible with Trinitarian belief and with the knowability
of God, in the sense of a Christian view of immanence, that is, corner
#2 of Frame’s square. But the philosophy they articulated le this point
unclear at best. Its discussion of law is muddied.
4
e muddiness appears
to me unfortunately to leave the door open to an interpretation where we
actually fall victim to non-Christian thinking about God’s transcendence
and immanence. And this muddiness aects the philosophy of math-
ematics, as well as every other area of thought.
In addition, if we fall into a non-Christian view of God’s transcen-
dence, we easily also fall victim to a non-Christian view of God’s imma-
nence. Let us illustrate how the reasoning could go. Suppose Jill assumes
that God is beyond number, because the laws are created. en she rea-
sons that numbers belong to us as human beings who interact with the
cosmos. Since the cosmos is created in a unied way, her own thinking
about numbers can, at least apart from the fall, serve as a standard. She
realizes that she does not need to claim that she herself is the absolutely
ultimate standard that belongs only to God. Rather, the position that she
occupies is a position as a proximate standard. It is, however, the only
standard that she actually needs within the world, because she has been
created by God so that she fully conforms in her thinking to the way the
world is. So she can be a master in her thinking in that respect.
Now Jill comes to confront God’s revelation to her in Scripture. She
reasons (falsely, by the way) that she can still be master, because when
the word comes to her, it comes within the cosmic order. erefore, she
reasons, she can use her normal standards for numbers in examining
Scripture. And therefore also she concludes that Trinitarian theology is
false, because it does not rationally and transparently conform to her
preestablished standards.
4
See ibid.
Christian Modifications of Philosophies of Mathematics 167
us she has arrived at a non-Christian view of immanence, in which
her ideas about number serve as standard, and are used to judge alleged
claims of divine revelation.
I should stress that cosmonomic philosophers as orthodox Christian
believers did not want any of this train of reasoning. By spinning out
Jill’s reasoning, I am illustrating the dangers that accrue when we remain
unclear about the dierence between Christian and non-Christian forms
of transcendence and immanence. And these dierences aect reasoning
about the quantitative order of things.
us, we need to maintain the Creator-creature distinction, and to
maintain what goes along with it, a Christian view of transcendence and
immanence. is view needs to remain in place when we think about
mathematics. God’s thoughts are superior to ours (Christian transcen-
dence); in addition, his power and his revelation give us genuine access
to his thoughts (Christian immanence). e modern world is used to
thinking about one level, not two—it ignores the Creator-creature dis-
tinction. Breaking with this modern way of thinking can take eort, but
is an integral aspect of being faithful followers of Christ.
Appendix C
Deriving Arithmetic
In chapter9 we introduced Peano’s axioms. With those axioms as a start-
ing point, we can dene addition and multiplication and derive arith-
metical truths. We illustrate the process here with simple beginnings.
Addition
We can dene addition using the successor relation, symbolized by S (as
explained in chapter9). In our denitions, the symbols m and n designate
natural numbers.
(a) Dene m + 1 to be Sm, the successor of m: m + 1 = Sm. at is,
the operation of adding 1 to m has as its result the successor ofm.
(b) Dene m + Sn = S(m + n). at is, once addition with n has
been dened, the operation of adding the successor of n (Sn) to
m is dened as the successor of the number obtained by adding
ntom.
ese two denitions together allow us to dene addition for all natural
numbers m and n. Why? Because, no matter now large n is, we can gradu-
ally reach it by starting with the denition (a) and then repeatedly using
(b). e repeated use of (b) in eect uses the principle of mathematical
induction. e property M in this case is the following property: M is
said to hold true for the number n if the process of adding the number
n to other numbers (m) has been dened. e property M clearly holds
for n=1, because of denition (a). And denition (b) implies that the
property M will always hold for the successor of n, once it holds forn.
Deriving Arithmetic 169
2 + 2 = 4
Let us show that 2 + 2 = 4. Now 2 is dened to be the successor of 1: 2 =
S1. en 3 is dened to be the second successor of 1: 3 = S2 = SS1. Finally,
4 is dened to be the third successor aer 1: 4 = S3 = SS2 =SSS1.
2 + 1 = S1 + 1 (by denition of 2) = SS1 (by denition (a)) = 3 (by
denition of 3).
2 + 2 = 2 + S1 (by denition of 2) = S(2 + 1) (by denition (b)) = S3
(by the previous line) = 4 (by denition of 4).
If we want to establish results for larger numbers, it just takes more
time. Consider, for example, some cases involving addition to the num-
ber3:
1. 3 + 1 = S3 (by (a)) = 4 (by denition of 4).
2. 3 + 2 = 3 + S1 = S(3 + 1) (by (b)) = S4 (by line 1 above) = SSSS1
(by denition of 4) = 5 (by denition of 5).
3. 3 + 3 = 3 + SS1 (by denition of 3) = S(3 + S1) (by (b)) = S(3 +
2) = S5 (by line 2) = 6 (by denition of 6).
4. 3 + 4 = 3 + SSS1 (by denition of 4) = S(3 + SS1) (by (b)) = S(3
+ 3) (by denition of 3) = S6 (by line 3) = 7 (by denition of 7).
5. 3 + 5 = 3 + S4 = S(3 + 4) (by (b)) = S7 = 8 (by denition of 8).
The Associative Law for Addition
Let us try to establish a general result:
eorem: for all natural numbers k, m, and n, (k + m) + n = k +
(m+n).
is theorem is called the associative law for addition.
Let us rst try to establish the simpler result that (k + m) + 1 = k +
(m+ 1). Let us call it a lemma (a result that will be used later).
Lemma: (k + m) + 1 = k + (m + 1).
Proof: We use mathematical induction, where we treat k as xed, and
we try to go through the numbers m starting with m = 1. is process
170 Appendix C
is called induction on m. In this case, the property M for mathematical
induction is the property that (k + m) + 1 = k + (m +1).
Step (a). Is the principle (k + m) + 1 = k + (m + 1) true when m = 1?
k + (1 + 1) = k + S1 (by denition of addition by 1 in denition (a)) =
S(k + 1) (by (b)) = (k + 1) + 1 (by denition of addition by1).
Step (b). Given that the principle is true for m, that is, that (k + m) + 1 =
k + (m + 1), is it true for m +1?
(k + (m + 1)) + 1 = (k + Sm) + 1 = S(k + m) + 1 (by denition of addi-
tion) = SS(k + m) = S((k + m) + 1) = S(k + (m + 1)) (by assumption)
= k + S(m + 1) (by denition of addition) = k + ((m + 1) +1).
Now we are ready to try to establish the general principle, (k + m) +
n = k + (m + n). We use induction on n, beginning with n =1.
Step (a). Is the principle (k + m) + n = k + (m + n) valid when n = 1?
(k + m) + 1 = k + (m + 1), as just established in the lemma.
Step (b). Assume that the principle is valid for n. Can we establish it for
n +1?
(k + m) + (n + 1) = ((k + m) + n) + 1 (by the lemma) = (k + (m + n))
+ 1 (by assumption) = S(k + (m + n)) = k + S(m + n) (by denition
of addition) = k + (m + Sn) (by denition of addition) = k + (m +
(n +1)).
So the principle holds for (n + 1). Since we have done both steps (a) and
(b), we conclude by mathematical induction that the principle holds for
all numbers.
The Commutative Law of Addition
Here is a second theorem:
eorem: m + n = n + m.
Deriving Arithmetic 171
is theorem is called the commutative law for addition. Again we can
use a lemma:
Lemma: m + 1 = 1 + m.
Proof: By induction onm.
Step (a). Is the lemma valid when m = 1?
1 + 1 = 1 + 1.
Step (b). Assume that the lemma is valid for m. We try to establish it for
m +1.
(m + 1) + 1 = S(m + 1) = S(1 + m) (by assumption) = (1 + m) + 1 = 1
+ (m + 1) (by the associativelaw).
Now we are ready to prove the general principle of the commutative law,
m + n = n + m. We do so by induction onn.
Step (a). Is the commutative law valid when n = 1?
m + 1 = 1 + m, which is just the lemma already proved.
Step (b). Assuming that m + n = n + m, can we show it is true for n +1?
m + (n + 1) = m + Sn = S(m + n) (by denition of addition) = S(n +
m) (by assumption) = n + Sm (by denition of addition) = n + (m +
1) = n + (1 + m) (by lemma) = (n + 1) + m (by the associativelaw).
Defining Multiplication
In a similar way, we can dene multiplication and prove its properties.
We will go only a little way in the process.
(a) Dene m × 1 to be m: m × 1 = m. at is, the operation of mul-
tiplying m by 1 has as its result m itself.
(b) Dene m × Sn = (m × n) + m. at is, once multiplication by n
has been dened (m × n), the multiplication by Sn (or n
+ 1) is
dened by adding m to the previous result m × n.
172 Appendix C
e net result of these denitions is that m × n is the result of adding m
to itself for a total of n copies ofm.
Using this denition, we can show that 2 × 2 =4.
2 × 2 = 2 × S1 (by denition of 2) = (2 × 1) + 2 (by denition of
multiplication part (b)) = 2 + 2 (by denition of multiplication part
(a)) =4.
Conclusion
ese exercises may seem tedious. But they show that elementary truths
of arithmetic can be derived from simpler principles, namely Peano’s
axioms. In harmony with our principle of antireductionism (chapter4),
we do not say that this procedure “reduces” numbers to Peano’s axioms.
Rather, Peano’s axioms show one kind of rich relationship between the
numbers and between arithmetical truths and logical derivations. We
could turn the process on its head, and say that Peano’s axioms are “de-
rived” from the truths of arithmetic by selecting certain truths. In order
later to serve as axioms, the truths that we select must together be enough
to derive therest.
Appendix D
Mathematical Induction
We include other illustrations of mathematical induction.
Sum of Odd Numbers
e sum of the rst n odd numbers is n × n = n
2
. We can check the truth
of this claim by testing the rst few cases:
1 = 1 × 1 = 1
2
.
1 + 3 = 4 = 2 × 2 = 2
2
.
1 + 3 + 5 = 9 = 3 × 3 = 3
2
.
1 + 3 + 5 + 7 = 16 = 4 × 4 = 4
2
.
But how would we check the truth for every case? We can never complete
the process. is kind of situation makes plain the value of mathematical
induction.
We proceed by induction on n. Step (a) consists in checking the truth
for the value n = 1. We have already done that above: 1 = 1 × 1 =1
2
.
Step (b) begins by assuming that the principle is valid for the number
n, and then trying to establish it for n + 1. Assumethat
1 + 3 + … + (2n - 1) = n
2
.
Now try to do the next case, for n +1.
1 + 3 + … + (2n - 1) + (2n + 1) = ?
174 Appendix D
Since the rst n terms in this sum are the same as in the previous equa-
tion, we can substitute n
2
for the sum of the rst n terms:
1 + 3 + … + (2n - 1) + (2n + 1) = n
2
+ (2n + 1) = n
2
+ 2n + 1 =
(n+1)
2
.
is shows that the formula holds for n + 1. So, by the principle of math-
ematical induction, the formula holds for all n whatsoever.
e principle of mathematical induction enables us to avoid having
to do an innite number of distinct calculations. We can understand and
use this principle because we are made in the image of God, and we can
transcend the particularities of an individual calculation in order to un-
derstand the general pattern.
Using the result for the sum of odd numbers, we have a wonderfully
easy way to calculate the sum of even numbers.
e sum of the rst n even numbers is n
2
+ n.
We could establish this formula by using induction on n. But there is a
simpler way of doing it. Consider again the sum of the rst n odd num-
bers:
1 + 3 + 5 + … + (2n - 1) = n
2
.
Now add a 1 to each of these n numbers:
(1 + 1) + (3 + 1) + (5 + 1) + … + ((2n - 1) + 1) or
2 + 4 + 6 + … + 2n
e result is the sum of the rst n even numbers. Since we have arrived
at this sum by adding a total of n 1’s to the original sum, which was n
2
,
the sum of the rst n even numbers must be the sum n
2
of the rst n odd
numbers, plus an additional n, for a total of n
2
+ n.So
2 + 4 + 6 + … + 2n = n
2
+ n.
If we take the sum of the rst n even numbers, and divide term by
term by 2, we obtain:
Mathematical Induction 175
2/2 + 4/2 + 6/2 + … + 2n/2 = 1 + 2 + 3 + … + n = (n
2
+ n)/2 =
n(n+1)/2.
at is, the sum of the rst n numbers is n(n + 1)/2. is result could
also be obtained directly by mathematical induction.
1
God has ordained
marvelous harmonies by providing several ways in which the same re-
sults may be checkedout.
The Sum of Squares
e sum of the squares of the rst n numbers is n(n + 1)(2n + 1)/6. Again,
we can verify the rst few cases:
1
2
= 1 = 1(1 + 1)(2 × 1 + 1)/6.
1
2
+ 2
2
= 1 + 4 = 5 = 2(2 + 1)(2 × 2 + 1)/6.
1
2
+ 2
2
+ 3
2
= 1 + 4 + 9 = 14 = 3(3 + 1)(2 × 3 + 1)/6.
1
2
+ 2
2
+ 3
2
+ 4
2
= 1 + 4 + 9 + 16 = 30 = 4(4 + 1)(2 × 4 + 1)/6.
Now let us try to show it is alwaystrue.
Step (a). Show that it is true for n = 1. We have already shown it above.
Step (b). Assume that it is true for n. at is, assumethat
1
2
+ 2
2
+ 3
2
+ … + n
2
= n(n + 1)(2n + 1)/6.
e sum for n + 1is
1
2
+ 2
2
+ 3
2
+ … + n
2
+ (n + 1)
2
= n(n + 1)(2n + 1)/6 + (n + 1)
2
(byassumption that the formula holds forn).
Regrouping,
n(n + 1)(2n + 1)/6 + (n + 1)
2
= [n(n + 1)(2n + 1) + 6(n + 1)
2
]/6
= (n + 1)[n(2n + 1) + 6(n + 1)]/6 = (n + 1)[2n
2
+ n + 6n + 6]/6
= (n + 1)(n + 2)(2n + 3)/6 = (n + 1)((n + 1) + 1)(2(n + 1) + 1)/6,
which conrms that the formula holds for n + 1. By induction, it holds
for alln.
1
See Poythress, Redeeming Science, appendix 2.
176 Appendix D
More Perspectives on the Sum of Odd Numbers
We can use other perspectives to show that the sum of the rst n odd
numbers is n
2
. Here is thesum:
1 + 3 + 5 + … + (2n - 3) + (2n - 1)
Write the same sum in the reverse order, and put this new sum directly
under the rst:
1 + 3 + 5 + … + (2n - 3) + (2n - 1)
(2n - 1) + (2n - 3) + (2n
- 5) + … + 3 + 1
Now add the two lines, term byterm:
2n + 2n + 2n + … + 2n + 2n
Since we started with n odd numbers, there are n copies of 2n, for a total
of 2n
2
. is total is the result of adding the original sum of n odd numbers
to itself. So the sum of n odd numbers is half of 2n
2
, orn
2
.
A second perspective on the same sum uses a pictorial diagram to enable
us to see the arithmetical truth (diagram D.1).
In the diagram, the L-shaped regions all contain an odd number of
dots. e odd numbers add up to make a square region containing a
number of dots that is a square number. For example, the number of dots
in the square region with 5 dots on a side is 5
2
. Inspecting the diagram
shows us that the same number of dots is also 1 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 9 =5
2
.
A third perspective on the same problem focuses on the dierence
between n
2
and the next square, (n + 1)
2
. (n + 1)
2
, when multiplied out,
is the same as n
2
+ 2n + 1. Hence,
(n + 1)
2
- n
2
= 2n + 1,
which is an odd number. As n increases, the dierences between the
squares are the successive odd numbers. If we start with n = 1, we obtain
the result that 2
2
- 1
2
= 3. If we arrange the squares in a row, with their dif-
ferences below, we obtain diagram D.2. Each square is 1 (the rst square)
plus the sum of all the dierences to its le and below it. is diagram
Mathematical Induction 177
enables us to take in at a glance the result from mathematical induction,
where we assume the truth for n and try to establish it for n +1.
Diagram D.1: Dots in a Square
Diagram D.2: Squares and Differences
e multiple perspectives for looking at the sum of odd numbers
show the richness of the truths that God has ordained.
Appendix E
Elementary Set Theory
In chapter12 we indicated that sets can be used to introduce axioms from
which the truths of arithmetic can be derived. We would like to explore
the rst steps in this process.
ere are several possibilities for starting axioms. e most common
starting point has become Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the work of Ernst
Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel in the early twentieth century.
1
We will
set forth some of their axioms. But when possible we will express the
meaning of the axioms in ordinary English, so that even readers without
a mathematical background can understand the central point.
The Axiom of Extension
e axiom of extension says that two sets are identical if they contain the
same elements.
is axiom indicates that the concept of set is a “stripped down” con-
cept. We ignore every kind of information except the specications for
which elements belong to theset.
e axiom depends on our ability as human beings made in the image
of God to see the general pattern common to many concrete collections,
and to produce a concept that focuses only on what is common. For
example, if we have two apples sitting on a table, we can think about the
apples in more than one way. If we focus on their past, we can observe
1
omas Jech, “Set eory,” e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N.
Zalta, http:// plato .stanford .edu /archives /win2011 /entries /set -theory/, §4, accessed June 18, 2014.
Elementary Set Theory 179
that they came from the same bag bought at the grocery store. Or they
were picked from the same tree. If we focus on the present, we can ob-
serve that they are both on the table. If we focus on their future, we can
observe that they are going to be eaten as part of a salad or part of an
apple pie. In terms of full meaning, we can have several “collections”—the
collection of apples from the same bag, or the collection of apples on the
table, or the collection of apples that will make up the same pie. If, on the
other hand, we strip away the extra meaning, we have one “set” of two
apples. e “set,” in the technical sense, depends only on what things are
its members, not on any extra knowledge about the members and why
they are considered as part of a single collection.
e concept of a set also depends on our knowledge of what it means
to be “the same” element. For example, we have to be able to identify an
apple as the “same” apple, even though it ripens over time. As we indi-
cated in chapter12, the concept of “being the same element” already uses
the idea of unity in diversity. e unity is the unity of the “same” apple.
e diversity—or at least one kind of diversity—is visible in the ripening
process over time. In this use of unity and diversity, we already depend
on our understanding of numbers. e unity is the unity of one thing, the
diversity is the diversity of more than one phase of the thing. We also rely
on our pre-theoretical understanding of collections. We must understand
tacitly what it means to have two apples on the table, and mentally to
consider them as belonging together.
The Axiom of the Null Set
e axiom of the null set says that there exists a set with no members.
is set is conventionally designated ∅, and is also called the emptyset.
is axiom is not so intuitive. Is a “set” with no members really a set?
Or is it nothing? e conception of a null set is analogous to the concep-
tion of the number zero. Is the number zero a number? Or is it nothing?
In a way the decision is up to us—it depends on how expansive we want
to make our own conception of “set.” We can understand the concept of
the null set more intuitively if we think about the process of “subtracting
away” one member from a set that has more than one member to begin
180 Appendix E
with. Suppose we begin with a set with two members: {2, 3}. If we omit
3 as a member, we get a second set, the set whose only member is 2: {2}.
It seems reasonable to allow that we might get a third set by omitting 2
as well, in which case we the set {} with no members. (e symbol ∅ is
customarily used instead of the symbol {}, but this is merely a matter of
notation.)
We see an analog to this concept of a null set in the account of cre-
ation in Genesis 1. Genesis 1 describes the initial situation as one where
“the earth was without form and void (empty)” (v.2). e context indi-
cates that some things were present: the earth itself, the waters, and the
Spirit of God. But the earth was empty of plants and animals, the kind
of discrete furnishings that it would later enjoy. e language in Genesis
is ordinary language, not the technical language of mathematics. But it
implies that God has designed a world where the concept of a collection
of furnishings for the world is appropriate. And at an early point in time
this collection of furnishings was empty. God, in making us in his image,
gave us the capability of thinking in terms of a nullset.
The Axiom of Pairs
e axiom of pairs says that if we have two elements or sets a and b, there
is a set whose members are a and b: {a,b}.
is axiom seems to be so simple that one might wonder why it is
included at all. One of the reasons for having axioms is to make all the
assumptions explicit, and leave nothing that is being used as an extra
implicit assumption. e axiom of pairs means that if we already have
some sets a and b, we can build more. One of the consequences is that if
a is a set, {a, a} is a set. But {a, a} is the same as {a} (since it has only one
member, a). Is a the same as {a}? No. {a} has one member, namely a. If a
is a set, it may have many members or none at all (it may be the null set).
So in general a ≠{a}.
God gives us the ability to make distinctions. Among the distinctions
we may make is one where we distinguish two items a and b from all the
other possible items. We are presupposing our capacity to make distinc-
tions. We also presuppose that, aer making a distinction, we can have
Elementary Set Theory 181
a group of items that are “inside” and distinguished from all the rest of
the world. In addition, the capacity to group together two items, aer we
already have one, displays an instance of additivity. We are really presup-
posing the idea of addition, which goes back toGod.
The Axiom of Subsets
e axiom of subsets says that if we have a set A, there is a set B that
consists in all the members of A that have a specic additional property
(besides being inA).
For example, suppose that A is the set of odd numbers less than 10:
A = {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}. Let B consist in those members of A that are perfect
squares. 1 = 1 × 1, so 1 is a perfect square. 9 = 3 × 3, so 9 is a perfect
square. e other numbers 3, 5, and 7 are not perfect squares. So B =
{1,9}. e axiom of subsets says that if the set A exists, B also exists.
is axiom depends on our understanding of how to separate out
some but not all of the members of a set by specifying an additional prop-
erty. e additional property separates some elements from the rest. It
is a distinction. e idea of distinction, as we have seen, has its roots in
God (chapter12).
The Axiom of the Sum Set
Suppose we start with a set A. e axiom of the sum set says that we can
“sum up” all the elements that are members of all the members of A, and
make a single set that has all of them as its members.
is idea can be confusing. So let us consider an example. Let the set
A have as its members several other sets B, C, and D. at is, A = {B, C, D}.
e sum set of A is the set U consisting of all elements that are members
of B or C or D (including elements that are members of more than one
of these three). atis,
U = {x | x ∈ B or x ∈ C or x ∈ D}.
is sum set of A is denoted ∪A = U.So
∪A = U = {x | x ∈ B or x ∈ C or x ∈ D} = {x | for some y, x ∈ y ∈ A}
182 Appendix E
e symbol ∪ is also used in another, related way to indicate the
union, B ∪ C, of two sets B and C. e union is the set whose members
are the elements that are either in B or in C or in both. If B and C are both
sets, the axiom of pairs says that {B, C} is a set. en the axiom of the sum
set says that ∪{B, C} exists. ∪{B, C} is the same as B ∪C.
e axiom of the sum set says that we can collect together all the
members from a list of sets. We creatively form a new collection. is
creativity is an image of divine creativity. is axiom together with
other axioms allows us to form sets with more and more members. In
doing so, we use the idea of what is next. In particular, we can produce
a series of sets that together mimic the series of natural numbers. Let
us seehow.
Producing a Sequence of Sets
Corresponding to the number zero we will have the empty set ∅. e
empty set exists, according to the axiom of the null set. It has zero ele-
ments. We will start with the number zero rather than with the number
one, so that later on each number n will correspond to a set with exactly
n elements. e empty set, with 0 elements, corresponds to the num-
berzero.
Since the empty set exists, the axiom of pairs implies that the set {∅,
∅} exists. Since the element ∅ is identical to itself, the set {∅, ∅} is the
same as {∅}. It has one element in it, namely ∅. To this set will correspond
the number1.
Because ∅ and {∅} both exist, the axiom of pairs implies that the set
{∅, {∅}} exists. It is the set with two elements ∅ and {∅}. e two ele-
ments are not identical, since ∅ has no members and {∅} has one member
(namely ∅). It is obvious at this stage that we have to distinguish carefully
between a set and the elements that are its members. e set {∅, {∅}} will
correspond to the number2.
Since {∅} and {∅, {∅}} both exist, the axiom of pairs says that there
exists aset
{{∅}, {∅, {∅}}}.
Elementary Set Theory 183
Again using the axiom of pairs, there exists aset
{{∅}, {{∅}, {∅, {∅}}}}.
e axiom of the sum set, applied to {{∅}, {{∅}, {∅, {∅}}}}, implies the
existenceof
∪{{∅}, {{∅}, {∅, {∅}}}} = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}
is set has three members, ∅, {∅}, and {∅, {∅}}. It will correspond to
the number3.
is process has been laborious, but we have produced sets with 0,
1, 2, and 3 elements, respectively. We could continue, and produce sets
with even more elements. To see the point quickly, we can adopt the op-
tion, sometimes used in set theory, of actually using sets as the names of
numbers (or numbers as the names for some sets, which amounts to the
same thing). For the purposes of the theory, a number is identied with
the set. So, for example, the number 0 becomes an abbreviation for the
empty set ∅: 0 = ∅. e number 1 becomes an abbreviation for {∅}: 1 =
{∅} = {0}. e number 2 becomes an abbreviation for {∅, {∅}}: 2 = {∅,
{∅}} = {0, 1}. And the number 3 becomes an abbreviation for {∅, {∅}, {∅,
{∅}}}: 3 = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}} = {0, 1, 2}. is notation enables us easily to
see a pattern. We can continue the pattern: 4 = {0, 1, 2, 3}; 5 = {0, 1, 2, 3,
4}; 6 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We can see (by imitative transcendence) that the
same pattern enables us to produce a number as large as we want. We can
extend the sequence indenitely.
In general, if we use this convention for numbers, the successor of
the number n is n ∪ {n}. Once we have a successor relation, we can pro-
ceed to dene addition and multiplication as in appendix C. But as an
axiom we need also to include some form of the principle of mathemati-
cal induction.
The Axiom of Infinity
So far, we have been able to build sets with a nite number of elements.
To obtain resources for arithmetic, set theory needs an axiom of innity.
is axiom can take the form of saying that there exists a set that includes
184 Appendix E
as members all the sets 0, 1, 2, 3, …. e minimal set with this property
is the set of nonnegative integers, conventionally designated ℕ. (In the
context of set theory, it is also designated ω.)
2
Chapters 8 and 9 indicated how we rely on God for the idea of an
indenitely extended sequence. e innity of God is the ultimate foun-
dation for our ability to think of an indenitely extended sequence—an
innite sequence. e same observations apply here. Whether we think
directly in terms of numbers or we think in terms of sets that we will use
to represent numbers, the same resources are needed, and these resources
have their ultimate foundation inGod.
The Axiom of Power Set
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory includes other axioms, which come into
play primarily in producing larger sets that are useful in the theory of real
numbers and in advanced set theory. e rst such axiom is called the
axiom of power set. To understand it, we should rst dene the meaning
of subset. A subset of a set A is a set B all of whose members are members
of A. So, for example, {1, 3} is a subset of {1, 2,3}.
e axiom of power set says that, if we have a set A, there exists an-
other set, the power set of A, whose members are all the subsets of A. For
example, if A is {1, 2, 3}, the power set of A is the set of all subsets of A or
{∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. Conventionally, the power
set of A is denoted P(A). By repeatedly applying the axiom of power set,
one can produce very large sets quickly. e power set of the set {1, 2, 3}
with 3 members has 2
3
= 8 members. e power set of a set with 8 mem-
bers has 2
8
= 256 members. e power set of a set with 256 members has
2
256
members, which is approximately 10
77
, 1 followed by 77 zeros.
e idea of power set shows another use of human power for imita-
tive transcendence (see chapters 8 and 9). When we have a set A, we
stand back from it and imagine ourselves collecting elements together
into a new, more extended set consisting of all the subsets of A. We “rise
above” the set A in the process. We imitate God, whose view of all things
is comprehensive, and who rises above them in his innity.
2
e symbol ℕ is unicode U2115. ω, the last letter of the Greek alphabet, is unicode U03C9.
Elementary Set Theory 185
The Axiom of Replacement
e axiom of replacement says roughly that if we have a set A, and we
have a way of correlating each member x in A with a unique set B
x
, there
is a set whose members are all the sets B
x
. is axiom is called the axiom
of replacement because the basic idea is to “replace” each member x in
A with the correlated set B
x
. e result of the replacement is a newset.
Here is an example. Let A = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let the numbers 1, 2, 3, and
4 be correlated respectively to the sets {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and {1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. en a set exists that has the “replacements” instead of
the original members 1, 2, 3, and 4 as its members. e new set has as its
members {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}; that is, it is the
set {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8}}.
e axiom of replacement presupposes our ability to make these cor-
relations, and to envision a second, new set with the correlated items as
its members. e correspondence between the members of A and the
other sets can be viewed as a kind of symmetry, depending ultimately
on the original symmetry in God. We are thinking God’s thoughts aer
him, in a complexway.
When we use an example like this, it may not seem too impressive.
But when the axiom of replacement is used in connection with the other
axioms, it can lead to new sets that are larger than any set produced by
other means, because the sets correlated with the members of A can be
very large.
Let us consider one example. Begin with the set of nonnegative in-
tegers, designated ω. Using the axiom of power set, produce successive
power sets of ω: ω, P(ω), P(P(ω)), P(P(P(ω))), and so on. Is there a set
larger than all the sets in this list? Without the axiom of replacement, we
cannot guarantee that there will be a set of theform
{ω, P(ω), P(P(ω)), P(P(P(ω))), …}.
Now we simply correlate 0 with ω, 1 with P(ω), 2 with P(P(ω)), 3 with
P(P(P(ω))), and so on. Using this correlation and the fact that the set ω
(= {0, 1, 2, 3, …}) exists, the axiom of replacement allows us to conclude
that {ω, P(ω), P(P(ω)), P(P(P(ω))), …} exists. Designate this new set
186 Appendix E
as M. is new set has only as many members as there are nonnegative
integers. But the sum set ∪M is very large, including as it does all the
subsets of all the power sets in the sequence beginning with ω. Once we
have the large set ∪M, the axiom of power set allows us to conclude that
P(∪M), P(P(∪M)), P(P(P(∪M))), … all exist. Since we can correlate 0, 1,
2, 3, … with the sequence ∪M, P(∪M), P(P(∪M)), …, there is a new set
whose members are the entire sequence: {∪M, P(∪M), P(P(∪M)), …}.
We can observe in this process the repeated use of imitative tran-
scendence. At each step where we produce larger sets, we go beyond or
“transcend” the position at which we have already arrived.
The Axiom of Choice
e nal axiom we will discuss is called the axiom of choice. e axiom
of choice was not part of the original list of axioms proposed by Zermelo
and Fraenkel. It is subject to more debate, and some philosophers and
mathematicians have expressed uneasiness about it. e intuitionists
reject it.
e axiom of choice says roughly that, if we have a set A whose mem-
bers are nonempty sets, we can nd a way of picking one designated
element out of each set that is a member of A. is axiom may sound
trivial. If the member sets are nonempty, it means that each of them has
at least one member, and we just pick one. But if we are dealing with an
innite set A, such as the set of natural numbers, we can never complete
the process. e axiom of choice is not a logical consequence of the other
axioms. But it seems reasonable. Why? We are again using our capacity
for imitative transcendence. Even though we can never in practice com-
plete the process of picking an element from each set among an innite
number of sets, we can imagine it being done. We extrapolate to inn-
ity, as it were. Even though we are nite, we are imaginative imitators of
innity. We have an idea of innity. We do because we are made in God’s
image and we are imitatinghim.
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35/2 (1983): 65–71. http:// www .frame -poythress .org /science -as -allegory/.
Accessed June 18, 2014.
———. e Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presby-
terian & Reformed, 1995.
———. Symphonic eology: e Validity of Multiple Perspectives in eology.
Reprint. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2001.
———. “Tagmemic Analysis of Elementary Algebra.” Semiotica 17/2 (1976):
131–151.
Sayers, Dorothy. e Mind of the Maker. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1941.
Strauss, D. F. M. “e Concept of Number: Multiplicity and Succession be-
tween Cardinality and Ordinality,” South African Journal of Philosophy
25/1 (2006): 27–47, http:// www .freewebs .com /dfmstrauss /Ordinality
_and _Cardinality .pdf, accessed August 5, 2014.
———. “Frege’s Attack on ‘Abstraction’ and His Defense of the ‘Applicability’
of Arithmetic (as Part of Logic),” South African Journal of Philosophy 22/1
(2003): 63–80.
———. “Innity and Continuity: e Mutual Dependence and Distinctness
of Multiplicity and Wholeness,” paper presented at the Free University of
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5, 2014.
———. “What Is a Line?” Axiomathes 24/2 (2014): 181–205.
van Atten, Mark. “Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer.” e Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. http://
plato .stanford .edu /archives /sum2011 /entries /brouwer/. Accessed June
18, 2014.
Van Til, Cornelius. e Defense of the Faith. 2nd ed., rev. and abridged. Phila-
delphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1963.
Vollenhoven, Dirk H. eodoor. “Problemen en richtingen in de wijsbe-
geerte der wiskunde” [Problems and Directions in the Philosophy of
Mathematics]. Philosophia Reformata 1 (1936): 162–187.
———. De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van theïstisch standpunt [e Philoso-
phy of Mathematics from a eistic Standpoint]. Amsterdam: Van Soest,
1918.
Whitehead, Alfred North, and Bertrand Russell. Principia Mathematica. 2nd
ed. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927.
General Index
Adam: creation of, 24; creation of in the
image of God, 81; fall of 75; the
fathering of his son Seth “aer his
image,” 79, 81
addition, 73–75, 109, 181; the associa-
tive law for addition, 98, 118,
169–170; the commutative law for
addition, 98, 118, 170–171; deni-
tion of, 88, 168–169; harmony of,
99; origins of, 77, 80
algebra: abstract algebra, 142; elemen-
tary algebra, 142; as the study of
discrete structures, 143
Anderson, Stephen R., 19n6
animal calls and signals, 18–19n6
antireductionism, 52, 54, 172
arithmetic, 73; clock (or modular)
arithmetic, 83, 90
Association for Christians in the Math-
ematical Sciences, 149
atomism, 29
atoms, particles of (protons, neutrons,
and electrons), 37–38; quarks in
protons and neutrons, 37–38
axioms, 49, 104, 156, 158; possible
sets of axioms, 88–89. See also
Peano’s axioms; specically listed
axioms under Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory
begetting, 80, 81; the eternal begetting
of the Son, 80
Big Bang, 37, 38, 39–40
Bishop, Steve, 149
Bradley, W. James, 51n6
Brouwer, L. E. J., 156
Cantor, Georg, 131
Chase, Gene B., 111n1, 149
children: basic intuitions of about num-
bers through social interaction,
51; learning of mathematics by in
relationships, 73–75
contingency: with respect to God,
64–65; with respect to mathemat-
ics, 65–66
cosmonomic philosophy, 161n1,
163–167; answer of to the problem
of the one and the many, 164–165;
distinguishing of two aspects of
the created order, 164; etymol-
ogy of the term cosmonomic, 164;
muddied discussion of the law in,
166; view of numbers, 164
creation, 90; beauty in, 22; and the earth
as “without form and void,” 180;
and God’s making of distinctions,
102–103; and God’s word, 21;
involvement of all three persons of
God in, 24; and the spatial struc-
ture of the world, 135
Creator-creature distinction, 19n8, 57,
58, 66, 80, 163, 167
Descartes, René, 139
distinctions, 180–181, 181; God’s mak-
ing of, 102–103; in the idea of a
set, 103; in languages, 103
192 General Index
division, 109–112; and fractions,
112–114; and the interlocking
between the one and the many,
111; normative, situational, and
existential perspectives on, 110;
notation for, 110; symmetry of,
111–112; symmetry between divi-
sion and multiplication, 111
Einstein, Albert: formula relating mass
and energy (E = mc
2
), 22, 93–94;
general theory of relativity, 124n1,
138
Elements (Euclid), 135, 138
empiricism, 52, 54, 151, 152, 154–155;
anity to the situational perspec-
tive, 152–153; sense experience as
its starting point, 152, 154
empiricism, Christianized. See cosmo-
nomic philosophy
engendering. See numbers, number
sequences
ethics, Frame’s perspectives on
(existential, normative, and
situational), 43; each implying
the other two, 45–46; harmony
of, 43–44; relevance of for all of
life, 44
Euclid, 135, 137, 138
Fermat, Pierre de, last theorem of, 157
formalism, 151, 152, 153, 158–159; lan-
guage as its starting point, 152
fractions, 109; addition of, 114; and
division, 112–114; existential, nor-
mative, and situational perspec-
tives on, 113–114; representation
of in decimal notation, 123; rules
for, 114, 115
Fraenkel, Abraham, 178
Frame, John, 12n3, 26n16, 43; on the
biblical view of transcendence and
immanence, 17n4; Frame’s square,
58–62, 66–67, 70, 163
geometry, 135; analytic geometry,
139–140; Euclidean geometry,
137–138; existential, normative,
and situational perspectives on,
138–139; interlocking of the one
and the many in, 137–138, 138;
laws of geometry as laws concern-
ing space, 137–138; non-Euclidean
geometries, 138; origin of in
connection with measurements in
space, 135; as the study of continu-
ous structures, 143
God: as archetype, 31, 33, 68, 80, 111;
beauty of, 22, 23, 74; as Creator,
57, 80; as distinct, 102; as es-
sentially immaterial and invisible,
but known through manifesta-
tions, 16; eternity of, 15, 42, 74;
faithfulness of, 65; as Father, 23,
24, 31, 78, 79, 80; harmony and
consistency of, 43, 52, 91; imma-
nence of, 17, 58, 66; immutabil-
ity of, 16, 74; innity of, 57, 123,
129, 130, 184; knowing God, 57,
66–69, 129; knowledge of, 67–68;
numbers and distinctions in, 105;
omnipotence of, 42, 64, 69, 74;
omnipresence of, 15–16, 42, 74;
oneness of, 31, 67, 68, 89, 102; as
the only and ultimate Lord, 64,
66; as the original thinker, 85;
plan of, 65; providence of, 26–27;
rationality of, 64; rebellion against,
27; rectitude of, 22–23; revelation
of, 25; self-consistency of, 64, 68,
89; self-knowledge of, 67–68; self-
suciency of, 65; transcendence
of, 16, 58, 123, 129, 130; Trinitar-
ian character of (God as three
persons), 23–25, 31, 32, 33, 66, 67,
68, 70, 102; truthfulness of, 16, 42;
uniqueness of, 80; word of, 20–21,
31, 33, 42, 145. See also Creator-
creature distinction; Trinity, the
Gödel, Kurt, 155–156, 159
General Index 193
Goldbach’s conjecture, 156
gospel, the, 27–28
Greeks, on the logos (divine “word” or
“reason”), 20
harmony: between disciplines, 143;
between mathematics and physics,
40; between perspectives, 51–54;
between space and numbers, 140,
144; of ethics, 43–44; of God,
43, 52, 91, 143; of mathematical
truths, 91; in numbers, 120
Heraclitus, 29, 29n2
higher mathematics: and the dier-
ence between structures that are
discrete and structures that are
continuous, 143; new subdisci-
plines of, 142–143; normative,
situational, and existential per-
spectives on, 143–144; and reliance
on God, 143–144; reliance of on
the intrinsic harmony between
number and space, 144
Hilbert, David, 137
Holy Spirit, 23–24, 80; involvement
of in creation, 24; role of in the
fellowship between the Father and
the Son (associational aspect), 32
Howell, Russell W., 51n6
humans: being full human beings, 27; as
creatures, 57, 80; as nite, 57, 84,
124, 129, 141, 186; and the signi-
cance of being created in the image
of God (humans as imaginative
imitators of God’s attributes),
57–58, 84, 91, 113, 124, 129–130,
131, 141, 155, 186
idealism, 52, 54
idols/idolatry, 17–18, 26, 28
image of God, 22–23, 57–58
imaginary numbers, 126–128; norma-
tive, situational, and existential
perspectives on, 128
imaging, 77–78, 80, 81, 89
innity, 129; and the “nitists,” 130; and
human limits, 129–131. See also
set theory, innite sets
intuitionism, 151, 152, 156–158; an-
ity to the existential perspective,
153; denial of the law of excluded
middle, 156; human subjectivity
as its starting point, 152; on the
“ideal mathematician,” 158; intro-
duction of the idea of a construc-
tive proof, 157
irrational numbers, 121–122; decimal
representation of, 123; and the
illustration of mystery, 124–125;
lack of “immediacy” of relevance
to the world, 124; normative, situ-
ational, and existential perspec-
tives on, 125; and the Pythagorean
theorem, 122; rules or norms for,
125, 125n3
Jesus: eternal begetting of, 79–80, 89;
incarnation of, 21, 75, 79; involve-
ment of in creation, 24; as the Last
Adam, 75; as the original image of
God, 78–79; as the Word (logos),
20–21, 23, 24, 31, 31–32, 78
Jews, on the logos (divine “word” or
“reason”), 20
Jongsma, Calvin, 149
Kant, Immanuel, 46, 46n2
Kronecker, Leopold, 109, 113, 116
Kuyper, Abraham, 11n2
language, 18–19; as a perspective on
mathematics, 49–50
logic, 41, 49; as a perspective on
numbers and on mathematics as a
whole, 49
logical paradoxes, 154; Russell’s para-
dox, 154, 159
logicism, 151, 152, 155–156; anity to
the normative perspective, 152;
logic as its starting point, 152
194 General Index
materialism, 35, 35n1, 40, 52, 54; at-
tempt of to answer the one and
the many philosophical problem,
37–38
mathematical induction, 90–91, 168,
169–170, 171; the sum of odd
numbers, 173–175, 176–177; the
sum of squares, 175
mathematical laws: and association, 32;
beauty of, 22, 23; as both know-
able and incomprehensible, 19; as
divine, 20; as expressible in human
language, 18; as good, 21; as
norms, 45–46; as personal, 17–19;
as rational, 18; rectitude of, 21–22;
as specied by God’s speech, 42; as
Trinitarian, 23–25
mathematical propositions, 156; Gold-
bach’s conjecture, 156
mathematical truths, 46; as both tran-
scendent and immanent, 16–17;
consistency of, 21; divine attributes
of, 16; as essentially immaterial
and invisible, but known through
manifestations, 16; harmony of,
91; as immutable, 16; necessity of,
62–63, 85–86; as omnipotent, 17,
42; as omnipresent and eternal,
15–16, 42, 86; power of, 16–17;
as specied by God’s speech, 42;
truthfulness of, 42; as truths from
God, 74. See also mathematical
truth, perspectives on
mathematical truths, perspectives on:
experience in time, 46; space,
46–47
mathematics, 39; and abstraction,
142; cultural inuence of, 51; the
harmony between mathematics
and physics, 40; and the harmony
of the three realms, 42–43; mental
concepts concerning, 11n1; neces-
sity and contingency with respect
to, 65–66; normative, situational,
and existential perspectives on,
154; origin of, 40–41; in the physi-
cal sciences, 47; and social interac-
tion, 50–51; truths internal to,
46. See also higher mathematics;
mathematical induction; math-
ematical laws; mathematical truths
Milbank, John, 25n14
multiplication, 92, 109; as associa-
tive, 99; close relationship of to
addition, 93; as commutative, 99;
denition of, 88, 93, 171–172;
the multiplication of animals and
humans in Genesis 1, 94; and pro-
portions in the tabernacle and the
temple, 92–93; relationship of mul-
tiplication truths to the normative,
situational, and existential per-
spectives, 95; symmetry between
multiplication and division, 111; in
the world that God made, 93–94
naturalism, 35–36, 35n1, 52; the dif-
ference between naturalism and
limited science, 35–36
necessity: intuition about, 63–64; with
respect to God, 64–65; with re-
spect to mathematics, 65–66
negative numbers, 116, 118–120, 120;
normative, situational, and exis-
tential perspectives on, 119–120;
notation for, 120; and the number
line, 118–119
neo-logicism, 156n5
Newton’s laws: of motion, 63; the sec-
ond law of motion (F = ma), 22, 93
Nickel, James, 99, 149
nomen (Latin: “name”), 30
nominalism, 160; medieval nominal-
ism, 30–31
numbers: complex numbers, 127;
distinct properties of each number,
144; distinctiveness of each kind of
number, 144; existential, norma-
tive, and situational perspectives
on, 45–46; harmony in, 120; the
General Index 195
harmony between numbers and
space, 140, 144; natural numbers,
17, 33, 84, 85; number sequences,
82–83, 85, 90, 130; prime numbers,
156n7; properties of, 16–17, 88,
88n2; rational numbers, 121–122,
123; real numbers, 127, 140–141;
set theory as a foundation for,
104–105; triangular numbers,
144; whole numbers, 109. See also
imaginary numbers; irrational
numbers; negative numbers; zero
the one and the many: cosmonomic
philosophy’s answer to, 164–165;
in Euclid’s geometry, 137–138, 138;
interlocking of in division, 111;
interlocking of in subtraction, 117;
materialism’s attempt to answer
the philosophical problem, 37–38;
the philosophical problem of,
29–30, 29n1, 36; reliance on in the
discernment of common patterns,
142; science’s inability to answer
the philosophical problem, 36
Parmenides, 29, 29n2
Peano, Giuseppe, 87
Peano’s axioms, 87–91, 87n1, 168, 172;
foundations for, 89–91; succession
as fundamental to, 87
Philo, on the logos (divine “word” or
“reason”), 20
philosophical naturalism, 160
physical sciences, mathematics in, 47
physics, 143; the harmony between
physics and mathematics, 40;
laws of, 38–39; and “the eory of
Everything,” 38
Plato, 69, 153
Platonism, 30, 151, 152, 153–154; an-
ity to the normative perspective,
152; and the “demiurge,” 154; an
ideal realm as its starting point,
152; and logical paradoxes, 154
Platonism, Christianized, 161–163,
161n1; conception of the nature of
ideas that it postulates in the mind
of God, 163; failure of to deal with
the problem of the one and the
many, 162–163
Plotinus, 29
Poythress, Vern S., 149; on the attempt
to isolate logical truth from the
world, 54n8; on commitments with
which to study the Bible, 12n3; on
the context for antireductionism,
144n2; critique of Kant’s approach
to time, 46n2; on the divine
character of God’s word, 21n11;
on God’s involvement in knowl-
edge of an ordinary sort, 85n2; on
just punishment, 23n12; on the
language-like character of scientic
law and mathematics, 19n7; on
materialism, 40n3; on mathemati-
cal induction, 91n3; on necessity,
67n2; on philosophy, 150; on prob-
ability, 150; on the relationship of
mathematical truth to cosmonomic
philosophy, 17n4; on science, 150;
on the tabernacle and implications
for mathematics, 75n1; on truth,
15n2; on worldviews, 150
predicates, 49
predicativism, 151, 152, 153, 159; whole
numbers as its starting point, 152
Principia Mathematica (Whitehead and
Russell), 155
punishment, just, 23
Pythagorean theorem, 122
quantum mechanics, 128; the square
root of 2 and the principle of
superposition in, 124n2
Quine, William van Orman, 160
realism, medieval, 30
re-creation, 75
reductionism, 52, 151
196 General Index
ruach (Hebrew: “breath,” “winds,”
“Spirit”), 24
Russell, Bertrand, 49, 155
Russell’s paradox, 154, 159
Saint Augustine, 161n1
Sayers, Dorothy, 24–25
science, 35–36; and the assumption that
the chosen focus for the practice of
science is the only legitimate focus,
36; the dierence between limited
science and naturalism, 35–36;
as a discipline, 36; as focused, 36;
inability of to answer the problem
of the one and the many, 36; as
personal, 17–19; the rationality
of scientic laws, 18; the refor-
mulation and transformation of
scientic laws, 19n7
set theory: denition of a set, 47, 100;
denition of a subset, 184; founda-
tions for sets in God, 101–103; in-
nite sets, 129, 130–131; members
or elements of a set, 47, 100; nor-
mative, situational, and existential
perspectives on sets, 103–104; and
properties of members or elements
of a set, 101; set notation, 100–101,
100n1, 182, 184n2; set theory as a
foundation for numbers, 104–105;
set union, 48; a set’s utilization
of distinctions, 103. See also
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
sets, as a perspective, 47–50
space, 46–47, 135–137; existential, nor-
mative, and situational perspec-
tives on, 138–139; the harmony
between space and numbers, 140,
144
spiritual warfare, 28
Stoics, on the logos (divine “word” or
“reason”), 20
structuralism, 160
structures: continuous structures, 143;
discrete structures, 143
subtraction: interlocking of the one
and the many in, 117; ledgers,
budgets, and debts as illustrations
of the idea of counting negatively,
116–117; normative, situational,
and existential perspectives on, 117
succession. See numbers, number
sequences
symbols, mathematical, 49
symmetries: in arithmetic, 98–99;
bilateral symmetry, 96; close rela-
tion of to beauty, 98; cylindrical
symmetry, 97; denition of sym-
metry, 96; expression of rectitude
in, 23; mirror symmetry, 96–97;
the origin of symmetry in God,
98; radial symmetry, 96; sixfold
symmetry, 97
tabernacle, the, of Moses, 75–77; the
ark, 76, 77; the bread on the table,
76; the cherubim on the ark, 76,
77; the courtyard, 81; as a display
of simple mathematical relation-
ships, 76, 77–78; the Holy Place,
77, 80, 81, 92; as an image of the
archetype, 78; as an image of God’s
dwelling in heaven, 77–78, 79, 136;
the lampstand, 76; the Most Holy
Place, 77, 80, 81, 92; multiple pat-
terns in, 92–93; proportions in, 92;
as a reection of God’s presence in
heaven, 76; spatial characteristics
of, 135–136; the Ten Command-
ments, 77
temple, the, of Solomon, 75–77; as a
display of simple mathematical re-
lationships, 76; as an image of the
archetype, 78, 137; multiple pat-
terns in, 92–93; proportions in, 92;
as a reection of God’s presence in
heaven, 76, 137; as a symbol of the
Holy Spirit dwelling in us, 136
theistic proofs, 27
time, 46, 46n2
General Index 197
topology, as the study of continuous
structures, 143
Trinity, the, 23–25; as the archetype
of the principles of classication,
instantiation, and association, 102;
as the archetype for symmetry, 98;
coinherence of the three persons
in, 78, 136; origins in, 78–80; unity
and diversity in, 31–32. See also
God, as Father; Holy Spirit; Jesus,
as the Word (logos)
unity and diversity. See the one and the
many
universe, the, 137
Van Til, Cornelius, 26, 27n17; on rebels’
dependence on God, 26n16
Vollenhoven, D. H. ., 149–150
Whitehead, Alfred North, 49, 155
Wiles, Andrew, 157
witness, principles for, 27–28
world, the: diversity in, 31; numerical
character of, 32–34; quantitative
and spatial aspects of, 93; richness
of, 52
Zermelo, Ernst, 178
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, 178; the
axiom of choice, 186; the axiom
of extension, 178–179; the axiom
of innity, 183–184; the axiom of
the null set, 179–180; the axiom of
pairs, 180–181; the axiom of power
set, 184; the axiom of replacement,
185–186; the axiom of subsets,
181; the axiom of the sum set,
181–182; producing a sequence of
sets, 182
zero, 120, 179, 182; normative, existen-
tial, and situational perspectives
on, 120
Scripture Index
GENESIS
1 19n8, 57, 75, 94,
103, 135, 180
1:2 24, 180
1:3 20, 21, 24
1:4–5 102
1:6–8 102, 135
1:9–10 102, 135
1:14 103
1:22 94
1:26 79
1:26–27 57
1:28 94
2:7 24
5:3 79, 81
5:6 81
5:9 81
9:6 23
EXODUS
20:3 22
20:8–11 22–23
25–40 75
25:8 76
25:9 76
25:16 77
NUMBERS
23:19 64
DEUTERONOMY
4:6–8 81
18:15–22 12
1 KINGS
5–8 75
8:27 76
8:30 76
JOB
32:8 58
PSALMS
19:1–2 25–26
33:6 20, 23, 24
33:9 20
94:10 58
104:14 27
104:30 24
115:3 64
147:16 27
ISAIAH
6:9–10 19
9:6–7 12
11:1–5 12
46:10 85
53:1–12 12
JEREMIAH
23:24 76, 135
EZEKIEL
37:5, 10 24
37:9 24
37:14 24
200 Scripture Index
OBADIAH
15 23
MICAH
5:2 12
MATTHEW
5:17–18 12
19:4–5 12
LUKE
1:35 79
JOHN
1:1 20–21, 23, 78, 136
1:1–3 24
1:14 21, 75, 136
2:21 75, 136
3:34–35 32
10:35 12
14:16–17, 23 136
14:17 78
14:23 78
17:5, 24 136
17:21 78, 136
17:23 136
ACTS
13:32–33 79
ROMANS
1:18 27
1:18–21 23
1:18–23 160
1:19–20 25, 34
1:19–21 57
1:21–23 26
1:22 27
12:1–2 145
1 CORINTHIANS
2:1–5 28
6:19 136
10:20 28
10:31 11
15:44–49 75
15:45 75
2 CORINTHIANS
4:4 78
10:3–5 28
EPHESIANS
1:4 65
1:11 65
4:17–24 28
COLOSSIANS
1:15 79
2:9 78
2 THESSALONIANS
2:9–12 28
2 TIMOTHY
2:13 64
2:25–26 28
TITUS
1:2 64
HEBREWS
1:3 20, 79
REVELATION
12:9 28
21:1 75
21:22 75–76
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